

Russian Occupation Update, July 2, 2026

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Key Takeaways

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant occupation administration launched a summer program to prepare recent graduates of occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast for careers as nuclear specialists.

Russian occupation officials completed the evacuation of the Artek International Children's Camp in occupied Crimea and may have facilitated the temporary deportation of some participants to children's camps in Krasnodar Krai.

Ukrainian sources reported that Russia continues the deportation of Ukrainian political prisoners to detention centers in Russia.

Russia continues to formalize the militarization of school curricula, including in occupied Ukraine.

Russian federal programs are using monetary incentives to encourage Russians to relocate to occupied Ukraine.

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) continues to brutally crack down on residents of occupied areas for perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian behaviors.

An independent investigation highlighted the scale of Russia's use of lawfare and persecution against Ukrainian minors.

Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) occupation administration launched a summer program to prepare recent graduates of occupied Enerhodar and Melitopol for careers as nuclear specialists.

The ZNPP occupation administration claimed on June 22 that it launched the fourth summer preparatory program "The Path of a Nuclear Specialist. Summer Express - 2026" in occupied Sevastopol for 91 graduates from occupied Enerhodar and Melitopol.[1] The program aims to prepare participants for admission to engineering and technical programs at the Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry at occupied Sevastopol State University, including nuclear energy, electric power, chemical engineering, ecology, and environmental management.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom and the ZNPP occupation administration support the program and provide targeted instruction in mathematics, physics, chemistry, Russian language, and geography, as well as opportunities for future specialists including tuition reimbursement, stipends, housing support, internships at the ZNPP, and post-graduation employment opportunities.[3] Russian-facilitated summer camps in occupied Sevastopol, including the ZNPP's program, will continue despite the occupied Crimea administration's June 22 decision to close all summer camps because occupied Sevastopol is a separate administrative entity.[4] The ZNPP occupation administration claimed that the program serves as an investment in the future human resources potential at the plant.[5] The ZNPP occupation administration and Rosenergoatom consistently facilitate such preparatory programs to prepare Ukrainian children for future careers in the Russian nuclear energy sector, which supports and legitimizes long-term Russian occupation of Ukrainian nuclear energy infrastructure.[6] Russian occupation officials completed the evacuation of the Artek International Children's Camp in occupied Crimea and may have facilitated the temporary deportation of some participants to children's camps in Krasnodar Krai.

ISW previously reported on the Crimea occupation administration's June 22 decision to close all children's summer camp programs in occupied Crimea (excluding those in occupied Sevastopol) until September 1.[7] The Russian Ministry of Education claimed on June 26 that occupation officials completed the evacuation from Artek as of June 26.[8] Occupation officials sent some children home and transported others to children's camps in Krasnodar Krai.[9] Russia hosts children from various different countries at Artek, but the case of Ukrainian children at Artek falls under specific international legal requirements due to Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine. If any of the children that Russia transported from Artek to Krasnodar Krai were Ukrainian nationals, that would likely constitute deportation, as opposed to forced transfer. Russian officials may use the closure of camps in occupied Crimea to temporarily deport Ukrainian children to summer camp programs outside of occupied Ukraine and into Russia for the purpose of their cultural re-education and integration into the Russian sphere of influence.[10]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russia continues the deportation of Ukrainian political prisoners to detention centers in Russia.

Ukrainian outlet RIA Melitopol reported on June 26 that Russian authorities deported at least ten

political prisoners from the pre-trial detention center in occupied Simferopol to a pre-trial center in Krasnodar Krai.[11] RIA Melitopol noted that one of the detainees is retired Ukrainian journalist Iryna Levchenko, who Russian security forces detained in occupied Melitopol in 2023 on fabricated -espionage- charges.[12] Russia has previously deported individuals held on false politically motivated charges from prisons within occupied Ukraine to federal detention centers within Russia, where they face inhumane conditions, abuse, and torture.[13]

#### Sociocultural Control

Nothing significant to report.

#### Militarization of Occupied Areas

Russia continues to formalize the militarization of school curricula, including in occupied Ukraine. Russian Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov reported on June 22 that the proportion of -basic military training- within the mandatory -Fundamentals of Security and Protection of the Motherland- (OBZR) curriculum will be increased from 20 to 50 percent at the start of the new school year on September 1.[14] OBZR is already in place for students grades 6 to 11 in schools in Russia and in occupied Ukraine.[15] Kravtsov also noted that OBZR includes a focus on drone operation, meaning that drone assembly and operation are now a compulsory part of the education system in occupied Ukraine.[16] OBZR represents Russia's weaponization of the education system in occupied Ukraine, and seeks to normalize the militarization of children and youth while socializing the idea of eventual service in the Russian military.

#### Administrative and Bureaucratic Control

Russian federal programs are using monetary incentives to encourage Russians to relocate to occupied Ukraine.

The occupied Luhansk Oblast branch of the Russian Pension and Social Insurance Fund claimed on June 26 that it paid over 880,000 rubles (\$11,320) to six residents of the Russian Far North for moving to occupied Luhansk Oblast.[17] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo highlighted on June 25 the -Zemsky Teacher- program, which pays Russian teachers two million rubles (\$26,000) to move to occupied Ukraine and take teaching positions in schools.[18] Saldo claimed that there are two Russian teachers already working in occupied Kalanchak Raion as part of Zemsky Teacher, and that three more teachers from Kamchatka Krai, Saratov Oblast, and occupied Crimea will relocate to occupied Kherson Oblast for the 2026-2027 schoolyear. Russia has historically used an array of financial incentives to encourage Russian citizens to relocate to occupied Ukraine as part of Russia's wider resettlement and Russification campaign.[19]

#### Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.

#### Physical and Legal Repressions

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) continues to brutally crack down on residents of occupied areas for perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian behaviors.

The FSB reported on June 25 that FSB officers detained a resident of occupied Mariupol on the allegation that he was planning an attack on a court building at the behest of Ukrainian intelligence. The FSB claimed that Ukrainian intelligence uses social media platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp to recruit residents for -terrorist attacks and sabotage- against Russia.[20] The occupied Zaporizhia Oblast FSB branch reported on June 29 that its officers detained a resident of occupied Polohy on suspicion of transmitting information about Russian military positions and movements to the Ukrainian military.[21] The FSB posted footage of officers violently detaining the resident and recorded his alleged confession. The June 25 and 29 incidents are consistent with a wider pattern of the FSB detaining residents of occupied areas on the allegation of collaboration with Ukrainian military intelligence, which is often just the justification for punishing residents for any behavior deemed to be anti-Russian.[22] Russian occupation courts will prosecute the majority of these residents on intense and fabricated treason or espionage charges. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation court, for example, announced on June 25 that it sentenced a resident of occupied Melitopol to 11 years in prison on the allegation that she transferred 2,070 rubles (\$26) to the Ukrainian military.[23] An independent investigation highlighted the scale of Russia's use of lawfare and persecution against Ukrainian minors.

Independent human rights research organization Parubets Analytics published an investigation on July 1 examining the number of minors registered as -terrorists- or -extremists- in the Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) monitoring list.[24] The study found that Russia

has added 465 minors to the registry since 2022, including those as young as 14. Parubets Analytics notably identified 37 Ukrainian minors on the Rosfinmonitoring list, the majority of whom Rosfinmonitoring has identified as 'terrorists'. The youngest Ukrainian on the registry was 14 years and three months old at the time of his addition to the list. ISW has recently reported on several cases involving Russian prosecution of Ukrainian teenagers on alleged terrorism charges, and continues to assess that Russia has weaponized the legal and court system in occupied Ukraine to punish adults and increasingly minors for any actions perceived as dissenting against the occupation.[25]

Economic and Financial Control

Nothing significant to report.

Information Space Control

Nothing significant to report.

Infrastructure and Development Projects

Nothing significant to report.

## ENDNOTES

[1] <https://t.me/znppofficial/1804>

[2] <https://t.me/znppofficial/1804>

[3] <https://t.me/znppofficial/1804>

[4] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/>

[5] <https://t.me/znppofficial/1804>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-18-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-30-2026/>

[7] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/>

[8] <https://t.me/minprosr/18764>

[9] <https://t.me/minprosr/18764>; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/382583](https://t.me/tass_agency/382583)

[10] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-25-2026/>

[11] [https://suspilne.org](https://suspilne.org/media/1340140-u-gdansku-trivae-konferencia-z-vidbudovi-ukraini-zelenskij-zatverdiv-40-dennu-operaciu-sbu-pro)

<https://www.facebook.com/imi.org.ua/posts/pfbid0zV6tn4LoqG26hFBBbhEYPpK74AADfBq99afphTmnjMsQAwU>

[12] <https://cpj.org/data/people/iryna-levchenko/>;

<https://rsf.org/en/retired-ukrainian-journalist-iryna-levchenko-held-kremlin-past-three-years>

[13] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-29-2026/>;

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/05/torture-death-ukrainian-journalist-russian-custody>

[14] <https://m.interfax.ru/1098305>

[15]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-22-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-5-2026/>

[16]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-22-2026/>

[17] <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/27861419>

[18] [https://t.me/SALDO\\_VGA/16174](https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/16174)

[19]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-resettlement-strategy-in-occupied-ukraine/>

[20] <https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/27855105>

[21] <https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/27868181>

[22]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-15-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-12-2025/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-28-2025/>

[23] <https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/27856169>

[24] <https://parubets.org/blog/nesovershennoletnie-v-reestre-terroristov-i-ekstremistov>

[25]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-march-26-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-january-15-2026/>

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