

Previous

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2026

Toplines

The Group of Seven (G7) reaffirmed its unified support for Ukraine and its interest in re-engaging in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine.

The G7 leaders issued a joint statement on June 17 outlining their agreement to increase deliveries of air defense systems and interceptors and long-range capabilities to Ukraine.[1] The G7 members stated that they will strengthen sanctions against Russia, including on Russia's oil and gas sector. A source close to the G7 summit told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that the United States and Iran will sign on June 19 has allowed G7 leaders to re-focus on Ukraine.[2] The source added that the G7 leaders, including US President Donald Trump, acknowledged how much Ukraine has achieved since the last G7 summit in June 2025 and suggested that Trump is ready to participate in peace talks again as the situation in Ukraine has now changed. Two senior EU diplomats told Politico on June 16 that Trump is starting to form a deal in which he backs Europe on the war in Ukraine in exchange for European help demining the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Bloomberg also reported on June 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that European Council President Antonio Costa established contact with Russia as part of efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[4] Bloomberg stated that Costa's top adviser held two calls with an unspecified senior Russian official close to Putin in preparation for more substantive future talks. The Kremlin's apparent willingness to engage in peace talks with Europe comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's repeated invitations for a head-of-state-level meeting with Putin, suggesting that the Kremlin remains committed to its effort to cut Ukraine out of the negotiating process completely.[5]

The United States, Europe, and Ukraine are reportedly in talks to extend US licenses to produce US weapons abroad, but it is unclear where this production would take place

. The G7 joint statement outlined that the G7 is 'ready to consider' providing Ukraine with licenses to increase Ukraine's military production - possibly referring to requests for the United States to allow production of Patriot interceptors in either Ukraine or Europe.[6] It is unclear, however, if the G7 summit reached an agreement on the matter, and there are conflicting reports about where this production would take place. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz responded on June 17 to a question about German defense companies' possible involvement in licensed weapons production in Ukraine, stating that the participating states will separately discuss the 'broad licensing,' including for European manufacturers.[7] French newspaper

Le Parisien

reported on June 17 that a diplomatic source stated that the United States and European G7 states agreed to produce air defense systems and long-range missiles 'under licenses' in Ukraine.[8] An official of a G7 state told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the G7 leaders spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about extending licenses to allow Patriot interceptor production in Europe, however.[9] The official stated that the United States has committed to looking into the matter but has not made a final decision.[10] Expanding production of air defense missiles for Ukraine would significantly replenish Ukraine's stock of Patriot interceptors and help Ukraine repel Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure continues to cause gasoline shortages across the country, hindering Russia's crude oil production and pushing Russia to maximize crude oil exports.

Russian independent outlet The Bell reported on June 16 that 53 Russian regions and all five occupied regions of Ukraine are implementing gasoline sale restrictions for private vehicles and that gas stations in 11 Russian regions have not implemented any restrictions but are nonetheless experiencing shortages.[11] The Bell noted that 18 Russian regions and all of occupied Ukraine have restricted sales to 50 liters (13.2 gallons). Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is also impacting Russia's oil production and exports. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported on June 17 that Russian crude oil production in May 2026 dropped to 8.7 million barrels per day - a roughly five percent drop compared to May 2025 and 10 percent below the May 2026 target.[12] The IEA noted that

Russian crude oil exports increased to 5.2 million barrels per day in May 2026 · an increase of 490,000 barrels per day compared to May 2025. The IEA added that Ukrainian strikes are forcing Russia to prioritize oil product supply for the domestic market and to maximize crude oil exports. Bloomberg additionally reported on June 16 that Russia's average crude oil shipments between May 17 and June 14 reached 3.83 million barrels per day · the highest so far in 2026.[13] Bloomberg noted, however, that Russian shipments of crude oil from June 7 to June 14 decreased to 3.82 million barrels per day from 3.89 million between May 31 and June 7. Bloomberg cited data from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) showing that Russian oil output in May 2026 averaged 9.01 million barrels a day · 690,000 barrels below Russia's production target under the OPEC agreement. Bloomberg added that Russia has just above 120 million barrels of oil on vessels at sea ready to export · a roughly 25 percent increase from April 2026. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 17 that Russia's increased oil exports are partly due to decline in Russia's oil refining capacity.[14] The US sanctions waiver for Russian oil and petroleum products on vessels at sea is set to expire on June 17 and the United States did not extend the waiver, which will likely intensify Russia's challenges with exporting crude oil on vessels already at sea.[15] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of their strikes against Russian energy infrastructure deep in the Russian rear in 2026, which are imposing costs on Russian domestic fuel supplies, oil exports, and refining capacity.[16]

Russia appears to be capitalizing on an alleged Ukrainian strike to narratively align Belarus with its recent information operations that aim to justify devastating Russian strikes against Ukraine. Acting Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed on June 17 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a passenger bus in Bryansk Oblast that was transporting a children's Belarusian soccer team from Gomel, Belarus, to Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, killing a woman and injuring six, including four children.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff denied the Russian claims, stating that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any drone strikes against Bryansk Oblast during the time of the alleged strike.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian statements about the alleged strike are false and part of an information operation. Russian officials claimed Ukraine deliberately targeted civilians.[19] ISW is unable to independently verify Russian claims regarding the strike. Belarusian officials also condemned the alleged Ukrainian strike.[20] Belarusian rhetoric paralleled that of Russia with claims that Ukraine conducted the strike in order to provoke a harsh Belarusian response and escalate the war.[21] Russian and Belarusian claims about the alleged June 17 strike follow similar Russian claims in recent weeks that Russia's large-scale strike packages against Ukraine are justified responses to Ukraine's alleged strikes against civilians.[22]

Key Takeaways

The Group of Seven (G7) reaffirmed its unified support for Ukraine and its interest in re-engaging in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine.

The United States, Europe, and Ukraine are reportedly in talks to extend US licenses to produce US weapons abroad, but it is unclear where this production would take place.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure continues to cause gasoline shortages across the country, hindering Russia's crude oil production and pushing Russia to maximize crude oil exports.

Russia appears to be capitalizing on an alleged Ukrainian strike to narratively align Belarus with its recent information operations that aim to justify devastating Russian strikes against Ukraine. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces recently advanced.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign continues to force Russian authorities to restrict airspace across several Russian oblasts. Russian forces launched 119 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports on fuel shortages within Russia.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign continues to force Russian authorities to restrict airspace across several Russian oblasts.

Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia issued a restriction on June 17 banning light and ultra-light aircraft at altitudes from zero to 5,200 meters in the airspace above Moscow City, most of Moscow Oblast, and parts of Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Tver, Yaroslavl, and Vladimir oblasts starting on June 20.[23] Rosaviatsia stated that it established the restriction at the request of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian sources previously claimed that Russian authorities restricted civilian aircraft flights in the Moscow air zone between zero and 5,100 meters starting on June 1, 2026.[24] ISW continues to assess that Russia has largely failed to defend its rear against Ukrainian strikes and that growing airspace restrictions are part of the Kremlin's effort to mitigate the threat of Ukrainian drones.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central and southern Rzasne (southeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[26] The presence of Russian forces in Rzasne indicates that Russian forces likely infiltrated the fields east of the settlement.

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vovchanski Khutory and south of Pokalyane (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[28]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 17.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations on June 16 and 17 in the Kupyansk direction but did not advance.[29]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on June 16 and 17 in the Borova direction but did not advance.[30]

Oskil Hromada Military Administration Head Hennadiy Zahoruiko stated on June 17 that Russian forces are conducting Lancet loitering munition strikes against vehicles traveling along the O211437 Oskil-Izyum road (southwest of Borova).[31] Zahoruiko stated that Russian forces began striking the road instead of Oskil itself after Ukrainian authorities evacuated civilians from Oskil, and suggested that Russian forces changed their targeting to focus on areas with a greater civilian presence. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces intentionally target and terrorize civilians as a tool of war.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Lyman after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western and central Lyman and south of Lyman.[34]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be expanding its cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the Fortress Belt as collapsing, as Russian sources publish possibly artificial intelligence (AI) generated footage.

Footage published on June 17 purportedly shows Russian forces holding Russian flags in Lyman and Pyskunivka (east of Slovyansk), though ISW has reason to suspect that the imagery is AI-altered.[35]

The Russian MoD claimed on June 17 that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are advancing in northwestern

Lyman and seized 61 buildings in the city between June 16 and 17.[36] The Russian MoD further claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ukrainian forces' last remaining ground line of communication (GLOC) into Lyman. The Russian MoD does not usually post this level of tactical detail about alleged Russian successes in the Lyman direction, and the June 17 claims are likely part of Russia's ongoing informational effort to aggrandize tactical progress. The Russian MoD began making similar claims about Kostyantynivka on June 13, and the Russian MoD appears to be expanding this informational effort to the northern tip of the Fortress Belt.[37] Russia has increased the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort over the last several months to make claims of advances in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions, including previously publishing likely AI-generated battlefield footage on June 15 and 16.[38] These videos are part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims of gains and infiltration missions to falsely portray the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[39]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 17 that Russian servicemembers are surrendering more frequently as Russian forces intensify their efforts in the Lyman direction.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 16 and 17 but did not advance.[41]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka and roughly three kilometers from the frontline).[42]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues informational efforts inflating claims of the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka to present the Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka as imminent, contrary to all available evidence.

The Russian MoD published footage on June 17 purportedly showing Russian forces raising Russian flags in Kostyantynivka, though ISW has reason to suspect that the footage is AI-altered.[43] The Russian MoD claimed on June 17 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces seized 96 buildings in the city between June 16 and 17.[44] The Russian MoD began to publish hyper-tactical details of alleged Russian gains in the Kostyantynivka direction around June 13, likely as part of an ongoing information operation to aggrandize tactical progress.[45] Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Alexander Bakulin reiterated his June 15 statement that there are only between 93 to 153 Russian servicemembers currently operating within Kostyantynivka.[46] ISW continues to assess that the presence of Ukrainian forces in southern Kostyantynivka, combined with the small number of Russian personnel reported within the city indicates that Russian forces likely do not control many of the areas that they claim to have infiltrated.[47]

Russian forces continue to conduct first-person view (FPV) drone strikes intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians.

Donetsk Oblast National Police Main Directorate reported on June 17 that Russian forces used an FPV drone to strike and kill a Ukrainian civilian in Druzhkivka.[48] Russian forces regularly conduct 'human safari' strikes across the frontline - using tactical drones to 'hunt' civilians and civilian infrastructure.[49]

Russian forces have integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operational battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template and inflict civilian casualties as an intentional tool of war.[50]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[51]

The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Stepy (east of Dobropillya).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 16 and 17 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 16 and 17 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 16 and 17 but did not advance.[56]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Komar (east of Oleksandrivka and roughly five kilometers from the frontline) and Maliivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly four kilometers from the frontline).[57]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation control point in Velyka Novosilka (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).[58] Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking an ammunition depot of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Staromykhailivka (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline); a command post of a battalion of the 51st CAA in occupied Selydove (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline); and a temporary deployment point of the 41st CAA (CMD) near occupied Kurakhove (roughly 32 kilometers from the frontline).[59] Geolocated footage published on June 16 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian strike on a Russian truck along the T-05-07 road west of occupied Amvrosiivka (roughly 97 kilometers from the frontline).[60]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Hulyaipole.

Geolocated footage published on June 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northwest of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[61]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 16 and 17 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[62]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Plavni, Kamyanske, Stepove, and Shcherbakiv (all west of Orikhiv).[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Novoprokopivka (south of Orikhiv and roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[64]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Kamyanske (either roughly five or 50 kilometers from the frontline).[65] Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on June 17 that Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure caused power outages in several areas of occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[66]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 17. Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian vessels in the Black Sea.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the sanctioned Russian shadow fleet tanker

FINA A

, which was flying under the Equatorial Guinea flag, in the Black Sea.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the tanker transported Russian petroleum products and had a gross tonnage of 62,002 units.

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea, disrupting Russian logistics.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the road bridge over the North Crimean Canal along the M-17 Armyansk-Oleshky highway near occupied Stavky, Kherson Oblast (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) and a road bridge near occupied Voinka, Crimea (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[68] The Crimean Bridge Telegram channel claimed on June 16 that Russian occupation authorities temporarily closed traffic across the Crimean Bridge between Crimea and Krasnodar Krai.[69]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 16 to 17.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 119 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 97 drones, that 20 drones struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial,

commercial, educational, and residential infrastructure in Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts.[71] Ukraine's largest energy company, DTEK, reported on June 17 that Russian forces struck an energy facility in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, leaving over 19,400 consumers without power.[72] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[73]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

See topline text.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] <https://www.elysee dot fr/en/G7evian/2026/06/17/g7-leaders-statement-on-geopolitical-issues>

[2] <https://suspilne dot>

<media/1332740-ugoda-ssa-j-iranu-dozvolila-lideram-g7-zosereditisa-na-ukraini-dzerela/>

[3] <https://www.politico dot>

<eu/article/g7-donald-trump-volodymyr-zelenskyy-offers-ukraine-olive-branch-with-a-price-tag/>

[4]

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-17/eu-chief-reaches-out-to-moscow-to-set-up-back-channel-t>

[5]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/>

[6] <https://www.elysee dot fr/en/G7evian/2026/06/17/g7-leaders-statement-on-geopolitical-issues> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/>;

<https://suspilne dot>

<media/952275-20-patriot-ta-licenzia-na-virobnictvo-raket-do-nih-mogli-b-zaminiti-amerikanski-vijska-v-ukraini-zel>

<https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025>;

<https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025>;

<https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-elim>

<https://www.president.gov dot>

<ua/en/videos/mi-namagayemosya-priskoriti-robotu-u-yevropi-po-virobnictvu-8673> ; <https://english dot>

<nv.ua/nation/u-s-refused-licensing-aa-missile-production-to-europe-50584806.html>

[7] <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-merz-pro-litsenzii-na-vyrobnystvo-zbroi/33783015.html>

[8] <https://www.leparisien dot>

<fr/international/des-europeens-du-g7-et-les-etats-unis-vont-produire-sous-licence-en-ukraine-des-missiles-de-lon>

[9] <https://suspilne dot>

<media/1332870-ssa-ne-nadali-dozvil-na-virobnictvo-patriot-u-evropi-ale-rozglanut-ce-pitanna-predstavnik-g7/>

[10] <https://suspilne dot>

<media/1332870-ssa-ne-nadali-dozvil-na-virobnictvo-patriot-u-evropi-ale-rozglanut-ce-pitanna-predstavnik-g7/>;

[11] https://t.me/thebell_io/37906

[12]

<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukrainian-attacks-push-russian-oil-output-10-below-target-may-iea-say>

<https://www.iea dot org/reports/oil-market-report-june-2026>

[13]

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-16/russia-s-oil-exports-near-record-pace-as-ukraine-s-drones>

[14] <https://t.me/rybar/81128>

[15] <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935641/download?inline>

[16]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/> [17] https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/701 ; https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/702 ;

https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/704 ; <https://t.me/SolovievLive/373177>

[18] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40075>

[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/381058 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381059 ; https://mid.dot.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2119737/ ; <https://ria.dot.ru/20260617/zelenskiy-2099467147.html> ;

<https://t.me/RusEmbassyMinsk/9663> ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/84914

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/381060 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381077 ; https://mfa.dot.gov.by/press/news_mfa/b3304310904b7bff.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381086 ;

https://t.me/MID_Russia/84905

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/381060 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381077 ; <https://tass.dot.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/27785307/> ; https://mfa.dot.gov.by/press/news_mfa/b3304310904b7bff.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381086 ;

https://t.me/belta_telegramm/380932 ; <https://t.me/astrapress/115990> ;

<https://t.me/RusEmbassyMinsk/9663> ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/84914 ;

https://t.me/MID_Russia/84905 ; <https://t.me/BelarusMFA/913>

[22]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/>

[23] https://t.me/favt_ru/6510 ; <https://meduza.io/news/2026/06/17/nad-moskvoy-i-sosednimi-regionami-zapretili-polety-legkih-samoletov-i-grazhdanskih-dronov> ;

<https://t.me/sotaproject/114620> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/115994> ; <https://t.me/bbcrossian/96151> ;

[24]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/>

[25]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/>

[26] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2067228577318195613> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/reel/1757838805586430>

[27] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2066972649176150451> ; <https://t.me/br58ua/3004>

[28] <https://t.me/divgen/81630>

[29] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44268> ;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/34869> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/94661

[30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040>

[31] <https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1333128-rf-pocala-biti-lancetami-po-transportu-na-dorozi-z-izuma-na-oskil-zagorujko/>

[32]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intelligence>
[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12207; <https://www.facebook.com/reel/153564531152526>
[34] <https://t.me/divgen/81667>
[35] <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2066917075218743326> ;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12205; <https://t.me/Osintpen/2990>; <https://t.me/shock3OA/7578> ;
https://t.me/operationall_space/12053; <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2067137722314354972>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12211 ; <https://t.me/Osintpen/2992>
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/64619
[37] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/> ;
[38] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/> ;
[39] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/> ;
[40] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs>; <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1332804-bilse-vipadkiv-zdaci-u-polon-ta-aktivizacia-sturmiv-vijskovij-66-ombr-pro-situaciju-navkol>
[41] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34869>
[42] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/64621 ; <https://t.me/Osintpen/2993>
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/64618
[45] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/> ;
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM ; <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1332624-mi-vze-stoimo-na-okolicah-prakticno-kostantinivki-za-viklucennam-deakih-napramkiv-tar>
[47] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/> ;
[48] <https://dn dot npu.gov.ua/news/chetvero-zahyblykh-i-17-poranenykh-politsiia-donechchyny-zadokumentovala-naslidky-rosiisky> ; <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1332952-vid-udaru-rosijskogo-bezpilotnika-v-druzkivci-vranci-zaginula-ludina/>
[49] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/>
[50] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/>
;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-int>
[51] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72934>
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/64620 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64623
[53] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72934>
[54] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34869>
[55] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074>
[56] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/94661
[57] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[58] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[59] <https://x.com/moklasen/status/2067204519734218919>; <https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1553>;
<https://x.com/moklasen/status/2067205227069976752>; https://militaryni_dot_com/en/news/ukraine-behemoth-drone-hundreds-km-range/ ; https://armyinform_dot_com.ua/2026/06/17/147-ma-artylerijska-brygada-dshv-pershoyu-sered-novostvorenyh-artbrygad-zastosuvala-mi
[60] <https://x.com/blinzka/status/2066995363391717518>;
<https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2066865547392716808>
[61] <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2066982727212294449> ;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2066982925141422092> ; <https://t.me/assaultregiment33/3064>
[62] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40038> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40040> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40074> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34869> ; <https://t.me/rybar/81138>
[63] <https://t.me/rybar/81138>
[64] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[66] <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8402>
[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[68] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40069>
[69] https://t.me/most_official/24917 ; https://suspilne_dot_media/crimea/1332784-vibuhi-v-armansku-dzankoi-ta-simferopoli-minoboroni-rf-zaavilo-pro-ataku-droniv-na-krim
[70] <https://t.me/kpszsu/65409>
[71] <https://t.me/kpszsu/65409>; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/23474; https://suspilne_dot_media/kharkiv/1332822-nicnij-vibuh-so-culi-u-harkovi-rf-vdarila-raketou-po-pidpriemstvu-u-dergacah/ ;
https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62539; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62538 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62564 ;
https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42070 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42071 ;
https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42104; <https://t.me/idelrealii/45378>; <https://t.me/astrapress/115958>;
https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42074; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62542; <https://t.me/astrapress/115919>;
[72] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4368
[73] <https://t.me/energyofukraine/7240>
Previous