

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

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Russian President Vladimir Putin is carefully constructing a reality that seeks to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable while downplaying the growing domestic economic costs of the war. This constructed reality is premised on a rejection of the tactical and operational developments that have characterized 2026 thus far and a continued Russian commitment to its untenable maximalist battlefield objectives. Putin's control over the information space and his ability to shape and propagate narratives of Russian military success are critical to maintaining this false reality.

Putin appears to have accepted the reality that the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit did not result in tangible or actionable diplomatic agreements.

Putin stated to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin in a likely carefully staged interview on June 28 that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreements at the Alaska Summit.[1] Putin acknowledged that there were no signed documents outlining the 'spirit of Anchorage' but claimed that Russia agreed during the summit to US proposals about ending the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia is ready to continue negotiations with the United States based on the Alaska Summit. The Kremlin readout of Putin's interview omitted his statements about the Alaska Summit, but Zarubin posted a video of the full interview that retained those details.[2] Putin's June 28 statement follows a similar remark from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on June 25 that there was only a 'proposal' at the summit but no official or signed written agreement.[3] Putin is likely acknowledging lack of agreements in order to avoid directly confronting the Trump administration about what happened in Anchorage, given Rubio's statements confirming the absence of a written agreement. Putin's stated readiness to return to the Alaska Summit proposals, however, aims to push the United States to resume negotiations as if the battlefield situation has not changed since August 2025. Ukraine has since liberated territory on the frontline and significantly slowed Russian advances, while engaging in successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russia - forcing Russia into a much more defensive mode of operation than it was in as of August 2025.

Putin implicitly rejected two recent Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that aim to bring about an end to the war, continuing to highlight his own intransigence to enter good-faith negotiations.

Putin claimed that Ukraine proposed to Russia a mutual ceasefire on long-range strikes.[4] Putin also claimed that Ukraine proposed a ceasefire of hostilities in areas outside of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts - essentially stopping fighting in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts. This is the first public mention of these reported Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin implicitly rejected these two ceasefires, however, stating that Russia is not interested in granting Ukraine such 'salvation.' Putin claimed that Ukraine initiated these proposals because Russian long-range strikes are more powerful and destructive for Ukraine than Ukraine's long-range strikes are for Russia and because Ukrainian forces want to make up for their manpower shortages by withdrawing from some areas of the frontline and redeploying those forces to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin's rejection of two new ceasefire proposals is yet another instance of Ukraine initiating - and Russia rejecting - measures to end the war.[5]

Putin and other Russian officials continue to publicly show their commitment to Russia's original war goals.

Putin stated that Russia's main objective is 'the final seizure of Donbas and Novorossiia' and that Russian forces will do 'everything' to achieve all of his war goals.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly stated on June 29 that Putin clearly outlined Russia's position on Ukraine in his speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 2024, in which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine abandon its goal of joining NATO prior to entering negotiations - demands that virtually amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov similarly stated on June 26 that Russia can only ensure its security when Ukraine 'ceases to exist.'[8]

Putin continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success.

Putin claimed to Zarubin that Russian forces are rapidly advancing in virtually all sectors of the frontline and that Ukrainian strikes are 'absolutely' not affecting Russian frontline operations.[9] Putin focused his claims about battlefield successes on the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, including

Lyman, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Dobropillya. Putin claimed that elements of the Russian forces have cleared a majority of Lyman; advanced into Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk); are about eight to nine kilometers from Slovyansk; and are four kilometers from Kramatorsk. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 4.3 percent of Lyman and that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 12 kilometers from Mykolaivka, 19 kilometers from Slovyansk, and 14 kilometers from Kramatorsk.

Putin claimed that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces has seized 96 percent of Kostyantynivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are clearing Kostyantynivka.[10] Putin claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) bypassed Kostyantynivka and entered Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (between Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka). ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in only 36.98 percent of Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces are roughly seven kilometers from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. Russian forces have infiltrated into a significant part of Kostyantynivka but have not secured control over or established enduring positions in these areas as Putin claimed.

Putin claimed that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces advanced into Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) and to Dobropillya itself.[11] Putin noted that Dobropillya is only 35 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border (likely referring to the border north - not west - of Dobropillya), implying that it will be easy for Russian forces to quickly outflank the Fortress Belt from the west and to advance to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary after seizing Dobropillya. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly seven kilometers from Hannivka and Dobropillya.

Putin also claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces continues to expand the -buffer zone- in northern Sumy Oblast and claimed that Ukraine will need to suffer territorial losses in the area in order to -pay for its crimes- in Kursk Oblast - referring to Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk incursion.[12] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 10.5 kilometers from Sumy City. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian infiltrators are roughly 13 kilometers from Sumy City and that Russian advances are roughly 17 kilometers from the city.

Putin briefly talked about Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but spoke vaguely about the area, likely as the Kremlin continues to refuse to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks in and around Kupyansk in late 2025.[13] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 to five kilometers from the western edge of Kupyansk, likely meaning that Russian forces have advanced 2.5 to five kilometers further west than Kupyansk's western administrative boundary. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces previously launched unsuccessful counterattacks near Kupyansk and that Russian forces had encircled a large number of Ukrainian servicemembers in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (just southeast of Kupyansk). Ukrainian forces liberated much of Kupyansk and its surroundings in late December 2025, and Russian forces have struggled to retake territory in the area since, including near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[14] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces currently maintain a presence in 2.39 percent of Kupyansk and 2.77 percent of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and that Russian forces do not maintain any consolidated positions in either town.

Putin claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces have pinned Ukrainian forces on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River in the Rubsti direction south of Borova and have nearly encircled 5,000 Ukrainian servicemembers in the area.[15] Putin claimed that Russian forces are pressing the Ukrainian group from the east, north, and south and that there are only two kilometers left until Russian forces complete the encirclement. ISW has not observed any evidence indicating that Russian forces are threatening to encircle any Ukrainian forces in the Borova direction or are close to reaching the Oskil River in the area.

Putin glazed over the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' offensive operations in southern Ukraine and dismissed Ukraine's 2026 advances in southern Ukraine.[16] Putin claimed that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces is advancing between one and 1.3 kilometers per day in the Zaporizhia sector. Putin outright denied any recent Ukrainian territorial liberations. Putin tried to cover up Ukrainian battlefield successes, dismissing them as Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that occasionally infiltrate into the Russian rear dressed as Russian servicemembers but quickly face elimination. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400

square kilometers of territory in the Oleksandrivka direction since January 1, 2026.

Putin's exaggerated claims of advance aim to falsely paint Russia's battlefield position as the same - if not better - than it was during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit.

The battlefield situation has dramatically changed, however. Ukrainian counterattacks liberated much of Kupyansk late 2025, over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in Winter and Spring 2026, and several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2026.[17] Ukrainian forces have also been engaged in highly successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, which are having cascading effects on Russian logistics and battlefield operations as well as causing gasoline shortages and economic frictions across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[18]

Russia's rate of advance has slowed significantly since the summit in the face of these Ukrainian successes, with Russian forces advancing an average of 3.79 square kilometers per day in June 2026 compared to an average of 16.65 square kilometers per day in August 2025.

Putin is constructing this narrative of battlefield success in order to obscure the growing domestic strain Russia faces due to Ukraine's long-range strike campaign.

Putin acknowledged the growing gasoline shortages in Russia on June 28 during his interview with Zarubin and in a meeting with Russian government and energy company officials.[19] Putin stated that Russia must minimize the impact of Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia's rear. Putin proposed measures to ensure a stable fuel supply, including tapping into gasoline reserves, maintaining the ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports, potentially extending the ban to diesel exports, quickening refinery repairs, postponing scheduled maintenance, and importing gasoline. Putin acknowledged that Russia's quantity of air defenses is insufficient and called on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) to expand production and for Russia to improve its air defense coordination across all structures and levels. Putin downplayed the impact of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia, however, claiming that Russia is repairing the damage quickly, that Russia's energy issues are not critical, and that Ukrainian long-range strikes have not affected the situation on the front lines. Putin's June 28 acknowledgment of the growing fuel crisis suggests that he likely assesses that he is no longer able to publicly ignore it. Putin's June 28 statements come amid recent efforts to link support for the ruling United Russia Party in the September 2026 State Duma elections to Putin and his war policies personally.[20]

Putin appears to be portraying Russian domestic hardships as a temporary and tolerable sacrifice necessary for Russia's allegedly inevitable battlefield victory.

The Kremlin is uplifting coopted and loyal Russian milbloggers who can help Putin construct his controlled reality.

Putin claimed to Zarubin that Russian military correspondents report objectively and comprehensively about the frontline situation in Ukraine-explicitly praising members of the correspondent community for reporting that the Kremlin tacitly endorses.[21] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov then held a meeting on June 29 with select Russian military correspondents and largely discussed issues with Russian air defense systems and unmanned aerial and ground vehicles.[22] Belousov met with a number of milbloggers that ISW assesses the Kremlin has already co-opted and curated, including prominent war correspondents Alexander Sladkov, Yevgeny Poddubny, and Semyon Pegov.

Belousov's meeting comes as other milbloggers have been increasingly criticizing the Kremlin for misrepresenting the worsening battlefield situation and for failing to defend against Ukraine's repeated long-range strikes on Russian infrastructure.[23] The Kremlin is likely attempting to further promote and weaponize the already coopted milbloggers who accept and then promote Putin's fabricated narrative of Russia's sweeping advances, especially in the Fortress Belt and elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast. The milbloggers' meeting with Belousov, in which they were able to publicly identify Russian weaknesses with air defenses and strike capabilities, suggests that the Kremlin is purposely allowing some criticisms of the Kremlin's insufficient response to Ukrainian strikes - and by default the resulting gasoline crisis in Russia. Sanctioning this type of criticism is likely an effort to make sure the milbloggers are not critical of what matters in Putin's fictional world he is crafting in the information space - the actual battlefield realities.

Putin is tolerating milblogger criticisms of the strikes and gasoline issues because he is trying to promote the idea that such hardships are necessary to endure in order to achieve Russia's inevitable battlefield victory.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is carefully constructing a reality that seeks to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable while downplaying the growing domestic economic costs of the war. Putin appears to have accepted the reality that the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit did not result in tangible or actionable diplomatic agreements.

Putin implicitly rejected two recent Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that aim to bring about an end to the war, continuing to highlight his own intransigence to enter good-faith negotiations.

Putin and other Russian officials continue to publicly show their commitment to Russia's original war goals.

Putin continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success.

Putin's exaggerated claims of advance aim to falsely paint Russia's battlefield position as the same - if not better - than it was during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit.

Putin is constructing this narrative of battlefield success in order to obscure the growing domestic strain Russia faces due to Ukraine's long-range strike campaign.

The Kremlin is uplifting coopted and loyal Russian milbloggers who can help Putin construct his controlled reality.

Russian forces launched 108 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on June 29.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian sources and satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 29 that Ukraine's June 26 strike against two Russian military communications facilities near Minyayevo, Moscow Oblast, destroyed one building and significantly damaged another.[24] Satellite imagery posted on June 29 shows damage to a reported communications node of the Russian 918th Information Reception and Transmission Center (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) near Minyayevo following the Ukrainian strike.[25]

Ongoing fuel shortages across Russia are impacting the commercial transportation market.

Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on June 29 that interruptions in gasoline supplies are beginning to affect the road transportation market, with trucking companies warning customers to expect tariff increases of at least 10 percent starting July 1, 2026.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[27]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City along the international border).[28]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[29]

Russian forces continue to target civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.

Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on June 29 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike on Kholodnohirskiy Raion, Kharkiv City, killing one and injuring at least twelve and damaging civilian infrastructure.[30]

Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 29 but did

not make confirmed advances.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kupyansk.[32]

Russian forces continue to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on June 27 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 glide bomb strike on a bridge over the Senyok River along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova Highway near Osynove (north of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[34]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces struck two unspecified railway bridges in occupied Luhansk Oblast and a Russian material and technical warehouse near occupied Novosvitlivka (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) on June 28 or overnight on June 28 to 29.[35] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows a Russian logistics vehicle burning in occupied Svatove (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline), likely following a Ukrainian drone strike.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[37]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces are resuming counterattacks in the Lyman direction in the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army's (CAA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) area of responsibility (AoR).[38]

Geolocated footage published on June 28 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-1500 guided glide bomb strike on a Siverskyi Donets River crossing near Mayaky (north of Slovyansk).[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 29 purporting to show Russian forces conducting two FAB-1500 guided glide bomb strikes on a Ukrainian temporary deployment point in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[40] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 28, 12 hours before the Russian MoD post, that Russian forces had advanced into Mykolaivka.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[42]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian drone command post near Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar and roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[44]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 29 that Russian forces conducted five FAB-500 guided glide bomb strikes on a Ukrainian drone control center near Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying offensive efforts northwest of Pokrovsk.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have intensified offensives in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR), including by increasing ground attacks and drone, artillery, and glide bomb strikes.[47] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces' goal is to reach Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces are increasingly switching to frontal assaults instead of infiltration tactics to accomplish this. A spokesperson of Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on June 29 that Russian forces are heavily attacking around Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the goal of reaching Dobropillya (north of Hryshyne) and that Russian forces are using Pokrovsk as a force concentration and drone launch point.[48]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 28 and

29 but did not advance.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[50]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces have resumed counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction in the Russian 36th CAA-s (Eastern Military District [EMD]) AoR south of the Vovcha River.[51]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues its cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances in the immediate vicinity of Oleksandrivka.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 29 that elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) seized Bohodarivka (just southwest of Oleksandrivka).[52] The Russian MoD similarly claimed on June 27 and 28 that Russian forces seized Novoskeliuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka) and Pysantsi (just north of Novoskeliuvate).[53] Bohodarivka, Pysantsi, and Novoskeliuvate are all at least 15 kilometers from the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances and 14 kilometers away from the furthest assessed extent of Russian infiltrations.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge near occupied Novoazovsk (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline and along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway), which Russian forces use to move personnel, weapons, ammunition, and other materials.[54] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data taken on June 29 shows heat anomalies around the bridge following the Ukrainian strike.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the command post of an electronic warfare (EW) unit near Velyka Novosilka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 18 kilometers from the frontline). Geolocated imagery published on June 29 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against a Russian truck on the Yenakyievo Bridge along the M-30 Yenakiyev-Debaltseve highway.[56] Transport costs for Russian logistics linking mainland Russia and occupied Crimea via occupied eastern Ukraine have surged due to Ukrainian strikes.

Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 28 that the cost for transporting cargo along the M-14 highway has reached between 260,000 rubles (roughly \$3,300) and up to 500,000 rubles (roughly \$6,500) due to Ukrainian strikes against logistics along the highway.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[58]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command post near Hulyaipole.[59]

Ukrainian forces refuted Russian claims of advance west of Hulyaipole.

Two Ukrainian brigades operating in the Hulyaipole direction refuted on June 29 the Russian Ministry of Defense-s (MoD) June 28 claim that Russian forces seized Novoselivka (southwest of Hulyaipole) and reported that Ukrainian forces captured one Russian servicemember from the group of the Russian servicemembers that recently attempted to raise a Russian flag in Novoselivka.[60]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 29.[61]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 29 that Ukrainian forces have resumed counterattacks in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast in the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army-s (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) AoR in the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City direction.[62]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 29.

Ukrainian forces continue to intensify strikes against Russian military assets in the Russian rear.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on June 29 that the USF struck 31 Russian air defense assets, primarily in occupied Crimea, between June 1 and June 29.[63] Ukraine-s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 29 that GUR has struck six Russian fuel tankers, two freight trains, three fuel tanks, a Kasta-2E2 radar system, and other military equipment in occupied Crimea between June 1 and June 29.[64]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 28 to 29.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 82 drones, that 25 drones struck 11 locations, and that debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck residential and commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[66] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head

Ivan Fedorov reported on June 29 that a Russian drone struck a passenger minibus in Zaporizhzhia City, killing three and injuring eight.[67] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on June 29 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Sumy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava oblasts.[68]

Russian forces continue their strike campaign against Ukrainian gas stations.

Ukrainian officials reported on June 29 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts.[69] Russian forces are increasingly striking gas stations in Ukraine as part of a concerted strike campaign aiming to replicate the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russia's fuel infrastructure.[70]

Russian forces continue to adapt their long-range strike tactics to maximize damage.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on June 29 that Russia continues to change the nature of its air strikes on Ukraine and is starting to prioritize striking frontline oblasts and increasingly using ballistic missiles.[71] Ihnat stated that more than 20 Russian drones struck frontline oblasts on the night of June 28 to 29, as it is much harder for the Ukrainian air defense to intercept drones near the frontline. Ihnat stated that Russian forces are now able to simultaneously launch a much larger number of drones as Russia stockpiled drones in May 2026.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping on June 29 in Beijing on his 17th state visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[72]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

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