

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2026

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Russian President Vladimir Putin used his speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress on June 28 to project Russia's strength, reinforce his resolve to achieve Russia's objectives militarily, and reject diplomatic solutions to end his war in Ukraine.

Putin claimed that Russia maintains sufficient strength, resources, and political will to resist external actors' attempts to restrain Russia's development.[1] Putin claimed that the West cannot strategically defeat Russia and cannot win on the battlefield. Putin alleged that Ukrainian forces are retreating along the entire frontline. Putin emphasized that Russia is ready to fight for its core interests and that it is the duty of the United Russia Party to do everything possible to ensure Russian victory. Putin claimed that Russia has always been strong and won due to its national unity and that all Russians support Russian forces on the frontlines.[2] Putin's June 28 speech is only the latest attempt from the Kremlin to frame a Russian military victory in Ukraine as inevitable and the Ukrainian front as on the verge of collapsing.[3] The Kremlin continues to resort to such rhetorical lines to try to influence the West and Ukraine to give in to Russia's demands, particularly as Russia's battlefield performance continues to decline in 2026 and Russia's ability to seize its objectives militarily is in question.[4] Putin vaguely acknowledged the effects that Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is having on Russia but attempted to dismiss concerns and promote a facade of stability.

Putin stated that Russia is going through a 'difficult' and 'fateful' time and that the Kremlin is aware of and responding to all problems related to external attempts to restrain Russia's development.[5] Putin claimed that Ukraine is conducting 'terrorist attacks' against Russian infrastructure - likely referring to Ukrainian strikes against Russian assets, including oil infrastructure. Putin reassured the Russian public that the Kremlin is taking appropriate measures to address Russia's economic challenges and will ensure the security of Russia and Russian citizens. Putin claimed that Russia will fully implement its strategically significant development programs even as the Kremlin has to adjust some plans based on the 'current situation.' Putin specifically claimed that the Kremlin will fulfill all its social obligations, likely to assuage concerns that the externalities caused by the war may impact social spending. Putin did not explicitly discuss Ukraine's strike campaign against Russia or the wide-scale gasoline shortages experienced across the entire country, but Putin is likely subtly trying to portray himself as cognizant of the economic and social struggles Russia is facing.[6]

The United Russia Party formally claimed to be Putin's party for the first time since 2007.

The United Russia Party published a campaign poster on June 28 that featured a drawing of Putin and the slogans, 'United Russia is the president's party,' and 'Being for Putin is the bare minimum.' [7] Russian opposition source Meduza noted that this is the first time since 2007 that United Russia has declared itself 'the president's party.' [8] Meduza noted that the slogan on the poster features the Latin letter 'Z,' which has become a common symbol for Russia's war in Ukraine - linking support for United Russia and Putin to support for the war. Putin's June 28 speech at the United Russia Congress likely intended to begin shaping the information space ahead of the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections, including doubling down on Russians' commitment to the war in Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin's decision to publicly tie Putin to the United Russia Party is notable and is likely intended to make it appear as if there is widespread popular support for Putin and his policies when the United Russia Party inevitably wins in the fall elections that will neither be free nor fair.

United Russia's top five State Duma candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections are mostly long-standing Putin loyalists.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev announced on June 28 the top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 State Duma elections: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Yunarmia Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin, Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyenin, Kremlin-appointed Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, and Kremlin-coopted and Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny.[10] Medvedev stated that the top candidates should be people whom Russians know for their deeds and strong patriotism and who defend Russia's sovereignty and national interests.[11] The official list only slightly differs from a purportedly leaked draft published in January 2026, which included Medvedev and Maryana Lysenko (a prominent Russian doctor who led City Clinical Hospital No. 52 and received the title of Hero of Labor for her

work combatting the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia) instead of Lvova-Belova and Sobyanin.[12] The finalized list platforms figures that are Putin loyalists and hardline supporters of the war in Ukraine. The list is reflective of Putin-s political and ideological positions that all Russians should emulate.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress on June 28 to project Russia-s strength, reinforce his resolve to achieve Russia-s objectives militarily, and reject diplomatic solutions to end his war in Ukraine.

Putin vaguely acknowledged the effects that Ukraine-s long-range strike campaign is having on Russia but attempted to dismiss concerns and promote a facade of stability.

The United Russia Party formally claimed to be Putin-s party for the first time since 2007.

United Russia-s top five State Duma candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections are mostly long-standing Putin loyalists.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 27 to 28. Russian forces launched two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles, six Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 142 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck two oil refineries in Russia on the night of June 27 to 28.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck and started a fire at the Slavyansk Oil Refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 300 kilometers from the frontline), one of the largest refineries in southern Russia.[13] Ukraine-s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that the refinery has an annual capacity of 5.2 million tons and that the overnight strikes started a fire near the refinery-s oil tank farm, oil products cargo area, and a primary oil processing unit.[14] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) tied the strike on the Slavyansk Refinery to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky-s recently announced 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine.[15] Geolocated footage published on June 28 shows a fire near the refinery.[16] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 28 shows large-scale heat anomalies at the refinery, and the Slavyansk-on-Kuban emergency dispatch service reported that the fire at the refinery is over 20,000 square meters (about 215,280 square feet).[17] The Krasnodar Krai emergency response headquarters acknowledged that drone debris started a fire at an oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[18]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 710 kilometers from the border), which has a refining capacity of 15 million tons of oil per year and produces automobile gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel.[19] Geolocated footage published on June 28 shows a smoke plume near Yaroslavl City.[20]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on June 28 that the Ukrainian missile strike against the Titan-Barrikady enterprise in Volgograd City on June 26-27 caused a fire and partially destroyed two of the three struck workshops.[21]

A Russian resistance group reportedly infiltrated the Alabuga Special Economic Zone where Russia builds its Shahed-type drones.

Russian resistance group Black Spark stated on June 27 that its members worked in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan for several months and gathered information about the assembly of Russian Geran-2 and Geran-3 drones.[22] The group implied that its members installed components in Geran drones that will sabotage the drones when Russian operators attempt to launch them in the future. Black Spark reported that it also hacked the Alabuga website.[23]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 27 and 28 but did not advance.

[24]

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on June 28 that Russian forces have not entered Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City), contrary to the Russian Ministry of Defense's claim on June 25 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[25]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

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Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 27 and 28 but did not advance.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 28 that Russian forces cleared Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces no longer maintain positions in Petropavlivka, Kurylivka, or Pishchane (east of Kurylivka).[27]

Russian forces continue to use first-person view (FPV) drones for logistics and sustainment in the Kupyansk direction.

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems company operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using FPV drones to supply their troops and cannot use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near the Oskil River.[28] The deputy commander stated that the FPV drones can carry limited payloads so can supply only a few infantrymen at a time and must make multiple flights.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 27 and 28 but did not advance.

[29]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a rail bridge near Sabivka (roughly 86 kilometers from the frontline) with drones.[30] Geolocated imagery published on June 28 shows the damaged bridge in Sabivka.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southwestern Lyman, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32] A

source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are attacking on the approaches to Lyman but have not entered the town.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on June 27 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in northern Lyman, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[34]

Russian forces continue to infiltrate around Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.

A Ukrainian soldier told Bloomberg in an article published on June 27 that Ukrainian forces kill about 90 percent of Russian infiltrators in the Kostyantynivka direction.[35] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that it is premature to talk about the Russian seizure of Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian groups continue to operate in the central part of the city.[36]

Russian forces continue to use strikes, particularly glide bomb strikes, to prepare the battlefield in and near Kramatorsk.

Bloomberg reported that a Ukrainian soldier stated that Russian forces are using glide bombs against Kramatorsk more than artillery, likely in order to intimidate the local population.[37] A foreign medic trainer told Bloomberg that Russian drones have also ·overrun· Kramatorsk, likely meaning that Russian forces are more easily conducting drone missions in Kramatorsk.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 27 and

28 but did not advance.

[38]

Russian forces are focusing on installing infrastructure to facilitate drone strikes in the Pokrovsk direction.

The spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces, Colonel Volodymyr Poliovyi, reported that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are installing antennas in order to increase the number of drone strikes.[39] Poliovyi stated that Russian forces are trying to disguise the antennas as civilian television antennas. Poliovyi added that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones in Pokrovsk itself but need Wi-Fi bridges in order to use them closer to the frontline. The Russian military command is reportedly pushing Russian companies to exhaustion during offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.

Poliovyi reported that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction reduced the intensity of their attacks due to heavy losses and infantry shortages.[40] Poliovyi reported that one company within a battalion leads offensive operations until it becomes exhausted, at which point another company enters battle. Poliovyi reported that the six to seven companies in each Russian battalion are therefore sufficient for about seven to 10 days of combat operations. Poliovyi added that the Russian military command withdraws a company for restoration after about one month-s worth of fighting destroys it but then throws the company back into battle once the command has replenished its personnel. Such tactics and force structure indicate that Russian infantry companies will remain fairly unprofessional, that the Russian military continues to optimize its force for positional warfare, and that Russian forces are unlikely to restore mechanized maneuver at the operational level in the medium-term.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 27 and 28 but did not advance.

[41]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Rybne (south of Oleksandrivka) on a prior date and that Russian forces occupied part of Krasnohirske (just north of Rybne).[42] Mashovets added that Russian infiltrators are operating between Zlahoda (just north of Krasnohirske) and Dobropillya (southwest of Zlahoda). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have seized most of Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and advanced southeast of the settlement but that small Russian groups maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts and northwest of Berezove.[43] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southeastern Zaporizke (just southeast of Berezove) and south of the settlement but that small Russian groups are operating in Novomykolaivka (just south of Berezove) and on the northern outskirts of Kalynivske (just southwest of Berezove). Mashovets also reported that Russian forces have made small-scale penetrations north and northeast of Novohryhorivka (further southwest of Berezove) a few hundred meters in depth and that small Russian groups are operating between Novohryhorivka and Novomykolaivka, including west of Kalynivske and near Verbove (northwest of Kalynivske). Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has not redeployed any forces from the Oleksandrivka direction to another sector of the front.[44]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues its cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances in the immediate vicinity of Oleksandrivka.

The Russian MoD claimed on June 28 that Russian forces seized Pysantsi (just southwest of Oleksandrivka).[45] Footage published on June 28 shows Russian forces holding flags in the settlement, but ISW has reason to suspect the footage is AI-altered.[46] The Russian MoD similarly claimed on June 27 that Russian forces seized Novoskeliuvate (just south of Pysantsi) and published possibly AI-altered footage showing Russian forces holding flags in the settlement.[47] Pysantsi and Novoskeliuvate are about 15 kilometers from the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances and 14 kilometers away from the furthest assessed extent of Russian presence. Russian officials have recently intensified their campaign using likely AI-altered footage to further their aggrandized claims of Russian successes.[48] These videos are part of the Kremlin-s systematic cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in

occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition

depot near occupied Amvrosiivka (roughly 97 kilometers from the frontline).[49] Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows a Russian truck burning along the M-30 Donetsk City-Horlivka highway near occupied Yasynuvata (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) after a Ukrainian strike.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

[51]

Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) and west of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[52] ISW has not observed Ukrainian forces operating within Zaliznychne since May 15, indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated throughout the settlement on a prior date.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to use likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances. Likely AI-altered footage published on June 28 purportedly shows servicemembers of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in Novoselivka (southwest of Hulyaipole).[53] The Russian MoD claimed on June 28 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 27 and 28 but did not advance.

[55]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Plavni (west of Orikhiv) and that Russian forces seized Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and advanced north of the settlement.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian mobile fire group along the M-18 Melitopol-Dzhankoi highway near occupied Danylo-Ivanivka (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 28. Russian strikes continued to target Ukrainian training grounds, including in Mykolaiv Oblast.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 28 that Russian forces conducted Geran drone strikes against a Ukrainian training ground in Prybuzke (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) and struck personnel assembly points and manned and unmanned boat depots.[58] The Russian MoD claimed that the drones were operating in a self-guided mode, likely referring to homing guidance in the terminal phase.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge near occupied Ichki (roughly 255 kilometers from the frontline), which Russian forces use to move troops and supplies.[59] Crimea-based telegram channel Crimean Wind claimed on June 28 that there were fires near the bridge and at a nearby agricultural chemical warehouse.[60]

Crimean occupation authorities may be taking control of oil assets in occupied Crimea and preparing for a potential large-scale evacuation.

A Russian insider source claimed on June 28 that armed men, reportedly from a Crimean private military company (PMC) that Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov reportedly uses as his personal guard, began arriving at all oil depots in occupied Crimea on June 26 and 27 and forcibly took control of the facilities.[61] The insider source claimed that the armed men cited a classified order from the Crimean occupation Council of Ministers about preparing reserves in case of evacuation. The source claimed that Crimean authorities have established a plan for the partial evacuation of government agencies, various institutions, and the Crimean population - up to 250,000 people - but that it is unclear if authorities will be able to implement the plan as they have not resolved issues around accommodations for such a large number of people.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 27 to 28.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast and six Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 142 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Zirkon/Onyx missile, all six Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 125 drones. The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that missiles and 14 drones struck 11 locations and that debris fell at 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck gas and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.[63]

Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian gas stations, including in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

[64]

Zaporizhia Oblast officials reported that Russian forces also conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck two gas stations near the city.[65]

Ukrainian officials continue to note the Russian practice of striking Ukrainian religious infrastructure throughout the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 28 that Russian forces have struck 740 religious buildings in Ukraine in the war.[66] Russian forces have long been engaged in a targeted campaign to deliberately destroy, desecrate, and loot religious infrastructure in occupied Ukraine, intending to eradicate religious organizations that the Kremlin deems "undesirable".[67]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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