

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the peace conditions recently proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7, demonstrating the Kremlin's continued disinterest in peace proposals that do not accept Russian demands for Ukraine's capitulation.

Lavrov published an essay on June 19 titled 'Ukraine, Europe, and Global Security,' rejecting the five conditions for a just and lasting peace laid out in the joint statement proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7.[1] France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued a joint statement with Ukraine on June 7 proposing an immediate ceasefire, the resumption of negotiations, and freezing the current frontline as a starting point for negotiations.[2] Lavrov stated that Russia cannot continue meaningful negotiations with Europe, claiming that Europe cannot be a 'third-party observer' or mediator of the peace negotiations due to its continued assistance to Ukraine.[3] Lavrov accused European leaders of using the premise of negotiations with Russia as a cover for 'geopolitical expansion' and preparations for a claimed future attack against Russia, arguing that Russia cannot resume negotiations 'through ultimatums' in reference to the June 7 proposal. The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from being involved in the peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, including rejecting European peacekeepers and security guarantees and portraying the United States and Russia as the only relevant negotiating actors.[4] The Kremlin has also insisted that Ukraine, the US, and Europe accept Russia's ultimatums.[5] Ukraine has repeatedly offered to arrange high-level peace negotiations with Russian officials, including Zelensky's open letter to Putin on June 4, in which he offered a head of state leader-level meeting that Putin subsequently rejected.[6] The Kremlin's routine rejection of negotiation meetings to discuss compromise peace proposals signals its continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that do not amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and fulfill Russia's maximalist demands.

Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin's unchanged negotiating position remains based on Russia's maximalist demands. Lavrov also asserted that Russia seeks to fulfill alleged agreements achieved during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit, despite the absence of any official documentation of any agreement achieved at the summit.

Lavrov responded to several media questions on June 19 about the possible resumption of peace negotiations following US President Donald Trump's recent expressed readiness to participate in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[7] Lavrov added that Russia remains committed to the settlement plans that the United States allegedly proposed during the Alaska Summit in August 2025. Lavrov implied that Russian negotiators will continue to advance various efforts aimed at justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine during upcoming negotiations with the US delegation. Lavrov also reiterated in his June 19 essay that Russia's maximalist demands include ensuring security of Russia's western borders and European 'guarantees' to respect Russian citizens' right to use the Russian language and protections of the Orthodox faith.[8] Neither the US nor Russia has released public statements or communiqués about any agreement reached following the Alaska Summit, however, and the Kremlin has repeatedly exploited the lack of official documents codifying the outcomes of the Alaska Summit to conceal Russia's continued unwillingness to compromise and commitment to its maximalist war aims.[9]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the Ukrainian June 18 strikes on Moscow City and started to set information conditions to continue and intensify strike packages against Ukraine.[10]

Peskov claimed on June 19 that Russian air defenses are performing well 'despite everything,' likely referring to the large number of Ukrainian drones launched against Russia on June 18.[11] Peskov and Lavrov both claimed that Russia will continue to conduct regular strikes against Ukraine.[12] Russian milbloggers and Russia's ultranationalist community continued emphasizing Russian air defense successes while expressing frustration with Russian citizens who undermined Russian operational security by publishing strike footage and its aftermath online.[13] Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian command for not investing in air defenses against small targets such as drones, called for greater Russian commitment to the war effort, and encouraged continued Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities in an effort to trigger a mass exodus from major Ukrainian cities.[14] The Kremlin will likely use the Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City on June 18 to justify repeated devastating Russian large-scale strike packages against Ukraine. The Russian military was already

significantly escalating its strike campaign against Ukraine well before Ukraine conducted its June 18 attack, however.[15]

The Russian Central Bank reduced its key interest rate to 14.25 percent as the bank's leadership continues to advocate for a more cautious monetary policy.

The Russian Central Bank announced on June 19 that it lowered its key interest rate from 14.5 to 14.25 percent, marking the lowest rate since October 2023.[16] The Russian Central Bank previously lowered its key interest rate on April 24 and March 20, 2026, both times by 50 basis points.[17]

Russia's Central Bank stated that pro-inflationary risks (or risk factors that increase inflation) are larger than disinflationary risks (economic risks associated with disinflation) in the medium term and acknowledged that the current decline in motor fuel production has raised pro-inflationary risk.[18]

Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on June 19 that the recent spike in domestic fuel prices (a result of Ukraine's strike campaign against Russian energy assets) has affected June's inflation rate and may increase inflation expectations, likely implying that the Russian Central Bank may need to change its calculations about the key interest rate if Ukraine's strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and inflation persist.[19] Ukraine's intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries and logistics have significantly constrained Russia's domestic gasoline supply and inflated fuel prices, and the Russian Central Bank's and Nabiullina's statements mark notable high-profile official acknowledgements of the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the Russian economy in the short- and possibly medium-term.[20]

The reduction of the key interest rate amidst the Russian Central Bank's leadership's push for a more cautious monetary policy may indicate that the Kremlin is eroding the independence of the Russian Central Bank.

Nabiullina has consistently advocated for a constrained monetary policy. Nabiullina stated on April 24 that the Central Bank had raised its average key rate forecast range as potential changes in Russia's fiscal policy and geopolitical tensions significantly increased inflationary risks.[21] Nabiullina also claimed on April 16 that it is naive to think that higher inflation will lead to lower rates, as State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Chairperson Anatoly Aksakov advocated for a 150-basis point key rate cut (likely in order to support Russian business and war industry).[22] The Central Bank's and Nabiullina's acknowledgements that Russia's pro-inflationary risks are higher than disinflationary ones suggest the need for a tighter monetary policy, and continued key interest rate reductions indicate that the Bank's leadership may be increasingly vulnerable to the Kremlin's policy demands, and/or the demands of Russia's war industry. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has exerted rising pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate to maintain the facade that Russia's economy is stable and expand capital availability for the war industry despite expansionary fiscal policies exacerbating Russian inflation.[23]

The Russian Central Bank's recent key interest rate cuts contradict its leadership's warnings about pro-inflationary pressures and the impact of Ukraine's strike campaign on consumer fuel prices in Russia, which indicates that the Kremlin may be eroding the Bank's independence in order to support Russia's war industry and portray the Russian economy as stable.

Ukraine's intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure continues to strain gasoline supplies. Russian authorities continue to impose fuel rationing in Russia and occupied southern Ukraine while some authorities deny that Russia is facing fuel supply shortages.

The

Financial Times

(FT) reported on June 15, citing French open-source analyst Clement Molin, that verified footage confirms that Ukraine conducted no fewer than 375 drone strikes against Russian trucks and vehicles in occupied Ukraine since May 2026 - half of which occurred on the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway).[24] FT noted that Crimean residents spend hours in line at gas stations due to supply shortages. A Local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed that almost 25 percent of Russian gas stations, including 85 Tatneft locations, 2,200 Rosneft locations, and all Lukoil, Teboil, and Neftmagistral gas stations, imposed restrictions on gasoline purchases.[25] Russian officials continue to deny the gasoline shortages and purchase restrictions, however. Russian state majority-owned oil company Rosneft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin claimed on June 19 that Rosneft did not impose any restrictions on refueling vehicles at gas stations and noted that Rosneft guarantees a stable fuel supply for Russian consumers.[26] The Russian Cabinet of Ministers announced on June 19 that Russia intends to

ensure a stable supply of petroleum products and prevent localized market imbalances.[27] Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely cause shortages to continue to spread across Russia and exacerbate existing shortages that the Russian government will not be able to ignore.[28]

Key Takeaways

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the peace conditions recently proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7, demonstrating the Kremlin's continued disinterest in peace proposals that do not accept Russian demands for Ukraine's capitulation.

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Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Russian forces launched 90 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 18 to 19.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another drone strike against Moscow City on June 19, the third time in three days if true.

[29] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyenin claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted 76 Ukrainian drones approaching Moscow City during the day on June 19.[30] It is unclear whether the Ukrainian drones struck any targets.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Moscow Oil Refinery ceased operations following Ukrainian strikes against the refinery on June 18.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 19 that Ukrainian strikes on the Moscow Oil Refinery (also known as the Kapotnya Refinery) on June 17 to 18 damaged the primary oil refining unit, three RVS-10,000 tanks, and one RVS-30,000 tank, and noted that the refinery suspended oil refining operations.[31] Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on June 18 that the Moscow Oil Refinery produces about a third of the fuel sold in Moscow City, supplies 40 percent of Moscow City's gasoline demand, and supplies 50 percent of Moscow City's diesel demand.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 18 and 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Sumy City.[33]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 18 showing Russian airstrikes against a bridge reportedly near Ulanove (northwest of Sumy City).[34]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military logistics in Bryansk Oblast.

A Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment released footage on June 18 of a drone strike against a Russian locomotive train carrying fuel near Zhudilovo, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 54 kilometers from the international border), disabling the locomotive.[35]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

·
Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 18 and 19 but did not advance.[36] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 19.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances.[37]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Russian forces entered Petro-Ivanivka (north of Kupyansk).[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations and interdiction efforts in the Borova direction on June 19.[39]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian railway lines between Novolatonivka (north of Borova) and Bohuslavka (northeast of Novoplantonivka).[40]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants storage tank near Bryanka (roughly 63 kilometers from the frontline), MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) near Tarasivka (roughly 39 kilometers from the frontline) and Smolyanynove (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline), and fuel tanker trucks in unspecified areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration area and equipment near Severodonetsk (roughly 38 kilometers from the frontline).[42] A Ukrainian corps operating in the area stated on June 19 that Ukrainian drone operators have full drone control over the low-altitude skies above occupied Luhansk Oblast as of May 31.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia-s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently infiltrated in central Lyman and east of Slovyansk in Zakitne but are unlikely to have consolidated positions in these areas.

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in central Lyman in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 18 that Russian forces are infiltrating into Zakitne in small groups but do not control the settlement, as Ukrainian drone strikes prevent Russian forces from consolidating in the settlement.[45] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces published footage on June 19, reportedly showing Ukrainian forces repelling a small Russian reconnaissance group of three infiltrators near Zakitne and noted that heavy fighting is ongoing in the area.[46]

Russian forces also infiltrated southeast of Slovyansk in Yurkivka, as Ukrainian officials continued to deny Russia-s claimed seizure of Rai-Oleksandrivka.

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian forces raising flags in Yurkivka, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 19 that infantry elements of the 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People-s Republic Army Corps [2nd LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized the settlement.[47] ISW assesses that this event does not indicate a change in control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), given that the footage only shows evidence of limited infiltrators in the settlement and does not indicate that Russian forces have consolidated within the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields south of Yurkivka.[48] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are clearing northern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of

Slovyansk and northeast of Yurkivka) after fighting for the settlement for several months.[49] Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets denied that Russian forces control Rai-Oleksandrivka and noted that part of the settlement is a contested gray zone.[50] Zaporozhets added that Ukrainian forces control the remainder of Rai-Oleksandrivka and continue to inflict casualties on Russian forces who are attempting to gain a foothold in the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in western Lyman, in eastern Pyskunivka and west of Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk), and north of Lypivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[51] Russian forces are attempting a motorized double envelopment movement in the Slovyansk direction and are increasingly using aviation to degrade Ukrainian fortified positions. Zaporozhets stated on June 19 that Russian forces are attempting to conduct a pincer movement to envelop Ukrainian positions on their flanks and that the Slovyansk direction is the northern flank of this Russian offensive.[52] Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are using motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to wage assaults but are largely refraining from using armored vehicles. Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces are increasingly using tactical aviation, particularly against Slovyansk, Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), and Oleksandrivka (west of Slovyansk). A Ukrainian artilleryman similarly reported that Russian forces recently intensified FAB and KAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions and rear areas, including Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Mykolaivka.[53] The gunner added that Russian drone operations are inhibiting Ukrainian artillery strikes as Ukrainian forces have to increasingly protect artillery from Russian drone strikes. The command of the Russian 20th CAA (Moscow Military District [MMD]) is reportedly rerouting logistics in the Lyman direction due to successful Ukrainian drone interdiction efforts. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 19 that commanders of the 20th CAA rerouted ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Lyman direction due to Ukrainian drone strikes and that Russian forces now have to deliver materiel at an increased distance of about 140 kilometers from the frontline.[54] The source added that Russian forces now rely on logistics that run through dangerous areas and that it takes them additional time and labor to deliver supplies to the frontlines. The source claimed that the Russian 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) has to commit an armored group of three personnel to drive a truck rather than a single driver due to the new requirement of escorting and guarding logistics vehicles, including countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), during logistics missions. Russian forces damaged a bridge near Mayaky (west of Lyman) in an effort to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the Lyman direction. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows a Russian FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against a river crossing over the Siverskyi Donetsk River near Mayaky.[55] The Russian MOD claimed that the strike destroyed the bridge, but a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the strike severely damaged but did not destroy the crossing.[56] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russia equipped the FAB-3000 with a unified planning and correction module (UMPK).[57] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian vehicles and equipment attempting to restore the crossing with drones.[58] Russian forces intensified artillery and drone strikes in the Kramatorsk direction, reportedly due to improving weather conditions and seasonal changes. A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on June 19 that Russian forces are increasing their artillery and drone strikes and continue to attack in small groups.[59] The officer noted that Russian forces are constantly concealing their manpower and equipment, including by using thermal cloaks at night. The officer implied that Ukrainian forces manually detect Russian servicemen, given that these cloaks make thermal imaging devices on drones ineffective. Zaporozhets stated that the Kramatorsk direction remains one of the quietest directions in eastern Ukraine as Russian forces are setting up logistics and are launching drone strikes from the rear and are not conducting assaults actively.[60] Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in several places in northeastern and eastern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 18 and 19 that Russian forces advanced in northwestern, central, and eastern Kostyantynivka and near Malynivka, Minkivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), and Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[62] Russian forces are continuing to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the

Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Druzhkivka direction reported on June 19 that Russian forces continue conducting drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs near Druzhkivka but are unable to completely halt traffic in the area.[63]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 19 but did not advance.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest and north of Pokrovsk on June 18 and 19 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Pokrovsk.[65]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of the concrete structures and basement systems to accumulate manpower, establish drone launch points, and conduct communications in Pokrovsk under cover and concealment.[66]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 18 and 19 but did not advance.[67]

Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) south of Sribne (roughly nine kilometers from the frontline).[68]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 18 and 19 but did not advance.[69]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian fuel and lubricants warehouses near Novoivanivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and Maliivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[70]

Russian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 18 to 19.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse near Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking vehicles along rural roads in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including the Khlibodarivka-Holubytske road (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline), the Svitlodarsk-Myronivskiy road (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), and the Molochne-Vulehirsk road (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline), and in Horlivka and Donetsk City (roughly 30 and 56 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[72]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Hulyaipole.

Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole).[73]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances.[74]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 18 that Russian forces recently advanced beyond Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), but the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported on June 19 that Russian forces do not even hold positions within Mala Tokmachka and advanced at closest 300 meters from the settlement before Ukrainian forces repelled the Russian forces.[75] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted a map on June 19 acknowledging that the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) is further west and south of Nesteryanka (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) than ISW previously assessed, though these Ukrainian gains are not within the last 24 hours.[76]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian logistics transportation and fuel tanker trucks throughout occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and a P-18 radar system near occupied Novovasylivka (either about 80 or 96 kilometers from the frontline).[77]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger posted footage on June 19 purportedly showing elements of the Russian Bagration USF Detachment of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) intercepting Ukrainian strike drones along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Kherson direction on June

19 but did not advance.[79]

Russian forces are increasing human safari tactics against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported on June 19 that Russian forces launched nearly 2,000 drones against Kherson City from June 8 to 14.[80] The Ukrainian spokesperson reported that Russian forces are using mass drone strike tactics against civilian cars, ambulances, and buildings. Russian forces regularly conduct 'human safari' strikes across the frontline using tactical drones to 'hunt' civilians and civilian infrastructure.[81] ISW has observed increases in Russian forces' use of human safari tactics against west bank Kherson Oblast, in particular, in recent weeks.[82]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign interdicting Russian logistics and fuel infrastructure in occupied Crimea on June 18 to 19.

Brovdi reported

that Ukrainian forces struck the Hlibivske gas condensate field near Dozorne and the Hlibivkse research center near Vnykove (both about 127 kilometers from the frontline), a locomotive near Rozdolne, and a Repeynik portable radar system near occupied Kamyanske (about 223 kilometers from the frontline).[83] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed that there was a fire near the Hlibivske underground fuel storage facility.[84] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck railway bridges near Rozdolne (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) and Vladyslavivka (roughly 254 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea.[85] Ukrainian forces struck the railway bridge near Rozdolne on the night of June 17 to 18.[86] The local Crimean-based Telegram source claimed that satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces also likely struck the railway bridge near the Vladyslavivka-Feodosia junction on the night of June 17 to 18 and that burn marks are visible on both sides of the tracks near the bridge.[87] The local Crimean-based Telegram source claimed on June 19 that Ukrainian forces also struck a gas station and a military transport vehicle near Armyansk and Perekop (both roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline).[88]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 18 to 19.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol-type loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces downed 79 drones, that nine drones hit eight locations, and that debris struck eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transportation, residential, civilian, energy, and commercial infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[90] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts, and Ukrainian energy operator DTEK reported that Russian forces have been striking power generation facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for the past two days.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Russian forces are systematically targeting the 100 kV distribution network in Sumy Oblast.[92]

Russian forces are reportedly using a new Molniya-2 variant strike drone to inflict more damage during strikes on Ukraine.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy 'Flash' Beskrestnov reported on June 19 that Russian forces are producing a new Molniya-2 variant strike drone called the 'Lightning-13' that has four engines and a 13-kilogram warhead.[93]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested that Belarus dismantle equipment that Russian uses to correct strikes against Ukraine.

Zelensky stated on June 19 that he is giving Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko a week (until June 26) to dismantle communications equipment in Belarus along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border that Russian uses for strikes against Ukraine, and noted that Ukrainian forces will dismantle

the equipment in Belarus does nothing.[94] Zelensky noted that there are Russian and Belarusian repeaters in Belarus, likely referring to systems that allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges and with greater precision. Zelensky previously claimed that Russian forces used Belarus for technical means to bypass Ukrainian drone interception systems and launch Shahed drone strikes against western Ukraine.[95]

Belarus officials continue to weaponize claims of a recent alleged Ukrainian strike on a civilian passenger bus in Russia to justify a future response.

[96] Belarusian Permanent Representative to the statutory and other bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Igor Nazaruk, stated on June 19 that Belarus reserves the right to take action with regard to Ukraine to protect the security of Belarusian citizens.[97] Russian and Belarusian officials accused Ukraine of striking a passenger bus allegedly transporting children in Bryansk Oblast on June 17.[98] Russia and Belarus will likely use the alleged Ukrainian strike in Bryansk Oblast to legitimize Russia's large-scale strike packages against Ukraine as responses to Ukraine's alleged strikes against civilians.

Belarus and Russia continue enhancing cooperation within the Union State framework.

Russian and Belarusian representatives signed memoranda on biotechnology cooperation at the Union State Biotechnological Forum in Minsk, Belarus, on June 18.[99]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2120138/

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