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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2026

Toplines

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Russia on the night of June 17 to 18, heavily targeting Moscow City and striking the Moscow Oil Refinery for the second time in two days.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery (also known as the Kapotnya Refinery) near Moscow City and started a fire at five locations in the refinery, including at the combined oil refining unit, a secondary processing unit, and an oil tank farm.[1]

Ukrainian forces previously struck the Moscow Oil Refinery on June 15 to 16.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense downed 555 Ukrainian drones overnight on June 17 to 18 and claimed later on June 18 that Russian forces downed 992 drones and four missiles in the past day.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the strikes against Moscow City were in response to the Russian strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra on June 14 to 15.[4]

Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows Ukrainian fixed-wing drones flying over Moscow City and a fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery.[5] All four airports in the Moscow City air hub - Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Zhukovsky, and Sheremetyevo - grounded flights due to the Ukrainian strikes.[6] Locals reported that the fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery resulted in -oil rain.-[7]

Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged on June 18 that Ukrainian forces struck and started a fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery.[8] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged on June 18 that Ukrainian drones struck Moscow Oblast overnight on June 17 to 18 and on the morning of June 18, causing fires and damaging infrastructure.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Gukovo Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast, causing a fire at the facility.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery stores and ships fuel and lubricants. Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar acknowledged a drone strike and fire in Gukovo.[11] Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows a fire near the Gukovo Oil Depot.[12] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evrayev claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes forced Russian authorities to close traffic on the Yaroslavl City-Moscow City highway.[13]

Russian milbloggers responded to the strikes on Moscow City by remarking on the domestic realities of the war and expressed concerns about Russian air defenses and censorship.

A Russian milblogger noted in a since deleted post that Ukrainian forces were able to inflict substantial damage despite Moscow City-s highly effective air defense systems.[14] The milbloggers stressed that Ukraine is bringing the war to areas of Russia beyond the border regions and emphasized Russia-s need to strengthen air defenses around facilities across the country.[15] One milblogger also criticized Russian state media for downplaying the strikes and not presenting an accurate picture of reality.[16] The milblogger claimed that those -detached from the people- control Russian state media and have created a false reality where -everything is fine, - calling for Russian media to present events accurately. Another milblogger added that Russia needs to change its approach or else official reports will be even more removed from reality than they are now.[17] Another milblogger criticized Russian state media for reporting on the far off -special military operation- (the Kremlin-s phrase for Russia-s war against Ukraine) that only affected Ukraine - not Russia - and for dismissing reports of Ukrainian battlefield movements as -fake news.-[18] The milblogger noted that Russians can now -see with their own eyes- that Russian state media claims that -everything is going well- do not correspond with reality.

Russian state media coverage of the strikes emphasized the Kremlin-s information control efforts while downplaying the impacts of the strikes themselves. Russian opposition media source Meduza reported on June 18 that major Russian state media TV channels Perviy Kanal and NTV did not cover the Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City in their daytime broadcasts, that the Rossiya-1 channel only quoted official statements, and that none of the channels ran a separate strike report.[19] Meduza noted that Russian news channels instead primarily focused on the need to punish residents who film the strikes and their aftermath.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes against heavily defended Russian deep rear areas like Moscow City continue to expose Russia-s weaknesses and inability to defend its domestic populace.

ISW continues to assess that the increasing frequency, size, and depth of Ukraine-s long-range strike

campaign against heavily defended major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg demonstrate growing vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses and dilemmas in how the Kremlin chooses to interact with the domestic costs of the war it started.[20] Ukraine's overnight strike series was able to generate substantial damages, even as a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved a high interception rate of about 90 percent.[21] Ukraine appears to be increasing its drone capabilities such that even relatively low numbers of drones reaching their targets are generating significant effects.

Reported shortages of some Russian air defense interceptors may be exacerbating Russia's strained air defense resources. CBS News reported on June 17, citing three Ukrainian officials familiar with Russian intelligence estimates, that Russia is experiencing a shortage of S-300 air defense missiles but did not quantify the shortage.[22] A Ukrainian official told CBS News that Russia has an insufficient quantity of key components for the S-300 interceptor missiles, including guidance seekers and control modules, due to Western sanctions. CBS noted that Russia has increasingly turned to more advanced air defense systems to defend against missile strikes, with two officials noting that Russian forces have repurposed S-300 missiles for surface-to-surface strikes against Ukraine. The sources noted that Russia still has other systems that are more advanced than the S-300 to defend against strikes. CBS added, however, that Ukrainian strikes with more advanced drones have forced Russian forces to repel drone strikes with interceptor missiles that they would traditionally use against missiles - likely depleting Russia's stocks of more advanced interceptors as the stocks of S-300 missiles also decline.

The Kremlin is already setting conditions to weaponize claims of a recent alleged Ukrainian strike on a civilian passenger bus in Russia to justify its next massive long-range strike package against Ukraine.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 18 that it intercepted official internal Russian reports concluding that Ukraine did not strike a passenger bus in Bryansk Oblast on June 17, refuting Russian and Belarusian officials' claims that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a bus in Bryansk Oblast that was transporting a Belarusian children's soccer team.[23] The SBU stated that internal reports from Russia's 'Safe Region' state public institution for Bryansk Oblast concluded that Russia did not detect any Ukrainian drones or other objects near the area where Russian officials accused Ukraine of striking the bus.[24] Russian and Belarusian officials capitalized on the alleged strike on June 17, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko additionally accused Ukraine on June 18 of using the strike to provoke Belarus and to drag Belarus into the war.[25] Russian and Belarusian claims about the alleged June 17 strike follow similar Russian claims in recent weeks that aim to legitimize Russia's large-scale strike packages against Ukraine as responses to Ukraine's alleged strikes against civilians.[26]

Russia is reportedly importing gasoline from unspecified Asian countries to respond to domestic shortages that are likely to worsen as the summer continues.

Reuters reported on June 17, citing four industry sources, that Russia will import gasoline from Asia by sea in June 2026 to manage the gasoline shortages throughout Russia.[27] The sources stated that Russia will receive gasoline cargo shipments at one of its western ports. Reuters' sources added that Russia is also increasing gasoline imports from Belarus and has previously imported smaller volumes from Kazakhstan but that neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan have sufficient reserve capacity to support Russia if the shortages worsen. A source reported that Russia previously considered importing gasoline by sea in 2025 but that domestic supply ultimately was sufficient. Russia suffered from a similar gasoline crisis in late Summer 2025 due to Ukraine's long-range strike campaign at that time, but the 2026 shortages are hitting at the start of the high summer demand season such that the shortages this year will likely be significantly worse than those last year.[28] Russia's decision to import gasoline from Asia in 2026 after not doing so in 2025 also suggests that the shortages this year will be worse. Ukraine has struck Russia's western ports including those near St. Petersburg, which will likely threaten efforts to import gasoline via western ports.[29]

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on June 17 that the Netherlands will allocate 250 million euros (about \$286 million) to develop Ukraine's drone capabilities and another 250 million euros for the purchase of US weapons through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative that funds the purchase of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[30] Fedorov stated that

Ukraine and the Netherlands also signed an agreement on defense innovation and cooperation between defense enterprises and that the Netherlands will soon launch production of Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range drones in the Netherlands. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on June 18 that Germany will allocate \$200 million to PURL and \$200 million to the JUMPSTART program, which supports the purchase of PAC-3 interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine.[31] Pistorius stated that Ukraine and Germany signed an agreement to develop anti-ballistic capabilities and to jointly produce the Termit unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) in Germany.[32] UK Defense Secretary Dan Jarvis announced on June 18 that the UK will provide Ukraine with 150,000 drones and 350 air defense missiles and radars by the end of 2026 as part of a loan package of 752 million pound (about \$992 million) backed by proceeds from frozen Russian assets.[33] The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 18 that it will allocate \$108 million to PURL.[34] Belgian Defense Minister Teo Franken announced on June 18 that Belgium will give Ukraine seven F-16 fighter jets in 2026, including three ready for use and four for spare parts.[35] Fedorov added on June 17 that the Ukrainian MoD expects to receive at least \$60 billion in international aid in 2026 and that Ukraine-s partners have already announced \$40 billion so far this year, including over \$20 billion from an EU loan.[36]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Russia on the night of June 17 to 18, heavily targeting Moscow City and striking the Moscow Oil Refinery for the second time in two days.

Russian milbloggers responded to the strikes on Moscow City by remarking on the domestic realities of the war and expressed concerns about Russian air defenses and censorship.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes against heavily defended Russian deep rear areas like Moscow City continue to expose Russia-s weaknesses and inability to defend its domestic populace.

The Kremlin is already setting conditions to weaponize claims of a recent alleged Ukrainian strike on a civilian passenger bus in Russia to justify its next massive long-range strike package against Ukraine.

Russia is reportedly importing gasoline from unspecified Asian countries to respond to domestic shortages that are likely to worsen as the summer continues.

Ukraine-s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles and 239 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for recent updates on Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Ukrainian sources provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian military assets.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 18 that Ukraine-s June 14 strikes against the Palkino Oil Pumping Station in Yaroslavl Oblast (roughly 660 kilometers from the international border) destroyed seven tanks with a total volume of 95,000 cubic meters.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes against the Kotovsky oil preparation and pumping station near Kotovo, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 500 kilometers from the frontline) on June 13 damaged three RVS-2000 tanks and a section of pipeline, and that Ukrainian strikes against the Tamanneftegaz oil terminal near Volna, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 270 kilometers from the frontline) on June 13 damaged five RVSP-30000 tanks.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 18 but did not advance.[39]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 18 that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS)

conducted a FAB-500 or -1000 guided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in Krasnopillya (southeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Hrafske, Verkhnya Pysarivka, and Shesterivka and advanced in central Vilcha and north of Symyivka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 18 but did not advance.

[43]

Russian forces continue to conduct first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians.

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on June 18 that Russian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against two civilians in Ukrainke, Chuhuiv raion (northwest of Velykyi Burluk), on the morning of June 18, killing one and injuring the other.[44] Russian forces regularly conduct 'human safari' strikes across the frontline using tactical drones to 'hunt' civilians and civilian infrastructure.[45]

Russian forces have also integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operational battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and increasingly inflict civilian casualties as an intentional tool of war.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 17 and 18 but did not advance.

[47]

Russian forces continue to raise flags in the Kupyansk direction as part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to create the false perception of sweeping Russian advances.

A Ukrainian brigade published footage on June 18 showing Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags in the Kupyansk direction.[48] ISW continues to assess that these flag raising tactics are part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to create a false perception of

Russian military strength.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 18 but did not advance.

[50]

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Nove, and Novyi Myr (all southeast of Borova) and Yatskivka and Karpivka (both south of Borova).[51]

Ukrainian forces are expanding their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 17 that Ukrainian drones are increasing their strikes against Russian logistics targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast and that they recently struck Russian fuel tanks and armored vehicles in the Russian rear.[52] The commander of the brigade stated that new unspecified technology and improved communications have increased the range of Ukrainian drones and enabled them to reach all areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian armored vehicle beyond Starobilsk (over 70 km from the frontline).

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian vehicles along the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway in southern Zakitne (east of Slovyansk) during Russian forces-

June 16 combined motorized and mechanized assault.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Lyman.[54] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve (north of Lyman).[55]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make false and aggrandized claims about Russian advances in the Slovyansk direction as Russian sources publish possibly artificial intelligence (AI) generated footage.

The Russian MoD claimed on June 18 that the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[56] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources published footage on June 16 and 18 purportedly showing Russian forces raising a flag and otherwise operating in Rai-Oleksandrivka.[57] The Russian MoD also continued on June 18 to make tactical claims about Russian advances in Slovyansk itself.[58] The Russian MoD first started making daily tactical claims in Kostyantynivka on June 13 and in Slovyansk on June 18.[59] Russia has increased the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort over the last several months to make claims of advances in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions, including by publishing likely AI-generated battlefield footage on June 15, 16, and 17.[60] These videos are part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims of gains to falsely portray the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[61]

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kostyantynivka and entered northern Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[63]

Russian forces are concentrating manpower in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in an apparent attempt to infiltrate Kostyantynivka en masse

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on June 17 that Russian forces are concentrating manpower near Kostyantynivka in an effort to advance in large numbers using small infantry groups.[64] The commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps reported on June 18 that Russian one-person infiltration groups have spread across every part of Kostyantynivka but that Russian forces do not maintain control over any specific area of the city.[65] The commander stated that Russian forces intend to infiltrate Kostyantynivka and bypass it from the flanks. An officer of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps reported on June 17 that the number of Russian personnel in Kostyantynivka remains roughly at 123-125 and that Russian forces are primarily attacking from the west, east, and northeast of the city.[66] The officer reported that Russian forces are still mostly on the approaches to Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces inflict casualties when Russian forces are moving. The officer noted that the total number of Russian personnel in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area (likely inclusive of frontline and near-rear areas) is about 11,000.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 18 that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted FAB-500 or -1000 guided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces near Serhiivka and Mykolaivka (both northwest of Druzhkivka).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on June 17 and 18 but did not advance.

[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 18 but did not advance.

[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 17 to 18.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge over the Kalka River near occupied Hranitne (either roughly 95 or 103 kilometers from the frontline).[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied

Soledar (roughly 14 kilometers from the frontline), fuel-and-lubricants depots in occupied Mariupol and occupied Pyatipillia (roughly 112 and 75 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), and a material and logistics warehouse near occupied Boikivske (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline).[71]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions north of Hulyaipole.

Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Solodke (north of Hulyaipole).[72] The presence of Ukrainian forces west of Solodke indicates that Russian forces likely infiltrated around existing Ukrainian positions in the fields west of Solodke rather than clearing them as previously assessed.

Russian forces recently conducted a reduced company-sized motorized assault in the Orikhiv direction and continued limited ground operations.

[73]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled

a Russian motorized assault of more than 30 motorized vehicles, primarily motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), toward Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[74] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed over 20 motorcycles, up to 12 ATVs, and 10 Russian servicemembers. The Russian military command is reportedly directing army-level formations to intensify strikes on civilian targets in Zaporizhzhia City.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 18 that the Russian military command ordered the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) to intensify first-person view (FPV) drone strikes on civilian targets

in Zaporizhzhia City and that the Russian military command promised to allocate additional FPV drones to the 58th CAA for this purpose.[75] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have integrated intentional civilian harm into their broader battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign template, weaponizing strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure as an intentional tool of war, and that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[76]

Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military logistics in occupied Kherson Oblast is disrupting Russian logistics between occupied southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks in occupied Chaplynka (roughly 46 kilometers from the frontline) and along the P-47 Nova

Kakhovka-Novoolesiivka highway north of occupied Novotroitske (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline).[77] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source published satellite imagery on

June 17 confirming that Ukrainian forces struck the road bridge connecting occupied Henichesk (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) with the Arabat Spit at least three times.[78] Kherson

Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on June 18 that Ukrainian forces struck oil and gas, electrical, and bridge infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and that approximately 20,000 residents across 22 settlements are without power in occupied Kherson Oblast.[79] Ukrainian forces have struck logistics and bridge infrastructure in occupied Kherson

Oblast more frequently in recent weeks, disrupting Russia's ability to use supply routes from southwestern Russia to Crimea and inhibiting Russian forces' ability to conduct logistics.[80]

NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite data shows an unusually large number of fire anomalies in the period lasting between June 13 and 19.[81] A Russian

milblogger speculated June 18 that the FIRMS data make reflect increased Ukrainian activity in recent weeks.[82]

Russian forces are reportedly deploying drone operators of the elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to defend vulnerable highway routes in occupied Kherson Oblast from Ukrainian strikes.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 18 that Rubikon drone units continue to conduct strikes against Ukrainian drone infrastructure and have begun conducting anti-drone air defense activity along Russian forces' logistics routes, particularly along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway.[83] Rubikon elements were instrumental in setting the conditions that enabled Russian

advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions in Fall 2025, and the Russian military command's reported decision to redeploy Rubikon elements away from the frontline to rear areas demonstrates the effectiveness of Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign.[84] Ukraine has been increasing the scale and scope of its long and intermediate-range strike campaign against key Russian logistics routes throughout occupied Ukraine, which is now forcing the Russian military command to decide between advancing in priority sectors or defending rear areas.[85]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign to interdict Russian logistics in occupied Crimea on the night of June 17 to 18.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 18 that Russian forces struck the rail bridge over the North Crimean Canal near occupied Rozdolne (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces use for military and occupation logistics.[86] Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking two bridges east of Rozdolne.[87] A Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on June 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel truck in occupied Aybar (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline), causing an explosion.[88]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 17 to 18.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from the directions of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts and 239 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four Iskander-M/S-400s and 212 drones, that two ballistic missiles and 26 drones struck nine locations, and that drone debris fell on seven locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that it is clarifying information on the remaining ballistic missile. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged educational, residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Poltava oblasts.[90] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts.[91]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

See topline text.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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