

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026

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Toplines

Ukrainian forces conducted another strike near Moscow City on the night of June 21 to 22 - the third strike against Russia's capital area in the past week.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Space Communications Center in Dubna, Moscow Oblast (just northwest of Moscow City and about 540 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian international border).[1] The center is a major ground hub that connects satellites with terrestrial communication networks and manages satellite links across Russia and abroad.[2]

Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows smoke rising in Dubna.[3] The Dubna Space Communications Center's parent company, the State Space Communications Company, reported on June 22 that a large-scale Ukrainian drone strike hit the center but that the strike did not disrupt television broadcasts and communications.[4] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyenin claimed on June 22 that Russian forces downed 84 drones en route to Moscow City in the past day and that the drone strikes did not cause any damage.[5] Ukrainian forces recently struck Moscow City, including the Moscow Oil Refinery, on June 15-16 and June 17-18.[6]

Russian authorities have reportedly been trying to strengthen air defenses covering Moscow City in recent weeks, including possibly at the expense of frontline areas.

Open-source analysts assessed on June 20 that satellite imagery collected on June 4 suggests Russia started constructing a new S-400 air defense installation at the Moskvoretsky Historical and Nature Park west of Moscow City in late May 2026.[7] The open-source analysts assessed that the size and shape of the construction site are similar to other S-400 sites near Moscow City and noted that the new construction sits on one of the highest elevation points west of the capital. The

Telegraph

also reported on June 22 that Russia redeployed a Pantsir air defense system from an unspecified area of the frontline and installed it on a tower near the Moscow Oil Refinery in southeastern Moscow City.[8] The

Telegraph

noted that the Pantsir system includes a protective metal cage similar to those located near the frontline, leading Ukrainian military experts to assess that Russia redeployed the system from the frontline to Moscow City. The

Telegraph

added that online imagery of the moved Pantsir shows that it has only two of the standard six launch missiles on one side, suggesting that Russia may be suffering from a Pantsir interceptor missile shortage. CBS News recently reported, citing Ukrainian official sources, that Russia is experiencing a shortage of S-300 air defense missiles as Western sanctions have limited Russia's quantity of key components.[9] The

Telegraph's

report suggests that the shortages may be affecting multiple types of air defense systems. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's intensifying long-range and intermediate-range strike campaigns are imposing additional competing requirements for air defenses across Russia's operational and deep rears, compounding Russia's air defense challenges given the vast amount of land and large number of facilities Russia must protect.[10] Ukraine's strike campaign has forced Russia to make difficult decisions about where to allocate its limited air defense assets.[11] Ukrainian strikes disabling Russian air defense radars over the past months are also likely contributing to Russia's inability to sufficiently repel strikes even in areas with increased air defense protection.

Ukraine continues to expand the intensity and range of its intermediate- and long-range strike campaign.

Russian opposition source Meduza analyzed coordinates of Ukrainian strikes against trucks and other military targets in occupied Ukraine from open-source geolocation organization GeoConfirmed since April 2023 and found that Ukrainian forces greatly increased their median strike depth in May and June 2026 to several tens of kilometers from several kilometers in previous months.[12] French open-source analyst Clement Molin verified footage confirming that Ukrainian forces struck at least 500 Russian trucks and vehicles in occupied Ukraine between May 1 and June 18 and that geolocated footage confirms 270 such Ukrainian strikes since January 2026.[13] Meduza noted that Ukrainian forces significantly increased their strikes against rear areas of the Russian Eastern

Grouping of Forces, which is operating in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, including heavily targeting sections of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in southwestern Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, in May 2026 but have reduced the intensity of their strikes in these areas in June 2026 as Ukrainian forces have shifted their strikes westward toward occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea. Meduza reported that Ukrainian forces have started to expand their strike campaign against Russian rear areas in the Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 210 intermediate-range strikes in occupied Ukraine in May 2026 and 145 thus far in June 2026.

Ukrainian forces are also expanding the range of their long-range strike capabilities, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on June 21 that new Ukrainian Fire Point drones recently struck targets up to 2,070 kilometers in depth and that Ukrainian drones will soon be able to strike targets up to 3,000 kilometers deep.[14] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets since March 2026.[15] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 18 long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia in April 2026, 33 in May 2026, and 28 thus far in June 2026.

Ukrainian strikes continue to exacerbate Russian gasoline shortages and inhibit Russian logistics to occupied Ukraine.

Ukraine's intensified strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and logistics since March 2026 has led to gasoline shortages across occupied Ukraine and in many Russian regions, and Russian authorities have thus far struggled to adjust and address these shortages.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on June 22 that Russian fuel prices are rising amid ongoing shortages but claimed that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers is coordinating with oil companies to resolve the issue.[17] Peskov further claimed that Russian authorities are working to minimize the consequences of Ukrainian strikes against Crimea and to ensure fuel supplies to the population there.[18] Russian authorities are also introducing more restrictions on gasoline purchases and encouraging civilians to reduce their private travel to combat the shortages.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that some are proposing that Russia shift to mini refineries to help combat the shortages but noted that this measure would not cover Russia's domestic demand and that Russia would have to return to using defunct AI-76 and AI-80 gasoline rather than replacing currently available gasoline.[20] Russian occupation authorities are also further restricting travel along key logistics arteries into occupied Crimea. Russian authorities temporarily closed traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 22, likely due to nearby Ukrainian strikes.[21] Crimean occupation authorities also recently shut off gasoline

sales to any non-state entities and suspended ferry operations.[22] Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov announced on June 22 that authorities are suspending all children's camps in occupied Crimea until September 1, 2026.[23]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise that produces components for Russian cruise missiles and air defenses in Voronezh Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used unspecified high-precision, air-launched cruise missiles to strike an enterprise in Voronezh City on June 22 that produces components for Russian missiles.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces components for Russia's Kh-101 cruise missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows smoke plumes near the Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Plant in Voronezh City.[25] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian air defense downed 18 drones and several unspecified high-speed aerial targets over Voronezh City and acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged a production facility in the city.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukraine may have used a Storm Shadow missile in the strike.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed, however, that Ukraine may have used a US-supplied Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) to strike Voronezh City.[28] The US Air Force launched the ERAM procurement program in 2024 specifically to provide Ukraine with affordable, mass-producible long-range strike weapons, and the United States approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine in August 2025 that allotted for up to 3,350 ERAMs.[29] ISW is unable to confirm the specific weapon Ukrainian forces employed in this strike at this time.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted another strike near Moscow City on the night of June 21 to 22 - the third

strike against Russia's capital area in the past week.

Russian authorities have reportedly been trying to strengthen air defenses covering Moscow City in recent weeks, including possibly at the expense of frontline areas.

Ukraine continues to expand the intensity and range of its intermediate- and long-range strike campaign.

Ukrainian strikes continue to exacerbate Russian gasoline shortages and inhibit Russian logistics to occupied Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise that produces components for Russian cruise missiles and air defenses in Voronezh Oblast.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces launched one missile and 88 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 21 to 22.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for additional reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russia.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that the Ukrainian strike against the Kavkaz port in Krasnodar Krai on June 21 damaged port infrastructure and two ferries.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russia uses the port to supply the Russian military in southern Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[31]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 22 that Russian forces entered Nova Sich and Kyianytsia (both north of Sumy City).[32]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Ilek-Penkovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly three kilometers from the international border).[33]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 21 and 22 but did not advance.

[34] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces regularly send a few soldiers to attack Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) in order to create the impression of constant fighting in the area.[35] The source noted that Russian forces have not advanced beyond the settlement's northern outskirts in the past few months (since late April 2026) and have not gained a foothold in the area.

Russian forces are reportedly using a record high number of drones in the Vovchansk direction.

A drone operator of a Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems company operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) reported on June 22 that the area has one of the highest densities of drones per square kilometers on the front.[36] The drone operator noted the area does not have the highest number of attacks but does have the highest number of Russian drones. The drone operator added that Russian forces have used the Vovchansk direction to test new systems and tactics, such as fiber optic drones, motorcycle assaults, and infiltrations.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 22.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv

Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces stated on June 22 that Russian forces recently seized Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[37]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 and 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Kupyansk and northern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova on June 21 and 22 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Borova.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian state media continue to make aggrandized claims about alleged Russian advances in Lyman and Kostyantynivka, including by publishing likely artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage.

The Russian MoD claimed on June 22 that elements of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District [CMD]) are advancing in southern and southwestern Lyman.[40] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources published footage purportedly showing Russian forces raising a flag in Lyman, however ISW has not been able to verify the footage and has reason to believe the footage may be AI-altered.[41] The Russian MoD also issued exaggerated claims about Russian advances in Kostyantynivka on June 22, and Kremlin newswire TASS published possibly AI-altered footage showing Russian forces holding Russian flags in the city.[42] Russian officials have recently intensified their campaign to use likely AI-altered footage to further their aggrandized claims of Russian successes near Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[43] These videos are part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims of gains to falsely portray the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[44]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions and strikes against Ukrainian logistics in the Slovyansk direction.

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on June 22 that Russian forces are both conducting small group infiltration missions and are trying to advance in frontal assaults under the cover of light and heavy equipment.[45] The brigade reported that Russian forces are trying to accumulate artillery and drone supplies near occupied settlements in the area and to evacuate equipment after recent failed mechanized assaults. A Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) platoon commander reported on June 22 that Russian forces are interdicting Ukrainian logistics with guided glide bombs and sleeper drones.[46] The commander noted that Russian forces are including using radio-controlled drones as there is a shortage of fiber optic drones.

Ukrainian sources continue to note that the situation in Kostyantynivka is serious, as Russian forces rely on tactics like those used to seize Pokrovsk.

Three Ukrainian servicemembers operating in Kostyantynivka told the BBC's Russian Service on June 22 that the situation in Kostyantynivka is not as catastrophic as Russian officials claim but is serious.[47] The Ukrainian soldiers stated that Russian infantry are advancing into the city from the south and east and are operating on the northern outskirts. The soldiers noted, however, that this does not mean Russian forces have seized the city as Kostyantynivka is a contested 'gray zone'. The Ukrainian servicemembers noted that the pace of Russian advances in Kostyantynivka remains extremely slow, with Russian forces advancing less than 100 meters per day likely due to Ukrainian drone strikes. The sources reported that Russian drone operators' main priority is to identify and strike Ukrainian drone crews in order to allow Russian infantry to move undetected through the 'kill zone' (an area of elevated drone strike risk). The Ukrainian sources assessed that Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in southern occupied Ukraine is not yet having a significant impact on the situation in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian forces similarly heavily used infiltration tactics and targeted Ukrainian drone operators in their seizure of Pokrovsk.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

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Russian milbloggers claimed on June 22 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) and in northern Kostyantynivka.[50]

Russian forces are attempting to break through toward Dobropillya north of Pokrovsk.

The spokesperson for the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on June 22 that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward the Fortress Belt from the Pokrovsk direction by advancing to Dobropillya from two directions.[51] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces' main efforts are in the directions of Rodynske and Bilytske (both north of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya) and that Russian forces are also trying to advance toward Dobropillya through Pokrovsk and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya).

Russian forces are increasingly interdicting Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction using first-person view (FPV) drones.

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 22 that Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian logistics by increasing their FPV drone strikes that can reach targets within 20-30 kilometers.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Pokrovsk direction on June 22.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone operator training ground near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and a command and observation post near Pokrovsk.[53]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 22 but did not advance.

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Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central and southeast of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone operator training ground near Perebudova (east of Oleksandrivka and roughly four kilometers from the frontline).[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes against trucks along the H-20 Donetsk City-Mariupol highway northeast of Kremeniivka and northeast of Volnovakha (roughly 92 kilometers and 75 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[57]

Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows elements of the Russian Ratibor Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) striking Ukrainian positions near Hrushkivske (northeast of Oleksandrivka), the first evidence ISW has observed of this battalion operating on the battlefield.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 21 and 22 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.

[59]

Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position northwest of Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces either maintained a tactical position that Russian forces bypassed with infiltration missions or that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators from the area.[60]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 21 and 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Mali Shcherbakiv and in eastern and western Stepanivka (both west of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged a road bridge near Vasylivka (southwest of Orikhiv and roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) that Russian

forces use to transfer troops and supplies.[62] Footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian glide bombs destroying the Karachokrak River crossing near Vasylivka along the E105 Zaporizhzhia City-Vasylivka highway.[63] Additional footage published on June 22 shows fires at the main railyard in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) after a Ukrainian strike, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for June 22 shows heat anomalies at the railyard.[64]

Russian forces reportedly used Geran drones to strike Ukrainian oil infrastructure in Zaporizhia Oblast on June 22.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 22 that Russian forces conducted a Geran drone strike against a fuel storage facility at the Kantserivka oil depot near Vysokohirne (just north of Kantserivka and roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[65]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 22. See topline text for reports on the effects of Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 21 to 22.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 88 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 79 drones, that the ballistic missile and five drones struck six locations, and that drone debris fell on nine locations.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, energy, and educational infrastructure in Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Sumy oblasts.[67] Ukrainian drone manufacturer General Chereshnya reported on June 22 that Russian forces struck one of its production facilities at an unspecified location.[68] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[69]

Russian forces struck several civilian merchant vessels in the Black Sea on June 21 to 22.

The Ukrainian Navy reported that a Russian drone struck and started a fire on the Turkish-owned Victress

vessel that was flying the Panamanian flag.[70] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba stated that the Russian strike killed one crew member from Egypt on the Panamanian-flagged vessel and caused significant damage to the ship.[71] Kuleba stated that Russian forces also struck vessels that were flying the flags of Palau and Belize on the same night but that the vessels were able to continue their journey.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Ukraine continues to push Belarus to stop its direct support of the Russian military.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly requested for the third time since June 19 that Belarus dismantle signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border that are helping Russian forces coordinate drone strikes against Ukraine.[72] Zelensky also stated that Belarus needs to stop supplying fuel to the Russian military.[73] A source claimed on June 20 that Belarusian authorities disconnected Russian mobile operator MTS following Zelensky's public statements, but other sources denied this claim.[74] The operating status of MTS in Belarus remains unclear.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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