

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/>

PDF generated from the original web publication.

Previous

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2026

Toplines

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.

[1]

Rubio stated on June 25 that there was only a 'proposal' in Anchorage but that parties did not come to an agreement during the Summit. Rubio noted that the Russian proposal included Russian control of Donbas among other demands. Rubio himself was part of the US diplomatic delegation in Anchorage and attended the high-level meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Putin claimed on June 23 that Russia will only negotiate on the basis of the alleged agreements from the Alaska Summit with the United States, which Rubio rejected exists.[3] Russian officials routinely invoke the alleged 'Anchorage agreements' to advance narratives about Russia's willingness to negotiate, despite the lack of public statements following the summit.[4]

The Russian cognitive warfare narrative aimed at painting the Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing appears to have so far failed to persuade Ukraine's partners to capitulate to Russia's demands. US President Donald Trump and US Deputy Secretary of State Jeremy Levin stated on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine currently has the battlefield advantage, demonstrating that Russia failed to convince the United States that the Ukrainian frontlines are collapsing.[5] Levin emphasized on June 24 that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are increasing the cost of war for Russia and are forcing Russia to divert resources away from the frontlines. Kremlin officials regularly make claims, aggrandize tactical Russian advances, and present false evidence as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort attempting to portray Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing - a coordinated campaign to pressure Ukraine and its partners into capitulating to Russia's demands in negotiations.[6] Ukrainian successful long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine and Russia along with Ukrainian tactical advances in several directions in Winter and Spring 2026 are dismantling the Russian false narrative of portraying Russian victory as inevitable.[7]

Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign against Russian refineries is exacerbating broader Russian inflationary pressures and complicating the Kremlin's efforts to conduct expansionary monetary policy. Bloomberg reported on June 24, citing the Russian Federal Statistics Service, that Russian gasoline prices rose three percent to \$0.95 USD per liter between June 16 and 22, the largest weekly increase in at least 20 years.[8] Bloomberg reported that Ukrainian strikes against Russia's largest fuel plants have driven Russians to panic-buy fuel, causing shortages and rising prices. A source familiar with the data told Bloomberg that Russian gasoline production has fallen 15 percent since June 2025 and nine percent since May 2026, likely due to intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 25 that widespread fuel shortages are affecting all Russian federal subjects (regions) except for Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kalmykia, Chukotka, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, though prices have increased nationwide.[9] Bloomberg reported that the inflationary effect of rising gasoline prices is seeping into other sectors due to increased production and transportation costs. Bloomberg reported that the Russian Economy Ministry data indicate that total annual inflation increased from 5.3 to 5.8 percent in June 2026. Economy-wide inflationary pressures may disrupt the Russian Central Bank's continued reductions to the key interest rate. The Russian Central Bank has lowered its key interest rate nine times since June 2025 from 21 percent to 14.25 percent as Russia has attempted to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.[10] Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on June 19 that the spike in domestic gasoline prices has affected June's inflation rate and may increase inflation expectations, implying that the Central Bank may need to change its calculations about the key interest rate if Ukraine's strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and inflation persist.[11] The Kremlin has exerted significant pressure on the Russian Central Bank and eroded its independence to lower the key interest rate as it attempts to continue expanding capital availability for the defense industry despite expansionary fiscal policies and gasoline shortages exacerbating Russian inflation.[12] The economic effects of Russia's gasoline shortage will also likely long outlast the physical gasoline shortages in the event that Russia is able to address the shortages. Russian gasoline shortages began in May 2026 and have already spread to the majority of Russian regions and caused inflation

to rise in a matter of weeks.[13] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to intensify their strike campaign against Russia oil infrastructure, exacerbate shortages, and increase inflationary pressure across Russia. Expanded inflationary pressures due to the Russian gasoline supply crisis may increase Central Bank resistance to lowering the key interest rate, complicating the Kremlin's push for expansionary monetary policies and creating administrative tensions.

The Russian military command likely continues to generate new formations on paper, but it remains unclear how or if Russia will be able to staff these formations to doctrinal endstrength.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 25 that the Russian military command has "adjusted its plans" and now intends to form an unspecified number of new divisions and five new brigades in 2026.[14] It is unclear whether Syrskyi is referring to an additional division and five new brigades or if he is remarking on the continued development of formations that the Russian military command announced in 2022 as part of broader military reforms. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions and later announced that Russia intended to stand up these new formations between 2023 and 2026.[15] The Russian military command also re-established the Moscow and Leningrad military districts from the former Western Military District as part of these reforms.[16] The Russian military command

has formed and deployed at least 10 new Russian divisions to combat since December 2022, although none of these nominally new formations are operating at their doctrinal endstrength.[17] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division; transformed previously existing brigades into the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions; transformed two existing naval infantry brigades into the 55th and 120th Naval Infantry divisions; and formed the 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in early 2026 that the Russian military command had only formed four new divisions out of the 17 planned maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades, which Russia had planned to form in 2025.

[18]

The Russian military command reportedly also plans to reorganize its 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into a naval infantry division, which would be the eleventh

new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.[19] The Russian military command is generating new formations nominally and only on paper, as Russian infantry-heavy tactics and economic and recruitment constraints will likely hinder the Russian military command from effectively implementing these reforms and fully staffing new formations as they come online.[20]

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on June 25.

French President Emmanuel Macron reported that the French Navy intercepted the Russian shadow fleet tanker

Deliver

on June 25 off the coast of Sicily in violation of maritime law.[21] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the

Deliver

was flying under the Cameroonian flag and left the Port of Primorsk on June 4 and turned off its AIS tracking on June 23. European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months in an effort to degrade Russia's ability to transport and thusly profit from sanctioned oil.[22]

Key Takeaways

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.

The Russian cognitive warfare narrative aimed at painting the Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing appears to have so far failed to persuade Ukraine's partners to capitulate to Russia's demands.

Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign against Russian refineries is exacerbating broader Russian inflationary pressures and complicating the Kremlin's efforts to conduct expansionary monetary policy.

The Russian military command likely continues to generate new formations on paper, but it remains unclear how or if Russia will be able to staff these formations to doctrinal endstrength.

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on June 25.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure within

Russia.

Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 90 drones against Ukraine overnight. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Poltavaska Oil Depot in Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the depot supplies oil to Russian forces in occupied Ukraine. Geolocated footage shows smoke and fires at the oil depot.[24] Krasnodar Krai officials acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the oil depot.[25] Ukraine-s Security Service (SBU) reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-Novoil and Bashneft-Ufanafokhim refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (over 1,500 kilometers from the frontline), causing fires to both primary AVT installations.[26] Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows fires at both refineries.[27]

Ukrainian sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukraine-s June 22 strike against the Vladimir Space Communications Center in Vladimir Oblast critically damaged the main 25-meter parabolic antenna, a roof antenna, the central part of the main hardware-software complex, and Hardware-Technical Building No. 1.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine-s June 24 strike against the Orenburg Gas Processing Plant in Orenburg Oblast damaged four gas processing units and halted production at the facility.

Ukraine-s Main Military Intelligence Directorate-s (GUR) Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) announced on June 24 that it launched Operation Torch against Russian gas infrastructure.

The LSR stated on June 24 that it struck six gas distribution facilities in Moscow and Tver oblasts and significantly damaged energy infrastructure, disrupting the operation of individual facilities.[29] The LSR stated that they have been preparing Operation Torch for several months in an effort to further degrade the Russian energy sector and deplete oil revenues.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Sopych, west of Chervona Zorya, and north of Sydorivka (all northwest of Sumy City).[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

.

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 24 and 25 but did not advance.

[32]

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 25 but did not advance.

[33]

Russian forces continued to strike energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows Russian forces conducting a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a transformer at a substation near Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 24 and 25 but did not advance.

[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive activity in the Borova direction on June 25 but did not advance.

[36]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck two rail bridges over the Aidar and Luhanchyk rivers, which Russian forces used to transfer troops and deliver ammunition to frontline positions.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near occupied Novohannivka (roughly 118 kilometers from the frontline).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 24 and 25 but did not advance.

[39]

Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southern Lyman, in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[40]

Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows Russian forces using three guided FAB-1500 glide bombs to strike a Ukrainian temporary deployment point located at the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 25 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a crossing over the Siverskyi Donets River near Mayaky (north of Slovyansk), dropped six glide bombs on the retreating Ukrainian forces near Shchurove (southwest of Lyman), and used four FAB-500 glide bombs to strike Ukrainian positions in western Lyman.[42] A Russian milblogger published footage on June 24 reportedly showing Russian forces conducting a FAB-1500 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions near Vysokoivanivka (east of Slovyansk).[43] These intensified glide bomb strikes are likely part of a Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at setting conditions for offensive operations against Slovyansk and depriving Ukrainian logistics to Lyman.

Russian forces are actively using strike drones to target Ukrainian logistics but are struggling to advance in the Lyman direction.

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 25 that the situation in the Lyman direction remains stable and that Russian forces are not making tactical gains.[44] The commander noted that Russian forces continue to actively use strike drones of various types capable of operating at greater depths and reach Ukrainian logistics routes with support from elements of the elite Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. The commander noted that Russian forces are not actively using heavy bomber drones in the Lyman direction at this time.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[45]

The Kremlin continues to propagate a systematic cognitive warfare effort alleging widespread Russian advances in Kostyantynivka.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued on June 25 its recent pattern of publishing hyper-detailed falsified reports about Russian gains in Kostyantynivka in order to aggrandize Russian successes.[46] Kremlin newswire TASS also published an interview on June 25 with the deputy commander of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) describing claimed advances in

Kostyantynivka.[47] These continued claims are part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort aimed at exaggerating Russian advances along the entire frontline, contrary to all available evidence.[48] Russian forces are increasingly using glide bombs in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported on June 24 that Russian forces have intensified glide bomb strikes against Druzhkivka in the past month.[49] A Russian milblogger posted footage on June 24 purporting to show Russian forces conducting FAB-1500 and FAB-250 guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Bilenke (north of Druzhkivka).[50]

Russian forces continue attempts to advance toward Dobropillya from positions north of Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on June 24 that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Dobropillya on two flanks - from Hryshyne (south of Dobropillya) and from Rodynske and Bilytske (both southeast of Dobropillya).[51] The 7th Corps reported that Russian forces use occupied Donetsk City, Horlivka, and Makiivka (all within 40 kilometers of the frontline) as logistics hubs to supply Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions and Kostyantynivka and Chasiv Yar directions. The 7th Corps reported that Russian forces are using Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad as springboards for accumulating forces and as a platform for deploying drone launch sites, repeaters, and electronic warfare (EW) systems, using urban development areas to camouflage equipment.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[53] Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian logistics and communications in the Pokrovsk direction to degrade Russian offensive capabilities.

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on June 25 that Russian forces continue to concentrate forces and resources in Pokrovsk in an attempt to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub but that Ukrainian forces are hampering Russian attempts to advance by striking their communication systems and drone launch points.[54] The 7th Corps noted that periodic Russian communication losses result in drone control disruptions, meaning that Russian forces have fewer drones operating at a given time, reducing Russia's ability to advance.

Russian forces are reportedly using electric motorized vehicles for offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction as gasoline shortages in Russia are intensifying.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 24 that Russian forces started using silent, likely electric, motorcycles and scooters to approach Ukrainian positions, likely due to ongoing Russian fuel shortages.[55]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 24 and 25 but did not advance.

[56]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in western Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[57]

Russian forces are attempting to regain previously-held positions in the Oleksandrivka direction as Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics are curtailing Russian offensive capabilities.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 25 that Russian forces are intensifying artillery strikes in order to hinder Ukrainian counterattacks and regain lost positions in the Oleksandrivka direction.[58] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on June 25 that Ukrainian offensive actions and strikes against Russian logistics are inhibiting Russian combat capabilities and forcing them to operate on a defensive footing.[59]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on June 24 and 25.

Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Shahed drone launch vehicle at the occupied Donetsk City International Airport (roughly 48 kilometers from the frontline).[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied Tsukuryne (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on June 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a bus,

engineering equipment, and eight trucks in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 25 but did not advance.

[63]

Russian forces appear to have reduced offensive intensity in the Hulyaipole direction to regroup and launch renewed offensives.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on June 25 that Russian forces have slightly reduced ground attacks in the Hulyaipole direction as Russian forces are regrouping forces and bringing up personnel to renew attacks in the neighboring Oleksandrivka and Orikhiv directions.[64] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have intensified drone and artillery strikes in the Hulyaipole direction, conducting around 100 to 120 guided glide bomb strikes daily compared to previous intensity of 20 to 30 airstrikes per day.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 25 but did not advance.

[65]

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian railway infrastructure.

Ukraine's state rail company Ukrzaliznytsia reported on June 25 that Russian forces struck trains in Zaporizhzhia City twice, killing one railway worker.[66]

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign targeting Russian bridges and logistics in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge over the Korsak River, which Russian forces use to transfer troops and deliver ammunition to frontline positions.[67] Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky restricted traffic along a section of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway that passes over the Korsak River following the Ukrainian strike.[68]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 25. Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, including against energy infrastructure.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck 38 targets in occupied Crimea overnight, including a coastal MR-231 radar in occupied Myrnyi (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline); coastal Neva-B radars in Morske and Zaozerne (roughly 245 and 160 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); the Tavriiska Thermal Power Plant and the 330 kV Simferopolska electrical substation in Simferopol (roughly 205 kilometers from the frontline); the 330/220/110/35 kilovolt Sevastopol electrical substation in Sevastopol (roughly 220 kilometers from the frontline); an oil depot in Dzhankoi (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline); gas compressor stations in Zhuravlivka and Kliuchi (roughly 183 and 210 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); and a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun in Kumove (roughly 108 kilometers from the frontline).[69] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces also struck a Nebo radar station and Skala-M radar station near occupied Kerch (roughly 275 kilometers from the frontline).[70] Crimean occupation authorities continue to restrict power consumption following Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage of Ukrainian strikes against substations shows no evidence of Russian air defense systems operating.[72] Aksyonov announced on June 25 that Russian occupation authorities will begin restricting the number of Tavria long-distance trains, which connects occupied Crimea to mainland Russia along the Kerch Strait Bridge, running to and from occupied Crimea and will gradually cancel other trains over the next two weeks, likely due to Ukrainian strikes.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 24 to 25 that targeted gas infrastructure.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 90 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo,

Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 83 drones, that the ballistic missile and six drones struck seven locations, and that drone debris fell on nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged gas, railway, medical, commercial, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Odesa, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts.[75] Former Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Andriy Pyvovarsky stated on June 25 that Russian forces have struck over 150 gas stations in Ukraine over the past two months but that the diversified Ukrainian oil and gas market is preventing significant regional shortages.[76]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

The Kremlin continued attempts to pull Belarus into its aggression against Ukraine.

Ukraine-s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 25 that Russia is building road infrastructure and ammunition and fuel storage facilities along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border in order to potentially expand the area of offensive activities to northern Ukraine.[77] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 25 that the Kremlin is increasingly pressuring Belarus to develop possible provocations or an offensive against Ukraine from the Belarusian territory against the backdrop of stalling Russian advances on the frontline.[78]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1]

<https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-of-state-rubio-speaks-with-reporters-in-bahrain/6817> ; <https://tass dot com/world/2151517>

[2]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025/>

[3]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/>

[4]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/>;

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-->

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november->

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december->

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-->

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-->

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/>

[5] <https://www.youtube.com/live/6Eva7RAkHK8?si=4h6AIFLFac1P3MOv> ; <https://suspilne dot media/1339176-zelenskij-nepogano-spravlaetsa-tramp-pro-vijnu-v-ukraini/> ; <https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/78907> ; <https://www.ukrinform dot net/amp/rubric-politics/4137331-right-now-ukraine-winning-war-us-under-secretary-of-state-says.html>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/>;
[7]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/>;
[8]
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-24/gasoline-price-spike-adds-to-war-s-economic-toll-for-russia>
[9] <https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9155>
[10] https://www.cbr.ru/hd_base/KeyRate/?UniDbQuery.Posted=True&UniDbQuery.From=01.01.2025&UniDbQuery.To=25.06.2026
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/>;
[11]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/>;
[12]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/>;
[13]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/>;
; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-29-2026/> ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/>
[14] <https://news.liga.net/ua/war/news/syrskyy-rozkryv-lohiku-stvorennia-novykh-bryhad-zamist-popovnennia-naiavnykh>
[15]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-22/
[16]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-20/
[17]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-by-th>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2026/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2026/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2025/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/>
[18]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/>
[19]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2026/>
[20]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/>;
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2026/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/>;
[21] <https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/2070078777443410023>; <https://meduza.io/news/2026/06/25/frantsiya-snova-zaderzhala-tanker-rossiyskogo-tenevogo-flota-uzhe-chetvertyy-s-nachala-go>
<https://suspilne.media/1339662-vmc-francii-zatrimali-tanker-tinovogo-flotu-rf-v-seredzemnomu-mori/>;
<https://t.me/andriyshTime/61362>; <https://military.com/uk/news/frantsiya-zatrymala-tanker-deliver-rosijskogo-tinovogo-flotu/>;
https://t.me/belta_telegramm/382295; <https://t.me/astrapress/116682>; <https://t.me/bbcussian/96462>
[22]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/>
[23] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398>;
[24] <https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2069983292905132467>;
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2069987582231105779>;

<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2070123232402026735>; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23713;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23715; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23712;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23721; https://t.me/supernova_plus/54484;
[25] <https://t.me/opershtab23/16526>; <https://t.me/opershtab23/16524>
[26] <https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-urazyla-dva-naftopererobnykh-zavody-rf-u-respublitsi-bashkortostan-ta-naftobazu-u-krasnodarsk>
; <https://t.me/SBUkr/17919>
[27] <https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2070041516609855864>
<https://x.com/blinzka/status/2070115644607996275> ;
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23752https://t.me/exilenova_plus/23740 ; <https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7761>;
https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13254
[28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40399>
[29] <https://military dot com/uk/news/svoboda-rosiyi-pidirvav-gazovi-obyekty/>
[30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381>; https://t.me/dva_majors/95112; <https://t.me/divgen/81878>;
<https://t.me/divgen/81881>; <https://t.me/rybar/81308>; <https://t.me/rybar/81312>;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/52988>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/52989>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>;
<https://t.me/severnnyi/8502>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>
[31] <https://t.me/divgen/81878>; <https://t.me/divgen/81881>
[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381>; https://t.me/dva_majors/95112; <https://t.me/rybar/81312>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>
[33] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381>
[34] <https://x.com/lostarmour/status/2069083323121512560>;
<https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2069749878998102474>
[35] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381>; https://t.me/dva_majors/95112; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>;
<https://t.me/grvZapad/18951>
[36] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401>; <https://t.me/grvZapad/18951>
[37] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398>
[38] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398>
[39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95112 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054> ;
<https://t.me/grvZapad/18951> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44633>
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12287; <https://t.me/BV25org/2892>
[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12284; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29621;
<https://t.me/divgen/81884>
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/64944
[43] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/57273 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19938
[44] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yxy_FKbotNc ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2026/06/25/molniyi-lanczety-ta-drony-perehoplyuvachi-yak-ppo-125-yi-brygady-trymaye-oboronu-na-lymansh>
[45] <https://t.me/striga.17csp>; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2069787104687616259> ;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2069787108244386246> ;
<https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DZrqtshuhOcw/>
[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/64943
[47] https://t.me/tass_agency/382280
[48]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025> ;
 ;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025>
[49]
<https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/pfbid0FciUTvHsePAJFPbsMiqLshTBog7hkZREcxE72zcMbkJowX3bFcf>
cft

[0]=AZbaPvxLMcGOOiJlFp5otJvRA0_HmdV5xDXPzlcY9V0eEpjVumTAuw9Y-giqYqSatffEkJLFeBWLzZ2rJHGtn
=;%2CO%2CP-R; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[ua/2026/06/24/druzhkivka-mizh-frontom-i-zhyttyam-u-misti-pid-udaramy-rosiyan-lyshayutsya-tysyachi-lyudej/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/24/druzhkivka-mizh-frontom-i-zhyttyam-u-misti-pid-udaramy-rosiyan-lyshayutsya-tysyachi-lyudej/)
[50] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/57273 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19938
[51] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zTyFp822po> ; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[ua/2026/06/24/do-dobropillya-z-dvoh-bokiv-u-dshv-poyasnyly-yak-rosiyan-namagayutsya-rozshyryty-nastup/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/24/do-dobropillya-z-dvoh-bokiv-u-dshv-poyasnyly-yak-rosiyan-namagayutsya-rozshyryty-nastup/)
[52] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117788> ;
[53] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/53091>
[54] <https://armyinform.com> dot
[com.ua/2026/06/25/lyagaye-zvyazok-i-logistyka-zsu-poslablyuyut-nastup-voroga-pid-pokrovskom/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/lyagaye-zvyazok-i-logistyka-zsu-poslablyuyut-nastup-voroga-pid-pokrovskom/) ;
<https://www.facebook.com/reel/3441289039365015>
[55] <https://armyinform.com> dot
[ua/2026/06/25/okupanty-dedali-chastishe-vykorystovuyut-bezshumnyj-transport-dlya-shturmiv-pid-pokrovskom/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/okupanty-dedali-chastishe-vykorystovuyut-bezshumnyj-transport-dlya-shturmiv-pid-pokrovskom/) ;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yxy_FKbotNc
[56] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381>
[57] <https://t.me/brygada23/6710> ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12283
[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yxy_FKbotNc ; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[ua/2026/06/25/na-pivdni-vyyavlyayut-najmancziv-z-aziyi-ta-afryky/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/na-pivdni-vyyavlyayut-najmancziv-z-aziyi-ta-afryky/)
[59] https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM ; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[com.ua/2026/06/25/cherez-velyki-vtraty-vorog-majzhe-prypynyv-atakuvaty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/cherez-velyki-vtraty-vorog-majzhe-prypynyv-atakuvaty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/)
[60] https://t.me/ombr_28/3127 ; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[com.ua/2026/06/25/u-doneczkomu-aeroportu-urazyly-ridkisnu-czil-puskovu-mashynu-dlya-shahediv/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/u-doneczkomu-aeroportu-urazyly-ridkisnu-czil-puskovu-mashynu-dlya-shahediv/)
[61] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398> ; <https://t.me/andriyshTime/61376>
[62] <https://t.me/PushilinDenis/9964> ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2069873135302619555
<https://t.me/andriyshTime/61338>
[63] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381> <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054> ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44622> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95112 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19941
[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yxy_FKbotNc ; <https://armyinform.com> dot
[ua/2026/06/25/na-pivdni-vyyavlyayut-najmancziv-z-aziyi-ta-afryky/](https://armyinform.com/ua/2026/06/25/na-pivdni-vyyavlyayut-najmancziv-z-aziyi-ta-afryky/)
[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40401> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40383> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40381> | <https://t.me/wargonzo/35054>
[66]
<https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskiy/posts/pfbid028YdX8SitLvMUa5Yxk8wyVwqFVUJB37Pwf6V3kfcft>
cft

[0]=AZabIKdfg3PXoH9fPuW_XDNdp0-LYWHWqRGxPhiWmLCp6x2ViOhC9neUdYGBYeRcTbod0pz_HodXAcztn
=;%2CO%2CP-R; <https://suspilne.com> dot
[media/zaporizhzhia/1339468-rosijski-droni-atakuvali-lokomotivi-v-zaporizzi-zagynuv-zaloznicnik/](https://suspilne.com/media/zaporizhzhia/1339468-rosijski-droni-atakuvali-lokomotivi-v-zaporizzi-zagynuv-zaloznicnik/) ;
[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398>
[68] <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/8445>
[69] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2521
[70] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40398>

[71] <https://t.me/razvozhaev/21743>

[72] <https://t.me/milinfo/174918>

[73] <https://t.me/Aksenov82/9742>; <https://t.me/astrapress/116678>; <https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1339354-rosia-skorocue-zaliznicne-spolucenna-z-krimom-skasovuut-11-potagiv/>;

[74] <https://t.me/kpszsu/66293>

[75] <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30072> ; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30392> ;

https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42869 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42870 ;

<https://t.me/synergubov/23173> ; <https://t.me/synergubov/23177> ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4200 ;

<https://t.me/yaroslavshanko/4724> ; <https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/33603> ; <https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1339246-rosijski-bpla-atakuvali-promislove-pidpriemstvo-u-poltavskomu-rajoni/> ;

https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2681 ; https://t.me/dsns_sumy/27696 ; https://t.me/dsns_sumy/27705 ;

<https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/25/vorog-povtorno-atakuvav-ryatuvalnykiv-pid-chas-likvidacziyi-naslidkiv-udaru-bpla-na-sumshhyni/>

;

<https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskiy/posts/pfbid028YdX8SitLvMUa5Yxk8wyVwqFVUJB37Pwf6V3kf>

;

<https://suspilne dot media/1339164-u-bilorusi-prinili-robotu-retranslatori-dbr-rozslidue-pooursenna-u-skeli-1583-den-vijni/anchor=live>

;

;

;

;

[76] <https://www.facebook.com/andrei.pivovarsky/posts/pfbid0YMvNK1Wxo21VmU93pGoypXBFejiWc5qi8UuYtGK9cft>

cft

[0]=AZbEHwaPzwTaksO_RSEJ5r4w6yL-BaUR58iFYjoEhu5tFJdKSKeYqM-XhDiwpM0x1K2HzHGKStPHIILZulih

tn

=%2CO%2CP-R

[77] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19608

[78] <https://news dot liga.net/ua/war/news/syrskyy-rozkryv-lohiku-stvorennia-novykh-bryhad-zamist-popovnennia-naiavnykh>

;

<https://military dot com/uk/news/ukrayini-treba-formuvaty-novi-brygady-cherez-zagrozu-z-boku-bilorusi-syrskyy/>

Previous