

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/>

PDF generated from the original web publication.

Previous

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2026

Toplines

Ukrainian forces are conducting a strike campaign to deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel across the Kerch Strait.

Ukrainian government and military officials reported on June 21 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) jointly launched long-range drone strikes against Russian maritime logistics, oil infrastructure, and air defense systems in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai overnight on June 21.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck the Port of Kavkaz at the Chushka Spit, Krasnodar Krai (northeast of the Kerch Strait Bridge), setting the tank farm of the oil transshipment complex and the territory of the oil depot on fire.[2] The USF reported that Russia relies on the oil depot at the port of Kavkaz to supply occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine with fuel.[3] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian forces struck tanks with petroleum products at the TES-Terminal-1 oil depot in occupied Kerch, which Russia uses to transship fuel oil, liquefied gas, and light petroleum products across the Kerch Strait.[4] The USF added that the TES-Terminal-1 oil depot is located less than one kilometer from the Kerch Strait Bridge and that Russia uses the terminal to refuel the Russian ferry connection between occupied Crimea and the Port of Kavkaz.[5] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian strikes disabled four S-400 air defense complex radar stations and two Pantsir air defense systems on the Kerch Strait Bridge.[6] The USF reported that its forces struck a Kasta-2E2 radar system in occupied Kurortne (northwest of Kerch and on the Sea of Azov coast) and a Nebo-U radar system near Kerch.[7] Geolocated footage confirmed fires at the TES-Terminal-1 and the Port of Kavkaz and Ukrainian drone strikes against the two radars north of Kurortne and west of Kerch.[8] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that Ukrainian drones struck the Panagia ferry at the Kerch Strait ferry crossing and started a fire at an oil terminal in Chushka.[9] Geolocated footage published and recorded on June 21 northeast of the Port of Kavkaz showed at least three ferries on fire.[10] Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against occupied Crimea on June 21 but did not specify what targets Ukrainian forces struck.[11]

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and transport infrastructure are already disrupting Russian logistics, straining energy supplies, and worsening fuel shortages across occupied Crimea.

Aksyonov announced on June 21 that all gas stations in occupied Crimea stopped selling fuel to any non-state entities but did not provide any reasons for this emergency measure.[12] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev similarly announced several measures to conserve fuel in Sevastopol in response to unspecified 'recent developments' in occupied Crimea, likely referring to Ukrainian drone strikes.[13] Razvozhaev barred gas stations from selling fuel on June 22 and 23, shortened work hours of public transport and major retailers, suspended ferry operations, and cancelled all outdoor events starting June 22. Russian occupation officials have been increasingly tightening fuel restrictions across occupied Crimea in June 2026.[14] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters announced that Russia temporarily suspended ferry service via the Kerch Strait and advised freight traffic to detour along the M-14 highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) via occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol.[15] Russian officials notably restricted freight traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge in January 2026, causing trucks to rely on ferries to transit the Strait.[16] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there were only seven auto and rail ferries operating at the Kerch Strait crossing area and that possible damages to three of the ferries could significantly strain logistics between occupied Crimea and Russia.[17] Crimean occupation energy company Krymenergo introduced electricity consumption restrictions on June 21, citing unspecified accidents at Crimean power grid facilities.[18] Local Crimean social media users reported power outages in numerous Crimean cities, including Armyansk, Alushta, Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Dzhankoi.[19]

The Kerch Strait strikes are part of an ongoing systematic Ukrainian campaign to deny Russian forces the use of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to occupied Crimea via occupied southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert 'Magyar' Brovdi implied on June 21 that Ukrainian forces are trying to degrade the Kremlin's ability to use occupied Crimea as a

springboard for offensive operations again by destroying Russian air defense systems, reducing of the Black Sea Fleet presence on the peninsula, and degrading Russian logistics, transportation nodes, and energy resources in the region.[20] The SBU similarly noted that the Ukrainian special operations, such as the Kerch Strait strikes, are necessary to disrupt Russian logistics and degrade Russian military potential, and the USF alluded to future strikes against.[21]

Russia has two main GLOCs into occupied Crimea - the 'land bridge' that runs across occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the bridge and ferry connection across the Kerch Strait.

Ukrainian forces have notably intensified their strikes against Russian GLOCs and energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea in June 2026 after launching a simultaneous effort in May 2026 to deny Russian forces the use of the 'land bridge'. [22] The Ukrainian General Staff notably reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces continued to strike railway bridges across the North Crimea Canal near occupied Rozdolne (Kherson Oblast) and near Chonhar (on the border of Kherson Oblast and Crimea), which Russian forces reportedly used to transport personnel and supplies.[23] Ukrainian forces are also conducting targeted strikes on Russian air defense and radar systems to enable further strikes against Russian logistics and are striking various oil infrastructure, such as gas compression stations, to deny Russian forces the ability to store fuel in occupied Crimea.[24] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces started a campaign targeting Russian maritime logistics between occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai in mid-2025 by targeting tankers and vessels in the Sea of Azov with unmanned surface and aerial vehicles (USVs and UAVs).[25] A combination of continued Ukrainian intermediate- and long-range drone strikes may further impose additional tactical to operational level dilemmas on Russian transport of personnel and equipment along both GLOCs and disrupt Russian fuel deliveries.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces are conducting a strike campaign to deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel across the Kerch Strait.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and transport infrastructure are already disrupting Russian logistics, straining energy supplies, and worsening fuel shortages across occupied Crimea.

The Kerch Strait strikes are part of an ongoing systematic Ukrainian campaign to deny Russian forces the use of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to occupied Crimea via occupied southern Ukraine.

Russian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area, but this advance is not likely to be recent. Russian forces launched four missiles and 105 drones at Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Krasnodar Krai.

The Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed on June 21 Ukraine's June 20 strikes against the Tyumen Oil Refinery in Tyumen Oblast.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.[27]

Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a purported Ukrainian drone launch point in Krasnopillya (southeast of Sumy City).[28]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian control point near Pochayevo, Belgorod Oblast (northwest of Sumy City about 10 kilometers from the international border) and a Russian drone control point near Gorky, Bryansk Oblast (one of multiple settlements from along the international border to about 108 kilometers from the international border).[29]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

·
Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 20 and 21 but did not advance.[30]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 21.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 - Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk and on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River northeast of Kupyansk on June 20 and 21 but did not advance.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 21 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Borova.[32]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 and dated to June 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck along the H-21 Luhansk City-Starobils'k highway north of occupied Novoaidar (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline).[33] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on June 21 that a Ukrainian drone strike killed Lieutenant Colonel Pinigin, chief of the engineering service of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) near Novoaidar on the night of June 15 to 16.

[34]

Russian and Ukrainian sources have not corroborated the report of Pinigin's death, however. The Russian military command is reportedly restricting vehicle movement in areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast as it attempts to mitigate logistical issues due to increasing Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics.

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF, whose area of responsibility comprises the Kupyansk to Lyman directions, claimed on June 21 that the Western GoF command moved fuel and lubricants depots at least 100 to 110 kilometers from the frontline.[35] The source claimed that the Russian units receiving fuel and lubricants from these depots are responsible for sending mobile fire groups to guard the trucks transporting the fuel, placing the responsibility for air defense on these units rather than dedicating manpower to rear area air defense. ISW has previously assessed that Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign would impose an additional manpower requirement on Russian forces for air defenses, a requirement that competes with Russian deep-rear air defense requirements and the requirement to recruit more personnel for the frontline.[36]

The source also reported that the command of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) prohibited the movement of unarmored vehicles within 25 kilometers of the frontline due to the threat of Ukrainian intermediate-range drone strikes.[37] The source reported that Russian military command also restricted the 4th Tank Division's use of motorized vehicles in staging areas and transport on public roads. ISW has observed reports of elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division operating in the Borova and Lyman directions.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 - Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction on June 21 as Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance deeper into and near Lyman.[39]

Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southwestern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40] Additional geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position east of Rai-Oleksandrivka contrary to Russian claims of advance, suggesting that Russian and Ukrainian positions near Rai-Oleksandrivka likely remain interspersed.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the Brusyn Train Station southwest of Lyman and advanced northeast of Brusivka (northeast of Slovyansk) and west of Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk).[42]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 21 purportedly showing Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position near Shchurove (west of Lyman) with a FAB-1500 glide bomb.[43]

Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian logistics in southern Kharkiv Oblast that support Ukrainian defensive operations in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka directions.

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 that Russian forces have fire control over the segment of the T-21-21 highway between Blyznyuky and Barvinkove in southern Kharkiv Oblast (at least 53 kilometers from the frontline).[44] Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Barvinkove extend to Izyum (supporting the Borova and Lyman directions) and Slovyansk (supporting the Lyman, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantynivka directions). Russian forces are likely attempting to degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against the prioritized Russian efforts against Lyman and Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and near Kostyantynivka on June 21 but did not make confirmed advances.[45]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka tactical area reported that Russian forces continued infiltration missions in efforts to bypass and consolidate behind Ukrainian defensive lines in Kostyantynivka.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that the heaviest fighting is ongoing in northwestern, central, and southwestern Kostyantynivka.[47] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources continue to aggrandize the extent of Russian advances within Kostyantynivka as part of an ongoing informational effort intended to falsely paint the city as falling imminently and to inflate Russian military capabilities.[48] Available reporting from Ukrainian units operating in the Kostyantynivka direction suggests that Russian forces deployed between 100 and 250 infiltrators through the city as of June 12.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Arbat Special Purpose Battalion (8th Reconnaissance Assault Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk direction.[50] ISW last observed reports of the Arbat Special Purpose Battalion operating in the Kursk Oblast border area in July 2025, indicating that the Russian military command likely withdrew the unit for rest and reconstitution and redeployed at least some of the battalion to the prioritized Russian effort in eastern Ukraine.[51]

Russian forces continued largely unsuccessful infiltrations in the Dobropillya tactical area and Pokrovsk direction on June 21 and are pulling forward infantry in preparations to intensify assaults southwest of Dobropillya and northwest of Pokrovsk.[52]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are reinforcing frontline assault units to prepare for assaults in the near future, including elements of the 51st CAA near Bilytske, Novotoretske, Chervonyi Lyman, and Rodynske (all southeast of Dobropillya and north to northeast of Pokrovsk), and of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) in northwestern Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya).[53] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are also concentrating infantry and light motorized vehicles near Zapovidne, Toretske, Mayak, and Chervonyi Lyman (all southeast of Dobropillya) and toward Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka (north of Hryshyne), and had transported at 65 to 70 personnel through Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) from June 21 to 22.[54] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction corroborated Mashovets' reporting on June 21, noting that Russian forces are concentrating infantry that have received better training and began intensifying infiltration missions within the last week (since about June 14).[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russian forces are accumulating within Pokrovsk, pressing north and northwest of Pokrovsk, and recently conducted a personnel rotation, but continue to use the same infiltration tactics.[56]

Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces have recaptured positions in Bilytske, and Russian forces are likely no longer actively infiltrating the settlement.[57] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces still hold Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) and much of the Bilytske area, forcing Russia to concentrate troops to start operations against Dobropillya along a relatively narrow sector of the frontline between Pokrovsk and Novooleksandrivka.[58] Mashovets reported that Russian forces recently conducted unsuccessful small-group infiltration missions near Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya), Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), and Bilytske.[59] Mashovets acknowledged that some Russian infiltrators managed to consolidate positions in an area southeast of Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk) and between Bilytske and Krasnoyarske (northwest of Bilytske), however. Mashovets reported that Russian forces recently retreated to Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya and northeast of Bilytske) during a failed infiltration mission, indicating that

Russian forces have likely seized Dorozhnie on a prior date.[60]

Mashovets noted that Russian forces currently lack the numbers and density required to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in the areas of responsibility (AoRs) of the Central Grouping of Forces north and west of Pokrovsk and of the Southern Grouping of Forces against Kostyantynivka.[61] Mashovets warned that the command of the 51st CAA may reallocate its forces and means to an effort to advance northward along the Kazennyi Torets River toward Druzhkivka to flank the Kostyantynivka effort, but noted that the 51st CAA requires frequent and often prolonged tactical pauses, which would inhibit the 51st CAA's ability to switch operational objectives and sustain a new effort.[62]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) operating in the Pokrovsk direction may have redeployed back to the Novopavlivka direction or to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the AoR of the 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the Oleksandrivka direction.[63]

Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian frontline drone launch points and logistics in the Pokrovsk direction

. Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian logistics hub in central Pokrovsk.[64] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian drone launch pads and antennas within Pokrovsk.[65]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 21 but did not advance.[66]

Russian forces conducted limited infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 21 but did not advance.[67]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian positions in eastern Kalynivske (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[68]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Komar (east of Oleksandrivka) overnight.[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants tanker truck near occupied Horlivka (roughly 29 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[70] Geolocated footage published on June 21 confirms the Horlivka tanker truck strike.[71] Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Russian trucks burning following a Ukrainian drone strike on the H-20 Donetsk City-Mariupol highway near occupied Kremenivka (roughly 93 kilometers from the frontline) and Volnovakha (roughly 73 kilometers from the frontline).[72]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 20 and 21 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Orikhiv.[74]

Geolocated footage published on June 20 and 21 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central Stepanohirsk (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared adjacent Russian positions of infiltrators.[75] Additional geolocated footage published on June 20 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position northwest of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[76] Additional geolocated footage published on June 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 21 that Russian forces seized southern Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and advanced to central Novodanylivka.[78]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on the evening of June 20 that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) reconnected to the electrical grid after losing offsite power for 4.5 hours.

[79]

Ukrainian forces continue striking Russian military assets and interdicting Russian logistics as part of

their intermediate-range strikes campaign in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert Magyar Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian logistics vehicles near Osipenko (about 92 kilometers from the frontline) and Terpinnya (about 62 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on June 20 to 21.[80] Geolocated footage published on June 21 confirms that Ukrainian forces struck trucks along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway west of Osipenko and Terpinnya.[81] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge near Petershahen (about 31 kilometers from the frontline) and Russian drone control points near Myrne (one of multiple settlements between the frontline and about 93 kilometers from the frontline) and Novoivanivka (one of multiple settlements between the frontline and about 86 kilometers from the frontline).[82]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 21. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo rejected claims of traffic restrictions and logistical problems in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.

Saldo claimed on June 20 that reports about the alleged preparation of evacuation buses, the imminent closure of traffic toward occupied Crimea, and the closure of the administrative border between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea are false.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 17 that Russian authorities closed the Dzhankoi checkpoint and the railway station near the Kherson-Crimea administrative border following Ukrainian strikes in the area.[84]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 20 to 21.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M /S-400 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast, two Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Ryazan Oblast, and 105 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol-type loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Kacha and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 96 drones, that two ballistic missiles and six drones struck six locations, and that debris fell on five locations.
[86]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged a postal enterprise on the outskirts of Kharkiv City and that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders at the enterprise.[87] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Kyiv City and civilian infrastructure in Izmail Raion, Odesa Oblast.[88]

Russian forces are intensifying strikes against Ukrainian logistics in Zaporizhzhia City. Zaporizhia Oblast officials reported that Russian forces launched 10 glide bombs on a roadway and civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least five civilians and injuring 12.[89]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying strikes against Ukrainian postal infrastructure.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Chairperson Mykola Lukashuk reported that Russian strikes against Nikopol Raion hit a Ukrposhta (Ukrainian postal service) vehicle on June 20 and that Russian forces have used drones to destroy four such vehicles within the past week (since about June 13).[90]

Russian forces struck a Ukrainian post office in Zaporizhzhia City on June 19.[91]

Russian forces have intensified their long-range drone and missile strikes and use of glide bombs against Ukraine in 2026.

The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 19, citing data from the Ukrainian Air Force, that Russian forces launched an average of 74 ballistic missiles against Ukraine each month in 2026 and that Ukrainian forces downed roughly one-third of the ballistic missiles.[92] The NYT reported that Russian forces launched an average of six missiles per month in 2023, 28 missiles per month in 2024, and 49 missiles per month in 2025 by comparison. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 21, citing data from a Ukrainian military institute, that Russian forces are estimated to launch over 75,000 guided glide bombs in 2026 based on current trends, compared to about 60,000 guided glide bombs launched in 2025.[93] ISW observed as early as April 2026 reports of Ukrainian officials warning about Russia preparing to increase the frequency and intensity of combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in order to shape the battlefield for the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[94]

Russian forces are reportedly using a new Shahed strike drone variant with a double warhead that

stores cluster munitions, which can allow Russian forces to remotely mine areas while pursuing targets.

A Ukrainian source, citing information from unspecified Ukrainian forces, reported on June 21 that Russian forces used a Shahed strike drone with a double warhead in an unspecified sector of the frontline and that the second warhead had cluster munitions.[95] The source noted that the second warhead consists of approximately 20 submunitions and that Russian forces are using this Shahed variant to remotely mine an 80-meter vicinity around the selected target. The source added that the Shahed variant can then pursue the target normally while the released munitions can detonate between two to 20 hours later.

Russian forces may have used a new S8000 Banderol cruise missile during a June 20 strike on Poltava Oblast.

A prominent Russian milblogger analyzed footage from June 20 and speculated that Russian forces may have used a new S8000 Banderol missile during a strike against Poltava Oblast.[96] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces first reported Russian forces using a Banderol missile in Spring 2025 and noted that the missile is relatively cheap, has a 115-kilogram warhead, and has a range of 500 to 700 kilometers. The milblogger stated that Russia designed Banderol as a light cruise missile that Russian forces could launch from helicopters and drones.

Ukrainian interceptor drones are reportedly unable to systematically combat Russian jet-powered strike drones.

A commander of a Ukrainian counter-drone battalion reported on June 21 that Ukrainian interceptor drones are unable to reliably intercept high-speed strike drones, such as jet-powered Shaheds, because Ukrainian interceptors need to fly at faster speeds.[97] The commander noted that Ukrainian interceptors lack necessary battery capacity to maintain the high speeds necessary to pursue and intercept these high-speed drones and that poor weather conditions such as clouds and rain further constrain interceptors' targeting. The commander added that interceptors with optical guidance systems also struggle pursuing and intercepting high-speed drones in poor weather conditions but that Ukrainian forces will soon develop countermeasures for these high-speed drones.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested for the second time since June 19 that Belarus dismantle equipment along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border that Russia uses to strike Ukraine.[98] Zelensky made a request to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on June 21 that Belarus takes down special equipment on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border that helps Russia launch drones against Ukraine.[99] Zelensky specified that there are four Russian and Belarusian repeaters in Gomel and Brest oblasts, likely referring to systems that allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges and with greater precision. Zelensky stated that these repeaters support Russian strikes against railway and energy infrastructure in Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is aware of Belarusian enterprises that supply critical components for Russian armored vehicles and missile systems for the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on June 19 that he is giving Lukashenko a week (until June 26) to dismantle communications equipment in border areas that Russia uses for strikes against Ukraine.[100]

Russia continues to rely on Belarusian gasoline and diesel fuel supplies amidst widespread fuel shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[101]

Zelensky stated on June 21 that Russian imports of Belarusian gasoline increased 13 times and imports of diesel increased three times in the period from January through May 2026, compared with the same period in 2025.[102]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19566; <https://t.me/SBUkr/17858> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>; <https://suspilne dot>

[media/crimea/1336070-u-kerci-urazeno-naftovij-terminal-tes-terminal-1-na-obekti-vinikla-pozeza/](https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1336070-u-kerci-urazeno-naftovij-terminal-tes-terminal-1-na-obekti-vinikla-pozeza/);

<https://suspilne dot media/1336060-sbu-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-port-kavkaz-i-naftobazu-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-rf/>;
https://t.me/usf_army/2104
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19566; <https://t.me/SBUkr/17858> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>; <https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1336070-u-kerci-urazeno-naftovij-terminal-tes-terminal-1-na-obekti-vinikla-pozeza/>;
<https://suspilne dot media/1336060-sbu-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-port-kavkaz-i-naftobazu-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-rf/>;
https://t.me/usf_army/2104
[3] https://t.me/usf_army/2104
[4] https://t.me/usf_army/2104
[5] https://t.me/usf_army/2104
[6] <https://t.me/SBUkr/17858>
[7] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2507; https://t.me/usf_army/2106
[8] <https://x.com/klinger66/status/2068652824167059719?s=20>;
<https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2068611263500812677>; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36599;
https://t.me/robert_magyar/2507; https://x.com/GeoCrow_/status/2068662424383742220;
http://t.me/exilenova_plus/23450; https://t.me/supernova_plus/54178 ;
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2068513102279418325>;
<https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2068529315617165446> ;
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2068531799551353106>;
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2068534327676436813> ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23428;
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2068728872716419312> ;
[9] <https://t.me/opershtab23/16435>
[10] <https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2068721257601016153>; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23449;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23448; <https://t.me/milinfo/174668>; <https://military dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-ukrayiny-urazyly-try-rosijski-paromy-v-rajoni-portu-kavkaz/>
[11] <https://t.me/Aksenov82/9732> ; https://t.me/tass_agency/381676
[12] <https://t.me/Aksenov82/9733>; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/21/u-krymu-na-vsi-azs-prypynyly-prodavaty-palyvo-yurydychnym-ta-fizychnym-osobam/>;
<https://www.facebook.com/reel/1004400571947098>
[13] <https://t.me/razvozhaev/21672>
[14] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>
[15] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/27827265>
[16] <https://mintrans dot gov.ru/activities/324/330>; <https://kuban dot rbc.ru/krasnodar/05/02/2026/698499709a794725074eea9c>
[17] <https://t.me/milinfo/174668>
[18] <https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/06/2026/6a37d7319a7947d5a1145c56>;
<https://t.me/crimeaenergy/6229>
[19] <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102658> ; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102652>;
<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102620>; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102609>;
<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102601>; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102599>;
<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102598>; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102597> ;
<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102596> ; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102595>;
<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102593>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73012>
[20] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2508
[21] <https://t.me/SBUkr/17858>
[22] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-me>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>
[23] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>
[24] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-me>

https://t.me/robert_magyar/2507; https://t.me/usf_army/2106
[25] <https://t.me/rybar/81233>
[26] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/06/21/zdolaly-majzhe-2500-kilometriv-sso-urazyly-tyumenskyj-npz/>;
https://t.me/ukr_sof/2983 ; <https://suspilne.media/1335978-sso-urazili-odin-iz-najviddalenisih-npz-rosii-droni-podolali-2500-km/>;
<https://x.com/ZelenskyUa/status/2068393653752455616?s=20> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/> ;
[27] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233> ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/34961> ; <https://t.me/severnnyi/8455>
[28] <https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2068616696252735653>;
<https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2067637135637672308>; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29528
[29] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>
[30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961> ; <https://t.me/severnnyi/8455>
[31] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>
[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>;
<https://t.me/grvZapad/18920>
[33] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2068578868659683778 ;
<https://www.tiktok.com/@llexaman/video/7653475666742234389>
[34] <https://t.me/grvZapad/18921>
[35] <https://t.me/grvZapad/18923>
[36]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/>
[37] <https://t.me/grvZapad/18925>
[38]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025/>
[39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>; https://t.me/mod_russia/64775; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/52894>
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12246; <https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/2775>
[41] <https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/206846590898180500>; <https://t.me/shock3OA/7638>
[42] <https://t.me/divgen/81757>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>; <https://t.me/grvZapad/18920>;
<https://t.me/divgen/81768>
[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/64778
[44] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117561>
[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>; <https://t.me/sashakots/62480>
[46] <https://suspilne.media/donbas/1335720-infiltracia-zamist-sturmu-vijskovi-rf-diut-malimi-grupami-j-atakuut-fpv-dronami-u-kostanti>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs>
[47] <https://t.me/sashakots/62480>
[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/64776; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117533>; <https://t.me/sashakots/62480>
[49]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/>
[50] <https://t.me/wargonzo/34971>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34975> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34978>
[51]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025/>

[52] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117548>;
[53] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3459>
[54] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3460>
[55] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1335844-oficer-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-rf-posilue-pihotu-ta-vvodit-rezervi-j-pidgotovlenih-stur>
[56] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1336204-protivnik-zataguetsa-v-pokrovsk-tisne-v-pivnicnomu-i-pivnicno-zahidnomu-napramku-u-r>
[57] https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/841; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12250;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11557;
https://www.instagram.com/favorit_battalion/reel/DWW3k0vAukD/;
<https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2037336778814705984>
[58] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3461>
[59] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3460>
[60] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3460>
[61] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3461>
[62] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3462>
[63] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3459>
[64] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36590; <https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1564>
[65] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1336204-protivnik-zataguetsa-v-pokrovsk-tisne-v-pivnicnomu-i-pivnicno-zahidnomu-napramku-u-r>
[66] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>;
[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961>; https://t.me/voin_dv/19891
[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12247; <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1315800330730595>
[69] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>
[70] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2507 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2106
[71] <https://x.com/klinger66/status/2068636267022090590>;
https://x.com/usf_army/status/2068624169881702582
[72] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2068379464640196887; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23387;
<https://x.com/giK1893/status/2068394372513648796>;
[73] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19891
[74] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40256> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40233> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40231> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/34961> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/52905>
[75] <https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/2068437806872146320>;
<https://x.com/ukrgeonews/status/2068360496013582558>;
<https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2068642299123249307>; <https://t.me/Stavrubezh/85> ;
<https://t.me/UVO58/1659>;
[76] <https://t.me/UVO58/1659>; <https://x.com/jimhelloman555/status/2068520290640969766>;
<https://t.me/rybar/81176>
[77] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12249; <https://t.me/bolgarodessaanbu/270>
[78] <https://t.me/divgen/81771> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/52908>
[79] <https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2068378280768500165> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/>
[80] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2507 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2106
[81] <https://x.com/klinger66/status/2068636267022090590> ;
https://x.com/usf_army/status/2068624169881702582
[82] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40249>
[83] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/27825729>
[84] <https://t.me/rybar/81143>
[85] <https://t.me/kpszsu/65808>
[86] https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27148 ; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30315>
[87] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1336264-rosiani-atakuvali-troma-aviabombami-tec-v-peredmisti-harkova-terehov/>;
https://t.me/dsns_telegram/66565; <https://armyinform dot>

com.ua/2026/06/21/pid-harkovom-vorozhi-drony-atakuvaly-poshtovyj-terminal-i-sprychynyly-velyku-pozhezhu/
https://t.me/synegubov/23008; https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/1335842-rosiani-povtorno-vdarili-po-ratuvalnikah-pid-cas-gasinna-pozezi-na-postovomu-terminali-
[88] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4176; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4177; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4179;
https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4180; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/66579 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16929
[89] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/69442 ; https://armyinformdot
com.ua/2026/06/20/u-zaporizhzhzhi-5-zagyblyh-pislya-rosijskogo-udaru-vorog-skynuv-kaby-na-misto/
https://suspilne dot
media/1335900-rf-pidgotuvala-novij-masovaniy-udar-v-zaporizzi-vnaslidok-ataki-e-zagibli-1579-den-vijni/?anchor=
https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62761; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62753; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/62778;
https://suspilne dot
edia/zaporizhzhzia/1336134-ataka-na-azs-u-zaporizzi-21-cervna-e-poranena-ludina/
t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/42378;
[90] https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27148
[91]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/
[92] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/19/world/europe/ukraine-drone-attacks-ballistic-missiles.html
[93] https://www.ft.com/content/b409d72f-ccff-4952-8b71-dfd62d75a1cd
[94]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[95] https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42865
[96] https://t.me/milinfo/174675
[97] https://military dot com/uk/news/drony-perehoplyuvachi-reaktyvni-shahedy/
[98]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/
[99] https://www dot
president.gov.ua/news/sogodni-vnochi-ta-najblizhchim-chasom-treba-osoblivo-uvazhno-105061
[100]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/
[101]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/
[102] https://www dot
president.gov.ua/news/sogodni-vnochi-ta-najblizhchim-chasom-treba-osoblivo-uvazhno-105061
Previous