

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

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Toplines

Belarusian signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border reportedly ceased operations as of June 22 following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's warning that Belarus must disable the repeaters no later than June 26.

Zelenskyy stated on June 24 that the Russian-installed signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, which allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges deep into western Ukraine, have not been operational since June 22.[1] Zelenskyy stated that it is not clear whether Belarus fully dismantled the repeaters or simply suspended their use at this time. Zelenskyy has repeatedly asked Belarus to dismantle the signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, as they allow Russian forces to carry out higher-precision strikes against Ukraine, and recently warned that Ukraine would strike the equipment if Belarus refused to do so by June 26.[2]

The Kremlin is intensifying pressure on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to expand Belarusian involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine. Lukashenko continues trying to resist the Kremlin's demands while maintaining Russia's approval.

The

Wall Street Journal

(

WSJ

) reported on June 23, citing Russian and European officials, that the Kremlin is pressuring Lukashenko to allow Russia to more actively leverage Belarus in its war effort against Ukraine.[3]

WSJ

reported that the Kremlin is trying to sway Belarus into allowing Russian forces to launch drones against Ukraine from the Belarusian territory and extend the frontline westward to force Ukraine to redeploy troops from the frontline to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. A former Russian intelligence officer briefed on the matter told

WSJ

that the Kremlin is threatening to withdraw financial support from Belarus in case of noncompliance. The Kremlin continues to frame Ukraine as a threat to Belarus. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 24 that Russia will always stand by Belarus and repel threats against Belarus, including from Ukraine, as both Russia and Belarus are security and economic allies.[4] Zelenskyy's report about how Belarus de facto responded to his ultimatum favorably by disabling repeaters indicates that Lukashenko continues resisting fully committing Belarus to the Kremlin's military endeavor. Minsk is instead trying to balance maintaining Russian support for Belarus while maintaining what remains of Belarus' degraded sovereignty.[5] Lukashenko has resisted allowing Russia to operationalize the Belarusian Armed Forces to support Russian operations in Ukraine or full-scale recruit Belarusians into the Russian military at scale since 2022.[6] Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian officials notably continue avoiding adopting the Kremlin's framing that portrays Ukraine as a threat to Belarus.[7] Lukashenko continues to stall and deflect the Kremlin's intensified attempts to drag Belarus into the war in Ukraine while maintaining relatively neutral rhetoric towards Ukraine.[8]

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia's unwillingness to negotiate directly with Ukraine and assert Russia's commitment to its original maximalist war aims.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev on June 24 reiterated his confidence in Russian forces' ability to achieve all of Russia's war goals on the battlefield, dismissed Zelenskyy's legitimacy as Ukraine's president, and rejected direct dialogue with Ukraine to end the war.[9] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on June 24 that Russia is ready to listen to US negotiators during their next visit to Russia but noted that Russia will not accept freezing the current frontline as a condition to resume negotiations on Ukraine.[10] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on June 24 that Russia remains committed to the peace settlement plans that the US and Russia allegedly agreed to during the Alaska Summit in August 2025 and that the Kremlin is not interested in dealing with the European Union (EU) as a negotiator.[11] Russian officials have routinely alleged that the US and Russia reached an agreement following the US-Russian meetings in Alaska in August 2025, despite the lack of public statements following the summit and no confirmation that any agreement was reached.[12] The Kremlin alleges that the US and Russia

reached an agreement in order to advance a narrative that Russia is willing to negotiate and to assert that the US is not abiding by the terms of a supposed agreement. The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from being involved in the peace negotiations and has rejected several Ukrainian proposals for a high-level negotiations meeting.[13] The Kremlin's routine rejection to hold negotiations to discuss compromise peace proposals signals Moscow's continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that do not amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and fulfill Russia's maximalist demands.[14]

Russian authorities are implementing measures to combat intensifying gasoline shortages in Moscow City amid growing domestic gasoline and aviation fuel shortages in Russia.

Russian opposition source Meduza reported on June 23 that Moscow City mayor's office removed the requirement that fuel tankers enter Moscow City with travel permits to ensure an uninterrupted gasoline supply in Moscow City amid worsening country-wide gasoline shortages.[15] On June 24, Russian State Duma Economic Policy Committee Deputy Chairperson Mikhail Delyagin acknowledged the gasoline shortages and traffic jams in Moscow City.[16] Meduza reported on June 24 that Russian Azimuth Airlines claimed that Russia has reached a critical aviation fuel situation with rising gasoline prices and aviation fuel shortages.[17] Reuters reported on June 24 that Russia is negotiating with Kazakhstan the purchase of about 50,000 tons of AI-92 gasoline to alleviate Russian gasoline shortages.[18] Ukraine's intensified strike campaign against Russian refineries and Russian logistics since March 2026 has renewed shortages across occupied Ukraine and extended to many Russian regions.[19] Further Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely exacerbate shortages spreading across Russia and existing gasoline and aviation fuel shortages.[20]

Key Takeaways

Belarusian signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border reportedly ceased operations as of June 22 following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's warning that Belarus must disable the repeaters no later than June 26.

The Kremlin is intensifying pressure on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to expand Belarusian involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine. Lukashenko continues trying to resist the Kremlin's demands while maintaining Russia's approval.

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia's unwillingness to negotiate directly with Ukraine and assert Russia's commitment to its original maximalist war aims.

Russian authorities are implementing measures to combat intensifying gasoline shortages in Moscow City amid growing domestic gasoline and aviation fuel shortages in Russia.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian gas processing infrastructure in Orenburg Oblast overnight on June 23 to 24. Russian forces launched 101 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian gas processing and communications infrastructure on the night of June 23 to 24.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck Orenburg Gas Processing Plant and Orenburg Helium Plant in Orenburg Oblast - over 1,200 kilometers from the frontline - causing a fire.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Orenburg gas processing and helium plants together form one of the world's largest combined gas-chemical complexes. The plants process natural gas and other products with military applications, reportedly accounting for 60 percent of all Gazprom Pererabotka's gas processing. Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows smoke rising from the Orenburg Gas Processing Plant.[22] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on June 24 that Russian air defenses intercepted several Ukrainian drones over an industrial facility in Orenburg City, Orenburg Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on June 24 that an overnight Ukrainian strike against the Vladimir Space Communications Center in Vladimir Oblast damaged two buildings and caused a fire.[24]

Western reporting and Ukrainian sources provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military assets in Russia.

Reuters reported on June 24 that Ukraine's June 16 and 18 strikes against the Kapotnya Oil Refinery in Moscow City forced the refinery to halt operations until the end of 2026, with at least six months of repair work.[25] Zelensky reported on June 24 that recent Ukrainian strikes against the Russian Baltic Fleet arsenal near St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, destroyed 6,000 tons of ammunition.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on June 24 that Ukraine's June 22 strikes against the Dubna Space Communications Center in Dubna, Moscow Oblast, damaged the hardware-module complex of the 32-meter MARK-IV antenna and technical and administrative buildings used for satellite communications, a nearby technical building, and the main production-administrative hardware-software building.[27] Zelensky added that Russian forces are relocating air defense systems from Russian regions to Moscow and the Kerch Bridge to defend against Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast.

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces stated that fighting is ongoing in Bachkivsk, Pysarivka, and Nova Sich (all north of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated the settlements.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Izvolzhanske (north of Sumy City).[29] The Ukrainian Kursk Group of Forces refuted the claimed seizure of Izvolzhanske and reported that Ukrainian forces fully control the settlement.[30]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone depot near Alekseyevka (one of several settlements between 10 and 60 kilometers from the frontline).[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

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Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Starytsya and in northern Kozacha Lopan (both north of Kharkiv City).[33]

Russian forces continue their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics in Kharkiv Oblast.

The MoD published footage on June 24 purporting to show Russian forces conducting a Geran strike against Ukrainian railway infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[34]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a hybrid bridging vehicle (KRAZ-2555) of the Russian 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) attempting to cross the Vovcha River in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command point near Zhuravlevka, Belgorod Oblast (north of Kharkiv City and roughly two kilometers from the international border).[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne and Khatnie (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in

southern Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]

Ukrainian interdiction of Russian logistics in the Kupyansk direction is inflicting heavy Russian losses that are forcing Russian forces to change their offensive tactics.

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on June 24 that the Russian forces attacked in groups of four to eight servicemembers in February and March of 2026 but are now attacking in groups of one to two servicemen or using ATVs or motorcycles for assaults.[39] The commander noted that heavy Russian losses, particularly in the Russian 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 26th Tank Regiment (all of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), forced Russian forces to change tactics. The commander added that Russian personnel often must travel five to seven kilometers on foot to deliver ammunition to the frontline. The commander reported that most of the Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction are largely comprised of elements of the 1st GTA (MMD) and that the Russian military command has largely kept the regiments and divisions operating in the Kupyansk direction, apart from occasionally transferring individual units to the direction for reinforcements.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on June 24 that Russian forces attacked between Zahryzove (northeast of Borova) and Borova.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions, and Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers near Rai-Oleksandrivka and Pazeno (both southeast of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[41] Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in northern and southeastern Lyman and east of Lyman in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[43]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows two Russian servicemembers operating in northern Illinivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[44]

The Russian MoD continues to engage in a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances in Kostyantynivka.

The Russian MoD continued on June 24 its recent pattern of publishing hyper-tactical details of alleged Russian gains in Kostyantynivka in order to aggrandize Russia's progress.[45] The MoD also published interviews with Russian servicemembers operating in Kostyantynivka describing claimed successes.[46] These continued claims are part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[47]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 23 to 24 but did not advance.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 23 and 24 but did not advance.[49]

Russian forces recently intensified KAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces continue slow but steady advances in the area.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 24 that Russian forces are increasingly using KAB glide bomb strikes in the Pokrovsk direction.[50] The spokesperson stressed that the Pokrovsk direction is currently one of the most active directions on the frontline and that both Ukrainian and Russian forces are actively using drones in the area, creating a large 'kill zone'. The spokesperson stated that current Russian advances are significantly slower compared to Winter 2026. The spokesperson noted that seasonal changes are contributing to Russian minor advances as denser vegetation allows Russian forces to better camouflage themselves, but that warmer weather complicates Russian provision of supplies.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction, as Ukrainian forces

advanced or maintained positions in the area.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 24 that Russian forces maintain positions at the confluence of the Solena and Vovcha rivers east of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and currently occupy Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka).[51] Mashovets stated that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks and managed to infiltrate to the left (east) bank of the Vovcha River northwest of Oleksandrohrad.[52] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced to the area between Sichneve and Vorone on a prior date (both east of Oleksandrivka).

The Russian military command has reinforced Russian forces in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions to halt Ukrainian counterattacks.

Mashovets reported that the Russian military command is simultaneously attempting to cut off Ukrainian positions east of Novopavlivka in the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and to stabilize the situation in the neighboring 29th CAA-s (Eastern Military District [EMD]) AoR northeast of Oleksandrivka.[53] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has reinforced the 90th Tank Division and 29th CAA with elements of several regiments and brigades. Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 36th CAA (EMD) are operating at the junction with the 29th CAA in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue conducting ground attacks in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka direction but have not been able to make significant tactical gains thus far.

Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and south of the N-15 Zaporizhia-Donetsk highway in late May and early June and that Russian forces are currently trying to prevent further Ukrainian advances in the area.[54] Mashovets noted that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance along the Orikhove-Novopavlivka line and push Ukrainian forces to the north from eastern Novopavlivka and to infiltrate to the north from Filiya (south of Novopavlivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces remain in southern Novopavlivka, north of the Solena River, and east of Ivanivka - the same positions Russian forces reached in early spring. Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division have concentrated efforts to hold their positions along the Filiya-Novopavlivka line rather than further advancing, which is enabling Ukrainian forces to maintain fire control over Russian supply routes in Novopavlivka.

Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Zelenyi Hai, Novokhatske, and Tovste (all northeast of Oleksandrivka) to break through toward Piddubne (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and cross the Mokri Yaly River toward Zirka (northeast of Piddubne) but have not made confirmed advances. Mashovets reported that Russian forces previously attacked in the Myrne-Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka-Oleksandrohrad directions (all northeast of Oleksandrivka) and managed to halt Ukrainian advances between Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve. Russian forces appear to have halted Ukrainian counterattacks and stabilized the frontline in the Oleksandrivka direction

. Mashovets reported that Russian forces have halted Ukrainian advances and stabilized the situation northeast of Oleksandrivka.[55] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command will likely redeploy elements from the Novopavlivka direction to reinforce other sections of the frontline but noted that the Russian military command has not made such redeployments so far and can still conduct a diversionary offensive action in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 23 and 24 but did not advance.[56]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 24 but as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[57]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Basan (southeast of Orikhiv and roughly 21 kilometers from the frontline) and Hrozove (southwest of Orikhiv and roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[58] Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks on the M-18 Zaporizhzhia City-Melitopol Highway near occupied Pivnichne (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) and on the M-14

Melitopol-Mariupol Highway near occupied Pryazovske (roughly 124 kilometers from the frontline).[59]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 24. A Russian strike killed two international demining specialists in Kherson Oblast.

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin and Kherson Oblast State Administration reported on June 24 that a Russian strike killed two and injured five demining specialists from the international humanitarian organization Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in Novopetrivka, Kherson Oblast.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel tanker on the P-47 Highway near Novooleksiivka (roughly 155 kilometers from the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River) and a Russian truck along the M-18 Highway near Chervone (roughly 168 kilometers from the right bank of the Dnipro River).[61]

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck Saky and Hvardiiske military airfields overnight, damaging four hangars at Saky Airfield.[62] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces also struck two unspecified weapon systems part of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and two Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems near Kerch. Magyar reported on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck Sevastopol's main electrical substation overnight.[63] Crimean occupation energy company Krymenergo stated on June 24 that there are power outages in occupied Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, Saky, and Dzhankoy, and Perekop and Yevpatoria raions, likely due to Ukrainian strikes.[64] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported that fires broke out at a warehouse of the 133rd Logistics and Support Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) in occupied Bakhchisarai (roughly 225 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian strike.[65]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 101 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 95 drones, that six drones struck five locations, and debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[67]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

See topline text.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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