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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2026

Toplines

Russian forces conducted another devastating large-scale drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, heavily targeting Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 70 missiles - including six Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, 34 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles, and 30 Iskander-K/Kh-101 cruise missiles.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 611 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol loitering munitions; and Parodiya decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Zirkons, 15 Iskander-Ms/S-400s, 30 Iskander-Ks/Kh-101s, and 582 drones; that 20 ballistic missiles and 27 drones struck 42 locations; and that debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes injured at least 53 people and killed at least 11 across Ukraine, including at least 35 injured and five killed in Kyiv City alone.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and education infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities and that the strikes left 140,000 residents in Kyiv City without power.[3] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders who were responding to the initial Russian strike against Kharkiv City, killing five first responders.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[5] The June 14-15 strike series is the second strike in June 2026 with 70 or more missiles.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin is employing massive strike packages against Kyiv City in an effort to break Ukraine-s will to fight as well as to disguise his weakness, particularly his inability to secure Russian territory, including Russia-s capital, from Ukraine-s deep strikes.[7]

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to maximize damages.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia-s overnight strike package differed from other recent massive missile strikes in that Russian forces did not use Kalibr cruise missiles and instead used Iskander-K cruise missiles.[8] Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces, including F-16 fighter jets, air defense systems, and mobile fire groups, downed all of the Russian cruise missiles on June 14 to 15. Ihnat stated that drones and missiles struck from different directions such that both direct hits and falling debris from intercepted air targets caused destruction. Ihnat stated that Russian forces also flew the drones at lower altitudes and used fast jet-powered drones, making them harder to intercept.

Russian strikes damaged significant cultural sites in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (a historic monastery) and the Dovzhenko Film Studio in Kyiv City; the Dnipro House of Organ and Chamber Music in Dnipro City; and the Kharkiv Art Museum in Kharkiv City.[9] The United Nations (UN) Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) condemned the strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and related monastic buildings, including the Saint-Sophia Cathedral.[10]

The Russian information space is trying to deflect blame for the June 14 to 15 strikes by either blaming Ukraine for the damage or justifying the strikes as militarily necessary.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that -confirmed reports- indicate that a Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missile struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.[11] Ihnat noted that missile debris on the ground after the strike could have been from a Ukrainian air defense missile that likely shot down a Zirkon ballistic missile, but refuted the MoD-s claim, stating that Ukrainian investigations have already established that a Russian Geran-2 drone struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.[12] Ihnat reported that Russian sources are exploiting the presence of Patriot missile fragments to claim that Ukraine-s own missiles damaged cultural sites. Ukraine-s Center for Countering Disinformation similarly reported that Russia launched a large-scale disinformation campaign trying to justify massive strikes against Kyiv City cultural sites by claiming that the cultural sites are military targets or that Ukrainian forces are to blame for the damage.[13] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the West fabricated claims that Russia struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and reiterated the Russian MoD-s claim that a Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missile struck the site.[14] Other Russian

officials also claimed that Ukraine staged the strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and that Ukraine is only accusing Russia of the strike to provoke a response.[15]

Russia appears to be perpetuating sophisticated information operations that use artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in Kostyantynivka.

Footage published on June 15 shows Russian forces holding Russian flags on the western outskirts of Kostyantynivka, in southwestern Kostyantynivka, and in Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 15 that Russian forces seized Dovha Balka.[17] ISW has reason to believe that the Russian flag-raising videos may be AI-generated, which would be consistent with previous Russian information operations that use AI footage to claim battlefield advances.[18]

Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Alexander Bakulin assessed on June 15 that Russia is conducting information operations about the situation in Kostyantynivka.[19] Bakulin reported that Russian commanders have already reported up the chain of command that Russian forces have seized Kostyantynivka and are now attacking to make these reports reality. Bakulin noted that the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) recently published a high-quality video showing Russian servicemembers with Russian flags, whom Bakulin reported Ukrainian forces struck soon after. ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD, sources associated with the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and Russian state media have been engaged in informational efforts over the past few days that aim to aggrandize alleged Russian successes in Kostyantynivka.[20]

Ukrainian officials continue to report that only about 100 to 150 Russian servicemembers have infiltrated into Kostyantynivka, however.

Bakulin stated that there are an estimated 93 to 153 Russian infiltrators within Kostyantynivka and that estimates of 250 to 300 Russian soldiers are somewhat exaggerated.[21] Bakulin noted that Russian forces practiced their use of infiltration tactics in the seizure of Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka are taking stronger counteractions than they did in Pokrovsk. Bakulin added that a very large number of Russian units are operating in the Kostyantynivka direction and that Ukrainian logistics in the area are no worse than in other sectors of the frontline. Ukrainian servicemembers told independent Ukrainian online media outlet Hromadske in an article published on June 12 that there are between 100 and 250 Russian servicemembers operating in Kostyantynivka's center.[22]

Ukraine's tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD is falsely framing the potential future seizure of Kostyantynivka as a harbinger of the immediate seizure of the entire Fortress Belt and the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

The Russian MoD claimed on June 14 and 15 that Ukraine is preparing for the imminent loss of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Kramatorsk and the subsequent loss of the entire Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, given the ongoing rapid Russian advances in Kostyantynivka.[23] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin and the commander of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) similarly claimed on June 14 and 15 that Russia's seizure of the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration depends on the seizure of Kostyantynivka.[24] Russian officials and sources have repeatedly claimed that the seizure of various settlements and towns in Donetsk Oblast, such as Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Siversk, opens the way to the Russian seizure of the whole region and will lead to the inevitable fall of the heavily fortified Fortress Belt.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026, but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large.[26] Russian forces would need to continue fighting through the rest of the Fortress Belt's fortified cities and their environs, and Russian forces have not optimized their force for maneuver or urban warfare. Russia's ongoing cognitive warfare efforts about Kostyantynivka aim to further the Kremlin's false narratives that Ukrainian defenses are on the verge of collapse and that the Russian seizure of Donetsk Oblast is a matter of time in order to push the West and Ukraine to quickly cede to Russia's demands.[27] It is unclear when - if at all - Russian forces would be able to seize Donetsk Oblast, given Russia's slowing rate of advance, however.[28]

Ukraine continues to express willingness for a leader-level meeting with Russia while the Kremlin demonstrates its continued pursuit of maximalist war aims and a total intransigence to negotiate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 15 that he offered to meet Russian President

Vladimir Putin at the G7 summit in France to negotiate an end to Russia's war in Ukraine, but that Russia demonstrated it was not ready to speak.[29] Zelensky stated that the United States and Europe agreed to invite Putin to the summit. Reuters reported that a Ukrainian official stated that Ukraine delivered the invitation directly to its Russian counterparts but did not receive a clear response. Zelensky's latest invitation to meet Putin follows repeated Ukrainian offers for direct negotiations in recent weeks, including Zelensky's open letter to Putin on June 4, in which he offered a leader-level meeting that Putin subsequently rejected.[30] Russia, in contrast, remains committed to an end to the war only if Ukraine capitulates to its maximalist military and political demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 15 that Russia remains committed to the agreement the United States and Russia allegedly made during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[31] Lavrov claimed that the European Union and the United Kingdom are sabotaging these alleged Alaska agreements.[32] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of public agreements from the Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as a willing negotiator. [33]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted another devastating large-scale drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, heavily targeting Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to maximize damages.

Russian strikes damaged significant cultural sites in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.

The Russian information space is trying to deflect blame for the June 14 to 15 strikes by either blaming Ukraine for the damage or justifying the strikes as militarily necessary.

Russia appears to be perpetuating sophisticated information operations that use artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in Kostyantynivka.

Ukrainian officials continue to report that only about 100 to 150 Russian servicemembers have infiltrated into Kostyantynivka, however.

Ukraine's tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD is falsely framing the potential future seizure of Kostyantynivka as a harbinger of the immediate seizure of the entire Fortress Belt and the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

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Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure continues to cause fuel shortages within Russia.

Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on June 15 that the Russian government has extended its decision to allow some refineries to release substandard gasoline and diesel onto the domestic market due to ongoing gasoline shortages.[34] Kommersant reported that Russian authorities initially introduced this measure in Fall 2025 and that it was to remain in effect until May 1, 2026, but that authorities extended the deadline due to continued shortages. One source told Kommersant that easing fuel quality requirements does not fully address the shortage problem, however. Ukrainian strikes in September and October 2025 against Russian oil refineries caused gasoline shortages across Russia.[35] Ukraine's intensified strike campaign against Russian refineries and Russian logistics since March 2026 has renewed shortages across occupied Ukraine and extended to some Russian regions.[36] Further Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely cause shortages to spread across Russia and exacerbate existing shortages. Russia's continued inability to defend its rear against Ukrainian long-range strikes is leading to annual event cancellations in particularly vulnerable areas.

St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported on June 15, citing sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that the Russian MoD does not plan to hold its annual naval parade, which Russia has held in St. Petersburg on Navy Day (which is celebrated on the last Sunday in July) since 2017,

likely due to Ukrainian strikes.[37] Ukraine has struck Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in St. Petersburg numerous times in recent months, including two sets of strikes that coincided with the first and last day of Russia's St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 3 and June 6.[38] Ukrainian long-range strikes over 1,000 kilometers from the international border continue to demonstrate how Ukraine is bringing Russia's war closer to home, disrupting events that the Kremlin has historically capitalized on for reputational and narrative purposes.[39]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted strikes against Moscow Oblast on the night of June 14 to 15.

Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 15 that footage shows a fire in Reutov, Moscow Oblast, following a likely Ukrainian strike.[40] Astra reported that the fire broke out roughly 600 meters from the JSC rocket design bureau Mashinostroyeniya, which develops the Zirkon hypersonic missile and the Avangard strategic missile system, and the Aerospace Faculty of Bauman Moscow State Technical University.[41] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on June 15 that Russian air defenses downed four drones near Moscow City.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 15 that Russian forces also advanced to the outskirts of Velyka Rybytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in rear areas

. The Ukrainian Kursk Air Force operating under the command of the 8th Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on June 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone operator training center near Bolshiye Ugony, Kursk Oblast, (roughly 45 kilometers from the international border).[45]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

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Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 15 that Russian forces advanced to Mala Vovcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[47]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 15.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 - Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the area.[48]

Geolocated footage published on June 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember on the eastern outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (south of Kupyansk City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49]

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Borova direction on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[50]

Russian forces are likely using high-quality artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raising events in the Kupyansk and Borova directions as part of the Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances and demoralize the Ukrainian population.

A series of likely AI generated

footage published on June 14 purportedly shows elements of Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) raising flags in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (south of Kupyansk); elements of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division) raising flags in Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk); and other elements of the 1st GTA raising flags and walking around in Kivsharivka (south of Kupyansk), Shyikivka (east of Borova), Kruhlyakivka (north of Borova), and Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[51] Russian milbloggers subsequently falsely

framed this footage as evidence of Russian advances in the area.[52] Russia has increased the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort over the last several months to make claims of advance in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions.[53] These videos are part of the Kremlin-s systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims of gains and infiltration missions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia-s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 15 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian position in southeastern Lyman after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[56]

See topline for more information on the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[57]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember east of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[58]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Oleksandrivka on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[60]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that small Ukrainian groups are operating in several areas in the Oleksandrivka direction, including near Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[61] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pidubne (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka).[62]

Russian-occupied areas of eastern and southern Ukraine continue to suffer from fuel shortages due to Ukraine-s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns.

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 14 that there is little to no gasoline in all of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[63] The milblogger claimed that gas stations in the region that ·sporadically· sell gasoline quickly run out. The milblogger also claimed that authorities are only allowing sales at gas stations along the occupied Donetsk-Rostov Oblast border based on quotas. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in unspecified frontline areas are also without fuel and that one unit is trying to buy fuel at its own expense but struggled to find a gas station in Rostov Oblast that would give them enough fuel.

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky acknowledged on June 15 that occupied Zaporizhia Oblast is experiencing difficulties delivering fuel to gas stations.[64] Balitsky claimed that authorities have found alternative routes and new delivery logistics and noted that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations is working to fully supply fuel to all socially significant facilities, such as hospitals and utility services. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on June 15 that occupation authorities have temporarily suspended or reduced some bus routes due to the shortage of motor fuel in occupied Kherson Oblast.[65] Geolocated footage published on June 15 shows that aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian truck along the H-20 Donetsk City-Mariupol highway within Mariupol.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Hulyaipole on June 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[67]

Russian forces are reportedly planning to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction, likely to try to seize settlements that Russian commanders have already claimed as seized to higher ups.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 15 that Russian forces received orders to seize Vozdvizhivka, Kosivtsevo, Ternuvate, Verkhnya Tera

(all northwest of Hulyaipole), and other unspecified settlements by mid-June 2026.[68] Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command's maps show that Russian forces have already seized these settlements. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are rotating fresh units to the area after having restored their combat effectiveness and that Russian forces plan to intensify assaults in the area. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces recently received a large number of motorcycles in order to move more actively across the battlefield during the planned intensified assaults. Voloshyn added that Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics are not allowing Russian forces to fully deploy forces, conduct a high tempo of assaults, or provide sufficient fire support for assault groups.

Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[69]

Russian forces continue to strike ambulances in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Kushuhum Hromada Head Volodymyr Sosunovsky reported on June 15 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck an on-duty emergency medical vehicle in Kushuhum (just south of Zaporizhzhia City), injuring a nurse.[70] Geolocated footage published on June 15 shows that aftermath of the strike on the ambulance.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 15 showed a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian electronic warfare (EW) system designed to impede Ukraine's Starlink communications in occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast (along the M-14 Mariupol-Melitopol highway and about 90 kilometers from the frontline).[72]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskiy Bridge on June 14 and 15 but did not advance.[73]

Ukrainian forces continue to interdict bridges that support Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on June 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted a massive drone strike against the Chonhar Bridge, completely blocking traffic through the Dzhankoi checkpoint.[74] Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck and blocked traffic on the bridge connecting occupied Henichesk with the Arabat Spit. Ukrainian forces have struck several bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea in recent weeks, disrupting Russia's ability to safely use supply routes from southwestern Russia to Crimea.[75] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs will likely have cascading battlefield effects and may complicate Russian preparations for offensive operations.

Crimean occupation authorities are independently working to strengthen Crimea's air defenses following the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) failure to adequately respond to Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Crimea service Krym Realii reported on June 15, citing an activist with sources within the Crimean occupation government, that Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov is personally working to strengthen the BARS-Crimea detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) particularly focusing on increasing the number of mobile air defense groups.[76] The source reported that top occupation officials understand that the situation is deteriorating daily and are disappointed in the Russian MoD's inadequate response to intensified Ukrainian strikes. The source noted that there are reports Chairman of the Crimean state occupation council Vladimir Konstantinov spoke with Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev about the growing security issues in Crimea, but that Medvedev responded by citing Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent claim that the war in Ukraine will soon come to an end. The source stated that Aksyonov has already given orders to prepare alternate premises for the occupation government if Ukrainian strikes damage the Council of Ministers and parliament buildings in occupied Simferopol.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Russian and Belarusian officials held high-profile meetings in Minsk, Belarus on June 15.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to

discuss Russian-Belarusian foreign policy coordination and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[77] Lukashenko claimed he will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future.[78]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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