

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2026

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Toplines

Ukrainian forces continued to systematically strike bridges and other transport infrastructure supporting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that connect occupied Kherson Oblast with Crimea.

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge over the occupied Henichesk Strait, Kherson Oblast (approximately 120km from the frontline) overnight on June 20.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces use the bridge to transport supplies from occupied Crimea to Russian troops operating in southern Ukraine. A Ukrainian regiment published footage on June 20 showing Ukrainian strikes on a road bridge across the North Crimea Channel near occupied Voinka, Crimea (around 140 kilometers from the frontline) on June 17 and reported that the strikes damaged the bridge's support columns and roadway.[2] The regiment noted that this bridge is one of the few bridges that Russian forces can still use to cross the drained North Crimean Canal. Brovdi reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces also struck unspecified Russian logistics transports near Armyansk and Chaplynka (approximately 81 and 54 kilometers from the frontline respectively); a roadstead tug near Skadovsk (approximately 55 kilometers from the frontline), and a fuel tanker near Chaplynka.[3] Ukrainian forces previously struck several bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea and bridges over the North Crimea Canal throughout June 2026.[4] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project analyzed satellite images collected on June 19 and confirmed that Ukrainian previous strikes significantly damaged the Henichesk bridge, leaving a single operational lane and prohibiting the movement of trucks.[5] The OSINT project reported that previous Ukrainian strikes against the Chonhar bridge also left a single operational lane for light vehicles while military equipment and trucks travel along the nearby pontoons.[6] The OSINT project assessed that Ukrainian strikes critically damaged a road bridge over the North Crimea Canal near Armyansk and that Russian officials built a new crossing over the drained canal. Ukrainian forces are increasing their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across occupied southern Ukraine, disrupting Russia's ability to safely use supply routes from southwestern Russia to occupied Crimea.[7]

Ukrainian strikes on Russian transport and railway infrastructure are already disrupting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and worsening Russian logistics on the left bank of occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery reported on June 20 that Russian forces are increasingly facing difficulties with logistics on the entire east (left) bank Kherson Oblast because Ukrainian forces systematically strike Russian GLOCs.[8] The commander added that Ukrainian strikes hinder Russian efforts to accumulate personnel, ammunition, and other supplies along the frontline in occupied Kherson Oblast. Russian train operator Grand Service Express announced on June 19 that all of the company's passenger trains traveling to and from occupied Crimea are shortening their routes and will be stopping at Kerch due to temporary closure of an unspecified section of the Crimean railway.[9] Grand Service Express did not specify the reason for the temporary closure, although it is possible that the closures could be in response to the recent Ukrainian strikes against trains traveling in occupied Crimea.[10] Russian forces increasingly have had to commit additional manpower resources to protect GLOCs from Ukrainian drone strikes. A Russian milblogger posted images on June 20 showing Russian mobile fire teams accompanying Russian fuel tankers driving to occupied Crimea.[11] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs will likely have cascading battlefield effects and will likely degrade Russia's ability to sustain logistics necessary for preparing offensive operations.[12]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia overnight on June 19 and 20.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows a fire at a fuel and gas storage facility belonging to the Russian ·TES· gas station company northwest of occupied Bakhchysarai, Crimea (northeast of Sevastopol).[13] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel, citing local reports, reported that there were at least 13 explosions in Bakhchysarai within one hour on June 20 and added that TES is the largest network of gas stations in occupied Crimea.[14] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi also reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck gas

compression stations near occupied Zhuravlivka (approximately 120 kilometers from the frontline), Aromatne (approximately 220 kilometers from the frontline), Klyichi (approximately 212 kilometers from the frontline), and Lokhivka (approximately 212 kilometers from the frontline) in Crimea.[15] The NASA Fire Information for Resources Management System (FIRMS) recorded heat anomalies at the Tavriyska Thermal Power Plant (east of occupied Simferopol), and the local Crimea-based Telegram channel reported fire at the power plant following Ukrainian drone strikes and a series of explosions.[16] Adviser to the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Serhii Sternenko, reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces targeted the Tyumen Oil Refinery (also known as the Antipinsky Oil Refinery) in Tyumen City - about 2,000 kilometers away from the international border between Russia and Ukraine.[17] Tyumen Oblast Governor Alexander Moor claimed on June 20 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone attack against an unnamed oil refinery in Tyumen Oblast and that the attack did not damage the refinery.[18] Geolocated footage published on June 20 showed a smoke column at the Tyumen Oil Refinery.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra, citing locals, reported that there were at least two explosions in the area of the oil refinery and that at least 10 fire trucks arrived on scene.[20] Astra reported that the Tyumen Oil Refinery is one of the largest independent oil refineries in Russia with an annual processing capacity of around eight million tons of oil.[21] Continued systematic Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine and Russia will likely continue to exacerbate Russian gas and fuel shortages. Russian officials continue trying to mitigate rising gas prices as gas shortages spread across Russia amidst ongoing Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.

St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported on June 20 that Russian federal subjects are experiencing widespread gasoline shortages and price increases despite denials from Russian officials.[22] Fontanka observed high gas prices and gas shortages in previously unaffected cities such as St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Tula, and that Russian consumers are growing more frustrated about inconsistent pricing and availability of fuel across regions. Fontanka reported that some Russian gas station companies that are not part of vertically integrated oil companies are raising gas prices in an effort to prevent profit losses. Russian federal subjects are increasingly trying to mitigate and downplay the increasing gas prices and shortages, but Fontanka's reporting suggests that these efforts are not generating the desired effects at this time. Saratov Oblast officials noted on June 20 that they discussed the need to ensure a price cap at gas stations across Saratov Oblast despite increased demand and supply disruptions.[23] Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on June 20 that the Tver Oblast Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced temporary gasoline sales restrictions at Surgutneftegaz and Tatneft gas stations.[24] Vazhnye Istorii added that Tula Oblast authorities reported fuel shortages at some gas stations on June 19 and attributed the situation to logistical problems and increased demand.[25] The Russian government will likely continue to struggle to uniformly mitigate gas price increases and gas shortages in the short- to medium-term given that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely continue to exacerbate existing shortages.[26]

Russian forces are trying to adapt to their use of strike drones to compensate for the sudden loss of Starlink and Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine.

The commander of a Ukrainian air defense anti-drone battalion reported on June 20 that Russian forces have reduced their use of BM-35 and BM-39 Italmas-type drones at operational depths after SpaceX blocked Starlink for Russian users on February 1, 2026.[27] Russian forces previously used Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones to strike dynamic moving targets in January 2026.[28] The commander noted that Russian forces are resuming the use of BM-35 and BM-39 drones at shorter distances as of June 2026 and added that successful Ukrainian interceptor strikes are forcing Russian forces to switch to using cheap reconnaissance drones (particularly the Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drones), fly reconnaissance drones at higher altitudes, and use interceptor drones to escort strike drones.[29] The commander noted that Russian Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones almost never fly over the frontline and instead fly at high speeds and for a short time. The commander stated that Russian reconnaissance drones fly in silent mode to avoid radio and electronic warfare (EW) detection. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy ·Flash· Beskrestnov published footage on June 20 reportedly showing elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment) intercepting two Ukrainian strike drones along

the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) near occupied Melitopol (approximately 67 kilometers from the frontline).[30] Beskrestnov noted that Ukraine's strike campaign against Russian logistics is forcing Russian forces to use interceptor drones and highways to patrol ground lines of communication (GLOCs), including major highways in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are successfully leveraging Russia's loss of Starlink with Ukraine's intermediate-range drone strike campaign to conduct strikes on dynamically moving and operationally-significant targets farther in the Russian rear in occupied Ukraine. Russian forces will likely need to further adapt their strike and interceptor drones as Ukraine continues its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces continued to systematically strike bridges and other transport infrastructure supporting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that connect occupied Kherson Oblast with Crimea.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian transport and railway infrastructure are already disrupting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and worsening Russian logistics on the left bank of occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia overnight on June 19 and 20.

Russian officials continue trying to mitigate rising gas prices as gas shortages spread across Russia amidst ongoing Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.

Russian forces are trying to adapt to their use of strike drones to compensate for the sudden loss of Starlink and Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions.

Russian forces launched 99 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure.

The Ukrainian General Staff published satellite imagery on June 20 indicating that Ukrainian strikes against the Moscow Oil Refinery on June 18 destroyed one RVS-10,000 storage tank and one RVS-30,000 storage tank.[31]

The imagery also confirms the Ukrainian General Staff's June 19 reporting that the June 18 strikes also damaged the refinery's primary oil refining unit, three RVS-10,000 tanks, and one RVS-30,000 tank.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued limited operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 19 and 20 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Sumy City).[33]

Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Terebreno (roughly three kilometers from the international border).[34] Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) west of Gogolevka (roughly three kilometers from the international border).[35] Additional geolocated footage published on June 14 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian communications equipment near Grayvoron (roughly seven kilometers from the international border).[36]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

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Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible

buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 19 and 20 but did not advance.[37]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on June 19 and 20 but did not advance.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued infiltrations in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows two Russian servicemembers infiltrating into central Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced into Radkivka and northeast and west of Novovasylivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[40] Russian forces may be intensifying glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian drone operators and logistics in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian forces using three FAB-500 glide bombs striking a purported Ukrainian drone control point in western Monachynivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[41] Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Russian forces using four FAB-500 glide bombs to strike a bridge along the H-20 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway west of Hrushivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[42] These strikes likely intend to degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ground operations, particularly near Kupyansk itself.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova on June 20 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Borova.[43]

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a first-person view (FPV) drone strike on a Russian Grad-1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) southeast of Berestove (northeast of Borova).[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian armored fighting vehicle (AFV) near occupied Mykhailivka (approximately either 83 or 126 kilometers from the frontline), a Kamaz armored vehicle near occupied Nyzhnya Duvanka (approximately 28 kilometers from the frontline), and logistics vehicles near occupied Verkhnya Pokrovka (approximately 64 kilometers from the frontline).[45] Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows a Ukrainian-developed Blyskavka fixed-wing loitering munition attempting to strike Russian transport truck on the northeastern outskirts of occupied Lysychansk (approximately 38 kilometers from the frontline).[46] Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian Kamaz trucks in occupied Novookhtyrka (approximately 64 kilometers from the frontline).[47]

Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 20 that Ukrainian drones dropped explosive devices on unspecified sections of the M-03 Kyiv City-Dvorizhanske highway (also referred to as the E-50 highway) in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[48] Pasechnik claimed that Russian occupation authorities restricted traffic toward the Dvorizhanke border checkpoint along the Luhansk-Rostov Oblast international border, implying that Ukrainian drones may be interdicting logistics immediately along the Russian border with occupied eastern Ukraine.

Russian forces appear to be reallocating troops and assets supporting ground operations in the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces to defend Russian forces' rear against Ukraine's interdiction campaign.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 20 that the Russian command redeployed the Svarog Counter-Drone Detachment within the 50th Separate Varyag Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Brigade to the AoR of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (between Kupyansk and Lyman directions) to respond to Ukraine's interdiction campaign.[49] The source noted that Russian forces deployed 23 counter-drone, radar reconnaissance, and mobile interception teams of this unit. The source added that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is also trying to form its own counter-drone detachment from personnel and equipment from the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 20th Guards CAA (MMD), and the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]). The source reported that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces are

creating a new supply group with dozens of vehicles and 40 personnel but must take personnel from other Russian units. The source noted that Ukrainian drone strikes are forcing Russian forces to redeploy specialized units and personnel from other areas to the Russian Western Grouping of Forces. ISW has previously assessed that Ukraine's intermediate-range strikes impose an additional manpower requirement on Russian forces to defend against these strikes in addition to existing requirements to sustain frontline operations and a separate requirement to recruit personnel to defend against Ukrainian long range strikes.[50] Russian forces likely have to pull forces and means from existing formations as they are failing to meet their recruitment targets and replacement rates in the short term.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Ukrainian forces maintained positions in eastern Lyman as Russian forces continued to infiltrate in the central part of the settlement.

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in eastern Lyman, contrary to prior Russian claims that Russian forces advanced in the area.[52]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows a Russian servicemember raising a Russian flag in central Lyman in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53]

Recently geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in eastern Zakitne (east of Slovyansk) despite ongoing Russian infiltration attempts.

ISW previously reported on June 19 footage from Ukrainian military sources, which showed Ukrainian forces repelling three Russian infiltrators near Zakitne.[54] A new geolocation of the footage confirms that Ukrainian forces are still operating in eastern Zakitne, which supports the Ukrainian military's reports that Russian forces have not consolidated positions in the settlement and are instead conducting infiltration missions into the area.[55] Zakitne stretches between the Siverskyi Donets River to the north and elevated terrain at the Shyurova Mountain to the southeast, which may be complicating Russia's ability to consolidate positions in the settlement. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 18 that individual Russian groups are infiltrating into Zakitne due to a 'specific terrain' in the area and that the Shyrova Mountain makes it difficult for Russian forces to operate in the area under Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes.[56]

Russian forces recently intensified assaults in the Lyman direction, likely because foliage continues providing necessary concealment for Russian personnel concentrations.

A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 20 that Russian forces increased the number of assaults in the Lyman direction over the past few weeks and are trying to find weak spots in the Ukrainian defenses by exploiting thick foliage for concealment from Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes.[57]

Ukrainian forces are continuing to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Lyman direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian pontoon bridge over the Bakhmutka River north of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) with a Ukrainian-developed Blyskavka fixed-wing loitering munition.[58]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions deeper into Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces are likely consolidating at least some positions in the city while interspersed with Ukrainian positions.

ISW has updated its control of terrain assessment in Kostyantynivka by expanding Russian infiltration areas and Russian advances in the city. ISW increasingly has observed evidence of Russian forces infiltrating further into northern, northwestern, and western Kostyantynivka in recent days and has not observed evidence of Ukrainian forces maintaining an organized defense in the easternmost and southernmost sections of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely advanced in southern Kostyantynivka and up to a segment of the northern outskirts of Kostyantynivka. Available evidence also indicates that Russian forces have infiltrated deeper into several areas in western, northeastern, central, and southern Kostyantynivka. The absence of observed evidence of Ukrainian forces maintaining positions in the southernmost and easternmost areas of Kostyantynivka, in tandem with evidence that Russian forces continue infiltration missions deeper into the city, indicates that Russian forces are deepening their infiltration areas and have likely consolidated some positions within the city. These Russian infiltration areas likely remain interspersed with Ukrainian positions,

however. Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in southern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces remain in some southern parts of the city despite continued Russian infiltrations bypassing this position.[59] It is also possible that Ukrainian forces may maintain some tactical positions in areas ISW assesses to be Russian-held. ISW will continue to update and refine its control of terrain assessment as we collect and verify more data in the coming days and weeks.

Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), continue to aggrandize the extent of Russian advances within Kostyantynivka as part of an ongoing informational effort intended to falsely paint the city as falling imminently and inflate Russian military capabilities.[60] Available reporting from Ukrainian units operating in the Kostyantynivka direction suggests that Russian forces deployed between 100 and 250 infiltrators through the city as of June 12.[61]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue targeting each other's frontline drone positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Soledar, Donetsk Oblast (northeast of Kostyantynivka) on June 19.[62] The Russian MoD published footage on June 20 showing Russian forces striking a purported Ukrainian drone control point in Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka) with three FAB-1500 guided glide bombs.[63]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 19 and 20 but did not advance.[64]

Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian drone operators in the Dobropillya tactical area with glide bombs.

The Russian MoD published footage on June 20 showing Russian forces striking purported Ukrainian drone control points in Dobropillya and Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) with FAB-500 guided glide bombs.[65]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Pokrovsk amid continued fighting north to southwest of Pokrovsk on June 19 and 20.[66]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on June 19 and 20 but did not advance.[68]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast on June 19 and to 20.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel tanker truck near occupied Dmytrivka (either about 86 or 112 kilometers from the frontline) and a BAZ-6403 tank transporter tractor near occupied Klyuchove (either about 30 or 98 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on June 19 to 20.[69] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian logistics vehicles near occupied Novokrasnivka (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline), Hranitne (either about 96 or 106 kilometers from the frontline), and Kalchynivka (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline). Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian fuel trucks in occupied Kalynove and along the C-0513 rural road in Novoandriivka (roughly 82 and 64 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[70]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 19 that Ukrainian forces struck targets along the T-0508 Donetsk City-Novozovsk highway in the occupied Starobesheve Raion (south to southeast of Donetsk City and along the border with Rostov Oblast).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 20 that Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian trucks along the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway, an important Russian logistics route.[72]

Russian forces are employing road restrictions and deploying additional mobile air defense personnel in efforts to defend against Ukraine's intermediate-range interdiction campaign in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Russian mobile fire groups escorting unarmored fuel trucks along the T-0507 Taganrog-Amvrosiivka highway east of occupied Vyselky (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline and on the Donetsk-Rostov Oblast international border).[73] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 20 that Russian occupation authorities closed the motor and rail crossing through the Uспенка international checkpoint between Rostov Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 20 that

Russian mobile fire groups also regularly operate along the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 19 and 20 but did not advance.[76]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 20 but did not advance.[77]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control points near Hrozove (southeast of Orikhiv) on June 19.[78]

Russian forces are intensifying strikes against bridges in Zaporizhzhia City, likely to undermine Ukrainian logistics to the Orikhiv direction and southern Donetsk Oblast.

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 20 that Russian forces struck a bridge in Zaporizhzhia City and called for Russian forces to increase strikes against bridges in the city.[79] Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Head Ivan Fedorov reported on June 20 that Ukrainian officials are installing anti-drone nets along bridges in Zaporizhzhia City.[80] The Russian military command reportedly recently began directing army-level formations to intensify strikes on civilian targets in Zaporizhzhia City, and Russian forces may also be intensifying strikes against Ukrainian logistics in Zaporizhzhia City simultaneously.[81]

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost offsite power for the twentieth time since the start of the war and in its operational history on June 20.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on June 20 that the ZNPP lost power due to an unspecified issue with the ZNPP's only functional offsite powerline, the 330kV Ferosplavna-1 line.[82] The IAEA reported that repair work to the 750kV Dniprovska powerline, which has been disconnected since March 2026, continues under a localized ceasefire.[83] The physical condition of the ZNPP has deteriorated significantly under Russian occupation, and Russia has continuously been a poor steward of the ZNPP by militarizing the plant, threatening and imprisoning its personnel, and by setting conditions to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[84]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, logistics, and fuel infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 20 that Ukrainian Forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system near Dolynske (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on June 19 to 20.[85]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows a Ukrainian strike against a fuel truck along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway west of Prymorsk (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline).[86]

Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation officials acknowledged the strike against a vehicle near Prymorsk but claimed that the vehicle was carrying packages rather than fuel.[87]

Former Mariupol City Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage site and gas stations west of Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[88]

Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel tanker truck on the P-37 Berdyansk-Tokmak-Vasylivka highway north of Sofiivka (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline).[89]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 20. See topline text for additional reports on Ukrainian strikes in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian artillery and drone operators in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery reported on June 20 that Russian forces are continuing to shell the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast but had to move their artillery systems deeper in the rear due to the constant threat from Ukrainian artillery and first-person view (FPV) strikes.[90] The commander noted that Russian forces are carefully camouflaging their towed guns near Oleshkivsky Pisky (around 30 kilometers east of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian drone operators. The commander implied that Russian towed guns and drone operators hiding in dense urban areas are harder for Ukrainian forces to detect and disable. The commander added that Ukrainian forces are attempting to deny Russian forces the ability to strike Kherson City and have seen some successful but unspecified results.

A local Crimea-based Telegram channel provided more battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against the Hvardiiske Airfield in occupied Crimea on June 14.

[91] The channel reported, citing satellite imagery, that all three hangars at the airfield show signs of impact or fire.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones, that seven drones hit three locations, and that debris struck three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 19 and June 20.[93] The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces struck a post office department in Zaporizhzhia City with drones on June 19, wounding 15 people.[94]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40215>; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2504 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2101

[2] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/06/20/moment-udaru-po-avtomobilnomu-mostu-v-krymu-kadry-vid-polku-rejd/>;

<https://www.facebook.com/share/v/194zg9ncwZ/>;

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[3] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2504; https://t.me/usf_army/2101 ; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102458>

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[5] <https://t.me/andriyshTime/60944>

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[8] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/06/20/vorog-duzhe-nedobre-pochuvaye-u-rosiyan-problemy-z-logistyky-na-prydniprovskogo-nap>

[9] https://t.me/tavria_train/1636

[10] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2068025518562152708;

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[11] <https://t.me/milinfo/174564>

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