

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

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Toplines

The Kremlin continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast that do not align with battlefield realities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 29 that the Kremlin has issued 15 separate deadlines for Russian forces to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast in total since 2022.[1] Zelensky stated that the Kremlin gave five separate deadlines in 2022, including March 31, May 9, June 1, September 15, and December 31. Zelensky stated that the Kremlin gave Russian forces deadlines of March 1 and December 31 in 2023; March 1 and December 31 in 2024; September 1, December 1, and December 25 in 2025; and March 31, September 1, and now a deadline of December 31 in 2026. Russian forces have repeatedly missed Putin's demanded deadlines to seize specific territory in Ukraine, including Russian President Vladimir Putin's early demand that Russian forces seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 2022.[2] The Kremlin's deadlines for its military objectives continue to be divorced from the reality of Russian forces' battlefield performance. Russian forces advanced on average 3.79 square kilometers per day in June 2026 - a rate far below Russian forces' previous rate of advance in August 2025, when Russian forces advanced at a rate of 16.65 square kilometers per day.[3] Russian forces still need to seize about 5,305 square kilometers to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and are highly unlikely to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the newly set deadline of December 31, 2026. Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly advance or restore operational maneuver in Donetsk Oblast.[4] These unrealistic deadlines for advance are contributing to Russian forces on the ground submitting 'beautiful reports' up the chain of command, flag raising tactics, and Russian forces' increasing use of (AI)-altered footage to claim advances in areas where Russian forces do not maintain positions.[5] Russian forces continue to expend significant resources and manpower to try to fulfill these unrealistic objectives.[6] Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes and capabilities given the larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry and providing inaccurate assessments.[7] Zelensky's comments on failed deadlines were likely in response to Putin's June 28 claims that Russian forces are rapidly advancing across the theater and attempts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.[8]

The Russian domestic population appears to be increasingly interested in the topic of the end of Russia's war against Ukraine.

Russian opposition source Meduza reported on June 30 that Yandex's (Russia's main online search engine) Wordstat service shows that there were over 137,000 search requests on Yandex asking when Russia will end its war against Ukraine from June 22 to June 28 - a record high since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Meduza reported that Yandex recorded a significant bulk of the searches in Moscow Oblast and St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast - regions where the Kremlin has prioritized installing air defense systems but largely failed to defend against Ukraine's long-range strikes.[10] Meduza reported that the number of searches about when Russia will end the war has been growing for the second week in a row and that the previous peak occurred in the period of June 1 through June 7 when Ukrainian forces struck St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).[11] Polling from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) from June 19 to 21 found that Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating fell by five percentage points from 74 percent to 69 percent between June 12 and June 21, shortly after Ukraine's largest strike on Moscow Oblast.[12] Weekly FOM polling shows Putin's trust rating consistently falling since February 2026.[13] The Kremlin likely maintains political influence over polling data from Russian state-owned polling organizations, and it is notable that FOM is acknowledging growing domestic discontent with Putin after over four years of war. Putin has worked hard to shield major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg from the effects of his war in Ukraine, but recent statistics suggest that the Russian public appears to grow weary of Russia's war effort, likely as the Kremlin largely failed to isolate its constituents from the effects of Russia's war.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast that do not align with battlefield realities.

The Russian domestic population appears to be increasingly interested in the topic of the end of

Russia's war against Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on the night of June 29 to 30. Russian forces launched 154 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on June 30.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting.

We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on the night of June 29 to 30.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert Magyar Brovdi reported on June 30 that USF struck the Dubna Space Communications Center in Dubna, Moscow Oblast, overnight on June 29 to 30 - the second Ukrainian strike against the center since June 22.[14]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that the center is a special satellite communications facility that Russian forces use for reconnaissance and to coordinate Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[15]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows smoke rising from the center following the Ukrainian strike.[16] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged on June 30 that Ukrainian drones damaged an administrative building in Dubna, Moscow Oblast.[17]

Ukrainian sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 30 that Ukraine's June 28 strike against the Slavyansk Oil Refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai, destroyed four tanks with a total volume of 35,000 cubic meters and damaged nine tanks with a total volume of 30,000 cubic meters.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances. [19]

A Russian milblogger posted a map on June 30 that claims Russian forces advanced southwest of Sopych and into northern Marine (both northwest of Sumy City).[20]

Ukrainian forces continue to use drones and artillery to slow Russian advances.

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on June 30 that Ukrainian forces hold positions in Kindrativka and near Andriivka (both north of Sumy City) and are using drone and artillery activity to slow Russian advances in the area.[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 29 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold their positions in Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and are prioritizing striking Russian logistics routes toward Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City and along the international border).[22]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

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Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[23]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on June 30 that Russian forces are attempting to conduct infiltration operations in Hraniv (north of Kharkiv City) but do not maintain any consolidated positions in the settlement.[24]

Russian forces appear to be attempting to tie down Ukrainian forces in certain non-priority areas of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts to facilitate advances into northern Ukraine.

Ukrainian 14th Army Corps Spokesperson Colonel Vitaliy Sarantsev stated on June 29 that Russian forces are attacking toward Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) with the intention of new limited offensive areas along the international border to tie down Ukrainian forces in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[25] Russian forces regularly conduct limited cross-border attacks in previously dormant areas

of northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to generate informational effects and prevent Ukrainian forces from moving force concentrations to priority sectors of the frontline.[26]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast along the international border.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Veselaya Lopan, Belgorod Oblast (north of Kharkiv City and roughly 18 kilometers northeast of the international border), on June 29 or on the night of June 29 to 30.[27]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

[28]

A Russian milblogger posted a map on June 30 claiming that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bilyi Kolodyaz (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[29] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on June 30 of Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[31]

A Russian milblogger implicitly refuted Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 28 claims that Russian forces advanced south of Kupyansk.

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 30 that Russian forces are not advancing south of Kupyansk toward the Oskil River at the pace described in ·public statements· · likely referring to Putin's June 28 claims that Russian forces encircled a large number of Ukrainian servicemembers in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (southeast of Kupyansk and just east of the Oskil River).[32]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Borova.

[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[34]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) striking a Ukrainian position with a FAB-1500 guided missile in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

[36]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Tykhonivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[38]

Russian forces continued interdicting Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian mechanized vehicle and several quad bikes along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk highway north of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka and roughly 12 kilometers from the frontline) and in Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka and roughly 18 kilometers from the frontline).[39]

Additional geolocated footage published on June 30 shows elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) striking Ukrainian gas distribution fuel tanks northeast of Kramatorsk (north of Kostyantynivka and roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[40]

Russian forces continue to deploy ill-equipped and small infiltration groups in an effort to accumulate behind Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk direction.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 30 that Russian forces continue to deploy

small, ill-equipped infiltration groups to penetrate Ukrainian positions, but that Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on these groups.[41] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly striking Ukrainian logistics in the brigade-s area of responsibility (AoR).

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[42]

Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions. [43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[44]

Russian forces continue to attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small, isolated groups in the Pokrovsk direction.

The head of a Ukrainian unmanned systems unit reported on June 30 that Russian forces have stopped using armored vehicles in the brigade-s AoR due to the threat of Ukrainian drones.[45] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small, isolated groups and often attempt to infiltrate in several directions simultaneously as Ukrainian strikes restrict Russian drone supply and prevent Russian forces from accumulating forces.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[46]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 30 but did not advance.

[47]

Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian ammunition depot in central Prydorozhnye (southwest of Oleksandrivka), in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[48]

The Ukrainian general staff reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Komar (east of Oleksandrivka and roughly five kilometers from the frontline).[49]

Ukrainian forces are taking advantage of their drone superiority to undermine Russian efforts in the Oleksandrivka direction.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 29 that Ukrainian forces continue to send small infiltration groups into Russian rear areas in the Oleksandrivka direction and supply them with drones, and that it will take time for Russian forces to clear these dispersed Ukrainian groups.[50] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka reported that Ukrainian strikes are disrupting Russian military logistics and force Russian forces to resupply positions with drones.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian observation post near occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).

[52]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows damage to several gas stations in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian strikes.[53]

Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows damage to the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway near Novoazovsk (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian strikes on June 29.[54] Novoazovsk occupation administration head Vasiliy Ovcharovsk admitted on June 29 that the strike partially collapsed a bridge (likely along the M-14 highway) and left at least one lane unusable.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

[56]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues its cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances northwest of Hulyaipole.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Rivne (northwest of Hulyaipole) and that elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], EMD) seized Lisne (northwest of Rivne).[57] Rivne and Lisne are four and nine kilometers, respectively from the furthest assessed extent of Russian infiltrations. The Russian MoD similarly claimed that Russian forces seized settlements in the neighboring Oleksandrivka direction far from the front lines contrary to available evidence on June 27, 28, and 29.[58]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.

[59]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducting a FAB-3000 strike against Ukrainian forces in Orikhiv. [60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge near occupied Azovske (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) which Russian forces use to transfer personnel, weapons, ammunition, and material and technical resources.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian drone control points near Myrne (one of several settlements between roughly 4 and 90 kilometers from the frontline), Luhove (either roughly 7 or 65 kilometers from the frontline), and Skelky (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline). Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows two damaged trucks along the M-14 Melitopol-Mariupol highway near occupied Azovske, likely following a Ukrainian strike.[62] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian van on the M-18 Melitopol-Novooleksivka highway near occupied Yakymivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[63]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 30. Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Crimea.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge near occupied Ichki (roughly 260 kilometers from the frontline) on June 29 or the night of June 29 to 30.[64] Ukrainian forces previously struck the bridge on June 28.[65] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian ST-68 Radar near occupied Feodosiya (roughly 280 kilometers from the frontline).[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on June 30 that Ukrainian forces struck four electrical substations in occupied Kurman and Dzhankoi microraiions (roughly 158 kilometers from the frontline) and in Dzhankoi itself (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline).[67] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data collected on June 30 shows fires at an electric substation in occupied Poshtove (roughly 224 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a fuel train in occupied Feodosiya.[69] Satellite imagery collected on June 29 and published on June 30 indicates that Ukraine's June 28 strike against the Saky Thermal Power Plant (roughly 184 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed the main building and one fuel tank and damaged another fuel tank.[70]

Ukrainian strikes are increasingly causing power outages in occupied Crimea.

Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev stated on June 30 that the occupation authorities ordered a temporary power supply restriction regime in occupied Sevastopol as a forced measure to eliminate the overload of electrical networks outside Sevastopol and prevent a failure of the entire power system.[71] Crimean Wind reported on June 29 that Ukrainian strikes caused power outages in Simferopol, including at the train station and residential areas, effecting public transportation.[72] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking substations and other energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea in recent weeks.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 29 to 30.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 154 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 138 drones, that 13 drones struck 10 locations, and that debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Poltava oblasts.[75] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on June 30 that Russian strikes left consumers in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts without power.[76]

Russian forces continue their strike campaign against Ukrainian gas stations.

Kharkiv Oblast Police Head Petro Tokar told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on June 30 that Russian forces have intensified strikes against gas stations in Kharkiv Oblast, conducting 13 strikes since May 1, 2026.[77] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are increasingly striking gas stations in Ukraine as part of a concerted strike campaign aiming to replicate the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russia's fuel infrastructure.[78]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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