

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/>

PDF generated from the original web publication.

Previous

Next

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2026

Toplines

Russia's spring-summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operationally significant gains thus far, and Russian forces' rate of advance in June 2026 is a fraction of the rate of advance that Russian forces achieved in June 2025

. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated 30.42 square kilometers in June 2026 and advanced or infiltrated at an average pace of 1.01 square kilometers per day. Russian forces comparatively seized 481.25 square kilometers in June 2025, advancing at an average pace of 16.04 square kilometers per day. Russia's gains have been largely gradual and creeping for over a year, and even Russia's faster average rate of advance in 2025 was at a foot pace.[1] Russia's rate of advance has been steadily decreasing since November 2025, and Russian forces have thus far been unable to roll back the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka directions from late 2025 and spring 2026.[2] Russian forces' main territorial gains have been in Russia's main effort area near Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast, where Russian forces have achieved slow tactical gains at high costs in the city's urban environs.

Comparisons of Russia's rate of advance in June 2026 with the same period last year show that Russia's gains have slowed significantly, even when including Russian infiltrations. Russian forces seized 2189.87 square kilometers between January and June 2025, compared to the 622.60 square kilometers into which they advanced or infiltrated in the same period in 2026. Russian forces thus seized or infiltrated only 28.43 percent as much territory in the first six months of 2026 as they advanced into in the first six months of 2025. (Russian forces did not widely use infiltration tactics in early 2025, and ISW therefore previously did not make an analytical distinction between territory that Russian forces seized versus territory that Russian forces infiltrated through but do not control.) Russian forces have also experienced heavy casualties and equipment losses to make these relatively small gains.

Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces suffered 39,490 casualties, including killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA), in June 2026.[3] Russian forces therefore reportedly suffered around 1,298 casualties per square kilometer they seized or infiltrated in June 2026. Russian forces comparatively suffered 32,680 casualties in June 2025, an average of 68 casualties per kilometer taken.[4] Russian forces suffered over 19 times more casualties per kilometer in June 2026 compared to June 2025, indicating that Ukrainian forces are becoming increasingly effective at simultaneously slowing Russian advances and inflicting heavier losses. Ukrainian General Staff reports also indicate that Ukrainian forces are inflicting substantial Russian equipment losses as part of their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost 12,867 fuel vehicles and fuel tanks in June 2026 compared to 3,395 fuel vehicle and fuel tank losses in June 2025, a 3.8 factor year-on-year increase.[5] Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost 60,849 drones of various types in June 2026 compared to 4,581 drones lost in June 2025, a 13.3 factor year-on-year increase. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost 2,053 artillery systems in June 2026 compared to 1,243 artillery system losses in June 2025, a 1.65 factor year-on-year increase. Russian forces' heavy casualties and equipment losses amidst a tepid rate of advance indicate that Ukrainian strikes are undermining Russian battlefield operations and continuing to inflict significant losses behind Russian lines and at deeper depths. Russia is also struggling to recruit enough soldiers to replace its current losses using its current force generation methods, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current offensive tempo at their current loss rate.[6]

Russian forces have made and continue to make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka - Russia's assessed main effort for the spring-summer 2026 offensive - during June 2026.

ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 36.98 percent of Kostyantynivka and made 76.73 percent of the gains in June 2026. Russian forces have infiltrated into a significant part of Kostyantynivka but have not secured control over or established enduring positions in much of these areas. Russian forces first infiltrated Kostyantynivka in October 2025, but only began consolidating tactical gains in the city in June 2026 after months of intensified infiltration missions, offensive operations, and a concerted

tactical battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at depriving Ukrainian forces operating in the city of logistics.[7] Russian forces have deployed at least one combined arms army (CAA) and one army corps (AC) to the Kostyantynivka area and elements of at least four other armies and naval infantry formations to support offensive operations against the city.[8] Russian forces will likely continue to make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in summer 2026 but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large. Russian forces will likely also continue to suffer high casualties to make these gains.

Ukraine continued to intensify its intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns in June 2026, which are having cascading effects on Russian logistics and battlefield operations as well as causing gasoline shortages and economic frictions across Russia and occupied Ukraine.

ISW has observed evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 303 intermediate-range strikes against Russian targets in occupied Ukraine in June 2026. Ukrainian forces comparatively conducted at least 210 such strikes in May 2026. Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign is increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine and into occupied Crimea, in ways that are beginning to manifest on the frontline and impede Russian advances across the theater.[9] Ukraine will likely further expand and intensify its intermediate-range strike campaign, which will likely have cascading effects on Russian offensive operations in the coming months, especially as Ukraine's efforts to shape the battlefield mature.

Ukrainian forces have simultaneously been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia.[10]

ISW has observed evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 31 strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and at least 47 strikes against Russian military assets in at least 41 Russian federal subjects in June 2026. Ukrainian forces now regularly strike deep into the Russian rear, including in rear areas that were previously safely out of range of Ukrainian strike vehicles, for example, Moscow and Chelyabinsk cities.[11] Russia also largely has failed to defend against and adapt to Ukrainian long-range strikes, which are contributing to gasoline shortages across Russia.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's intensifying long-range and intermediate-range strike campaigns are compounding Russia's air defense challenges given the vast amount of land and large number of facilities Russia must protect.[13]

Russian authorities announced that Russia will temporarily close seven railway border crossings with Finland, Latvia, and Estonia starting July 1 for unspecified reasons.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin announced on June 30 that Russia would close the Vyborg, Svetogorsk, Vyartsilya, Lyuttya, and Saint Petersburg railway border crossings with Finland; the Pechory-Pskovskie border crossing with Estonia; and the Pyatolovo border crossing with Latvia starting on July 1.[14] The Pechory-Pskovskie border crossing with Estonia and the Pyatolovo border crossing with Latvia have been operational since 2024, but Finnish authorities closed the other five crossings in 2023 and have not re-opened them since.[15] ISW is not prepared to assess the reasoning for Russian authorities' decision to close these railway border crossings at this time.

Russia is becoming increasingly reliant on crude oil exports and foreign gasoline imports as Ukrainian intermediate- and long-range strikes continue to plummet Russia's refining capacity.

Bloomberg reported on June 30 that Russia's seaborne crude oil exports in June 2026 increased to 4.13 million barrels per day, 780,000 barrels higher than in the first quarter of 2026 and the highest figure since February 2022.[16] Bloomberg reported that rising crude oil exports coincide with a 34 percent increase in Russian oil currently at sea (up to 133 million barrels), with tankers accumulating off the coasts of Egypt and Singapore, indicating that Russia may be struggling to find buyers for its excess supply of crude. Bloomberg reported that Russia's gross revenues from crude exports fell to \$1.9 billion per week in June, the lowest value since March 2026. A reduction in crude export revenues in conjunction with a spike in export volumes demonstrates that Russia is currently unable to outpace lower crude oil prices by selling its excess unrefined supply. Two industry sources told Reuters on July 1 that Russia began importing gasoline from India and that India has dispatched at least 60,000 metric tons of gasoline to Russia.[17] A third source told Reuters that Russia plans to import 400,000 tons of gasoline per month from various countries, including Belarus. Reuters also reported on June 30 that Indian imports of Russian crude oil surged to 2.70 million barrels per day in June 2026, accounting for over half of India's total oil imports, compared to between 1.95 and 2.13 million barrels in May 2026.[18] Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, specifically targeting Russia's refining capacity.[19] These

Ukrainian strikes are causing gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[20] Record-high Indian imports of Russian crude oil, paired with Russia's first imports of refined Indian gasoline, indicate that Russia is effectively using India to partially recover Russia's oil refinery capacity. Russia was a substantial net exporter in every major fossil fuel category in 2023, but widespread Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries have forced Russia to seek refined gasoline from external sources.[21]

Belarus has not dismantled Russian-installed signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border as of June 30, after having turned the repeaters off on June 22.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 30 that Belarus has not dismantled the Russian-installed signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and turned on one of the signal repeaters on June 29.[22] Syrskyi stated that Belarus will "realize that this is not necessary," implying that Ukrainian forces took unspecified measures to prevent Russian forces from once again using Belarusian airspace and signal repeaters to fly their drone at extended ranges deep into western Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeatedly warned Belarus to dismantle the signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border; Belarus turned the repeaters off as of June 22 after Zelensky threatened to strike the equipment if Belarus refused to do so by June 26.[23]

Key Takeaways

Russia's spring-summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operationally significant gains thus far, and Russian forces' rate of advance in June 2026 is a fraction of the rate of advance that Russian forces achieved in June 2025.

Russian forces have also experienced heavy casualties and equipment losses to make these relatively small gains.

Ukraine continued to intensify its intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns in June 2026, which are having cascading effects on Russian logistics and battlefield operations as well as causing gasoline shortages and economic frictions across Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian authorities announced that Russia will temporarily close seven railway border crossings with Finland, Latvia, and Estonia starting July 1 for unspecified reasons.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil and gas infrastructure and military assets on the night of June 30 to July 1. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, one Kh-59 guided missile, and 151 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia on the night of June 30 to July 1.

Ukrainian

President

Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (over 1,300 kilometers from the frontline), for the second time in the past week, noting that the oil refinery is one of Russia's largest producers of lubricants.[24] Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic on June 25.[25] The

Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the JSC Scientific Research Institute of Physical Measurements in Penza City, Penza Oblast, overnight and that the enterprise is a leading Russian facility for space, aviation, and military instrument-making as part of the Russian Space Systems Holding (Roscosmos state corporation).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the enterprise manufactures sensors for cruise and ballistic missiles, components of airborne aviation systems, including Su-34, Su-35, and Tu-95MS, and equipment for military space, including for reconnaissance satellites. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows the aftermath of the strike on the facility in Penza City.[27]

Open sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in

Russia.

Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi published satellite imagery collected on July 1 indicating that the Ukrainian June 27 FP-F Flaming cruise missile strike against the Titan-Barrikady enterprise in Volgograd City, Volgograd Oblast, destroyed parts of two buildings at the enterprise.[28] Satellite imagery published on June 30 shows damaged buildings at the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Rubin communications complex in Beloomut, Moscow Oblast, following a reported recent Ukrainian strike.[29] Additional satellite imagery published on June 29 shows damage to the Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Assembly Plant's two production workshop buildings and four sections of the administrative-production building after the Ukrainian strike on June 22.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[31]

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian logistics depots near Krupka, Kursk Oblast.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 1 that Russian forces conducted two FAB-500 guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Krasnopillya (southeast of Sumy City and roughly nine kilometers from the frontline).[33]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 30 and July 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[34]

The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 82nd and 83rd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Ukrainke (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Losivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[36] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted a Kh-38 ML missile strike against a Ukrainian temporary deployment point near Udy (north of Kharkiv City and roughly 6 kilometers from the international border).[37]

Russian fuel shortages are beginning to spread to the battlefield.

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on June 30 that Russian forces are experiencing acute fuel shortages in frontline areas of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, where Russian forces are rationing fuel for generators, likely due to Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russian oil refineries and intermediate-range strikes on Russian logistics.[38] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are now conducting logistics on foot during assaults due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. Trehubov stated that Russian forces have intensified infiltration attempts near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City), Dekhtyarne, and Vovchansk (both northeast of Kharkiv City) over the last 10 days (since June 20).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 1 but did not advance.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 - Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[40]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian service members in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (just southeast of Kupyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[41] The presence of Ukrainian forces in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi indicates that Ukrainian forces cleared previous Russian infiltrators from central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi on a prior date. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot near occupied Novoyehorivka (northeast of Kupyansk and roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline).[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 31 and July 1

but did not advance.[43]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge across the Telpa River near occupied Nyzhnoteple (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[48]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control posts near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), Novooleksandrivka (one of two settlements either northwest or southwest of Pokrovsk), and Pokrovsk.[49] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Pokrovsk direction despite intensified Russian artillery, drone, and glide bomb strikes.[50]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 30 to July 1 but did not advance.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[52]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics crossing near Novoocheretuvate (roughly 12 kilometers from the frontline).[53]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge across the Malyi Kalchik River near occupied Hranitne (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline), and a logistics depot near Rivnopil (either roughly 13 or 60 kilometers from the frontline).[54] Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a destroyed bridge across the Malyi Malchuk River along the H-20 Rostov-Crimea Highway near Kremeniivka (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) after reported Ukrainian FP-1 and FP-2 drone strikes.[55] Geolocated footage published on June 30 and July 1 shows fires at a reported Russian ammunition depot and 20 damaged Russian trucks following Ukrainian strikes near Donetsk City (roughly 58 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Geolocated footage published on June 30 and July 1 shows damage to two trucks along the T-0508 Pokrovsk and Hryshyne Highway near Maryanivka (roughly 63 kilometers from the frontline) and damage to a Russian Ural truck near Obilne (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian drone strikes.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 30 and July 1 but did not advance.[58]

The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 that elements of the Russian 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) seized Kopani (northwest of Hulyaipole).[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[60]

Russian forces are failing to consolidate advances beyond infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction, despite committing significant forces to advance.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 1 that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) as well as elements of the 35th and 36th CAAs (both EMD), the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are continuing attempts to advance their main forces northeast of Orikhiv and to reestablish forward

positions along the Haichur River north of Hulyaipole.[61] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have significantly slowed and even halted their advance in most areas of the Hulyaipole direction, and that the 5th CAA is attempting to consolidate its forward assault groups which infiltrated behind Ukrainian positions between Nove Zaporizhzhia (north of Hulyaipole) and the area southwest of Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole). Mashovets reported that Russian forces have recently only been able to infiltrate in the Hulyaipole direction and that Russian forces' westernmost presence near Novoselivka (west of Hulyaipole), west of Charivne, and near Vozdvizhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) consists of small infiltration groups that bypassed Ukrainian positions. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions interspersed with Russian positions, including near Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), Hulyaipole, Zelene, Varvarivka (both north of Hulyaipole), and west of Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole).[62] ISW is currently unable to map these enduring Ukrainian positions with precision, and ISW's current depiction of Russian infiltration areas near Hulyaipole overestimates the true extent of Russian forces' presence. Mashovets noted that the 5th CAA is the largest army of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces but is still struggling to advance. Mashovets noted that the 5th CAA's logistics rely in large part on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, which Ukrainian forces are interdicting.[63] Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing to counterattack north of the Hulyaipole direction in the Russian 36th CAA's and 29th CAA's (EMD) areas of responsibility. Mashovets concluded that the 5th CAA will continue to struggle to advance as Ukrainian forces strike its logistics and counterattack nearby. Mashovets further assessed that the Russian military command is prioritizing advancing in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction and may later focus on the Kupyansk direction, concluding that the Russian military command is unlikely to devote reserves to the Hulyaipole direction.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia oblast on June 30 and July 1.[65]

The Ukrainian general staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Hrozove (southwest of Orikhiv and roughly 7 kilometers from the frontline).[66]

Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in the fields southwest of Mali Shcherbakiv (west of Orikhiv), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military logistics in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricant depot in occupied Melitopol (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian military van on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway near occupied Vyazivka (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[69]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 1. Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Crimea.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on June 30 that it struck hangars at the Saky military airfield overnight, resulting in five hits, including against two aircraft hangars with Su-30 and Su-30SM fighter jets.[70] The SBU reported that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the hangar with a Su-30SM fighter jet, indicating that Ukrainian forces destroyed the jet. The SBU reported that each Su-30 type aircraft costs between 30 and 50 million dollars. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data collected on July 1 shows heat anomalies at the Saky military airfield.[71] The Crimean Government told Russian business newspaper Kommersant on July 1 that occupied Armyansk has been without power and water for over two days, and occupied Yany Kapu and the Feodosia municipal district are also experiencing significant power outages following Ukrainian strikes.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 30 to July 1.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea, one Kh-59 guided missile from the Black Sea, and 151 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City;

and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59 guided missile and 130 drones, that 17 drones struck 16 locations, and that debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck gas, agricultural, commercial, residential, and road infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[74]

Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian oil infrastructure.

Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Advisor Andriy Podorvan stated on July 1 that Russian forces are increasingly targeting civilian fuel infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast with long-range drones, including striking four gas stations between June 30 and July 1.[75] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Hanzha reported on July 1 that Russian forces struck five gas stations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on June 30 to July 1.[76] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on July 1 that Russian forces struck seven gas stations in Zaporizhia Oblast over the past week.[77] Chernihiv Oblast Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported on July 1 that Russian forces struck four gas stations in Chernihiv Oblast in the past day.[78]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

See topline text.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025>

[2]

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/)

[https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/;](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/)

[3]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026emUdyJDSfqSX9bBLWz4CuXvKxykoHiU8vTqnD28dy>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dY1qRxWipHyNN1aQJ1UsyWULk5W2DxThQcgfMthU>

[Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff-s daily reports between May 31 and June 30, 2026.]

[4]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02X2wd3xUTX8AJU2aRZBgwmxcTy517kPPpvfMSukM67>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Q7oE5NePUEa82dNQqYKtYP58anMQA8uHk6HVmrHs>

[Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff-s daily reports between May 31 and June 30, 2025.]

[5]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026emUdyJDSfqSX9bBLWz4CuXvKxykoHiU8vTqnD28dy>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dY1qRxWipHyNN1aQJ1UsyWULk5W2DxThQcgfMthU>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02X2wd3xUTX8AJU2aRZBgwmxcTy517kPPpvfMSukM67>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Q7oE5NePUEa82dNQqYKtYP58anMQA8uHk6HVmrHs>

[Total losses for June 2026 generated from the Ukrainian General Staff-s daily reports between May 31 and July 30, 2026, total losses for June 2025 generated from the Ukrainian General Staff-s daily reports between May 31 and June 30, 2025]

[6]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/>

[7]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/>

[8]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/>

;

[9]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/>

[10]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/>;

[11]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_24-2/;

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-25/;

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_18-6/;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025/>;

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-3/;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025/>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/>;
[12]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/>
[13]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-me>
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/>
[14] <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202606300028>
[15] <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410869/finland-s-eastern-border-to-remain-closed-until-further-notice-2> <https://meduza.io/news/2026/06/30/rossiya-zakryla-sem-zheleznodorozhnyh-pogranpunktov-na-granitse-s-finlyandiy-latvii-i-e>
[16]

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-30/russia-boosts-crude-oil-exports-to-record-while-prices-tum>
[17]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-buys-gasoline-india-tackle-shortages-sources-say-2026-07-01/>
[18]
<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indias-russian-oil-imports-hit-record-high-june-data-shows-2026-06-30/>
[19]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/>
[20]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-template-020426/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/>
;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/>;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/>
[21]
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Russia/pdf/Russia%20CAB_2025.pdf
[22] <https://suspijne.media/1344120-sirskij-retranslatorii-na-teritorii-bilorusi-demontovani/>
[23]
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/>
[24] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2072203673359303053>

[25]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/>

[26]

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>

[27] https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2072184093127659947; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24215

[28]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/>;

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2072284549589962930;

https://x.com/mil_in_ua/status/2072282391134023907;

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2072268063144099881;

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2072265679303057459 ; <https://t.me/milinfoolive/175257> ;

[<com/uk/news/rakety-flamingo-zrujnuvaly-chastyny-dvoh-budivel-zavodu-tytan-barrykady-u-volgograd/>](https://military dot</p></div><div data-bbox=)

[29] <https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2072309402481086627> ;

<https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2072309412736209119>; https://t.me/exile_plus/1768;

[30] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13277;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>

[31] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/35198> ; <https://t.me/severnyyi/8554> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95411

[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/65156;

[34] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637> ; <https://t.me/severnyyi/8554> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198> ;

<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44832> ; [<media/kharkiv/1344640-u-kozacij-lopani-provodat-zacistku-rosijskih-vijsk-u-granevi-rf-okupuvala-daci-zadorenko>](https://suspilne dot</p></div><div data-bbox=)

; https://t.me/dva_majors/95411 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/53237>

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/65152 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/65154

[36] <https://t.me/voenkorkotenok/73215>

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/65156

[38] [<com.ua/2026/07/01/zaraz-yih-vybyly-a-zavtra-vony-mozhut-polizty-znovu-rechnyk-uos-pro-boyi-bilya-kozachoyi->](https://armyinform dot</p></div><div data-bbox=)

[39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602>;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/35198> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44832> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95411

; <https://t.me/voenkorkotenok/73215>

[40] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/35198> ; <https://t.me/severnyyi/8554>

[41] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/15835 ; <https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2072002092760478110>

[42] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>

[43] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/grvZapad/19015>

[44] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>

[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602>;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637>; <https://t.me/grvZapad/19015>;

<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44840>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198>;

<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44846>

[46] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198>

[47] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198>

[48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602> ;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637>

[49] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>

[50] [<media/donbas/1344766-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-kilkist-sturmiv-zmensilas-obstriliv-zrostae-59-brigada/>;](https://suspilne dot</p></div><div data-bbox=)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgLgpn0Mw4>

[51] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602>;

<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637>
[52] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602>;
<https://t.me/odshbr79/870>; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2072017749249806814;
https://t.me/voin_dv/20021
[53] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>
[54] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>
[55] <https://x.com/Tendar/status/2072205137162973613>;
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2072208138476958108;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2072260137855631685; <https://t.me/istrebin/44850>;
<https://t.me/istrebin/44849>; <https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/36542>;
<https://x.com/Nina04476644330/status/2072264451986739618>; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36869;
<https://military dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-zrujnuvaly-avtomobilnyj-mist-na-trasi-donetsk-mariupol/>
[56] <https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2072121197295210914>;
<https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2072121199262409145>;
<https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2072121249510130159>; https://t.me/supernova_plus/54796;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2072265145804268026 ; <https://t.me/VESTIDONETSK/21234>;
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2072289863161061661
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2072289091954389403
[57] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2072278202349662517 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24246;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/207198793497101157; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24182
[58] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40600>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40637>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198>; https://t.me/voin_dv/20021
[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/65152; https://t.me/mod_russia/65153
[60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>
[61] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3479>
[62] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3480>
[63] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3481>
[64] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3482>
[65] <https://t.me/wargonzo/35198>
[66] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>
[67]
<https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2071964535196385284>;
<https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2071964731028467839>; https://t.me/Ruski_Medved/1593
[68] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40626>
[69] <https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2071962444000641190>;
<https://x.com/RALee85/status/2071537561059692956>; <https://www.instagram.com/p/DaJ7sGsBXf1/>
[70]
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1391427926417447&set=a.276500821243502&locale=uk_UA
; <https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1344434-sbu-u-krimu-urazili-angari-z-vinisuvacami-na-vijskovomu-aerodromi-saki/>;
<https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1424386216402066&set=pb.100064921021431.-2207520000>;
[71] <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.591,45.098,13.876z>
[72] <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8781304>
[73] <https://t.me/kpszsus/66963>
[74] <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30212> ; <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30215> ; <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1344804-cotiri-udari-za-dobu-na-cernigivsini-zbilsilasa-kilkist-rosijskih-atak-po-azs/> ;
https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4232 <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30501>;
https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27365; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/01/vorog-atakuvav-5-zapravok-na-dnipropetrovshhyni-ye-zagybla-ta-poraneni/>;
https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42877; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42879 ;
<https://t.me/synegubov/23332> ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/29689; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/01/shestero-lyudej-postrazhdaly-vnaslidok-vorozhyh-udariv-po-harkivshhyni/> ;
<https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/13619>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/60534>;
<https://t.me/bbcrossian/96693>; <https://t.me/phogovua/10522>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/01/okupanty-vdaryly-po-marshrutci-v-hersoni-zagynuly-dvoye-lyudej/> ;

<https://t.me/khersonskaODA/60544>; <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/13629>;
<https://t.me/khersonskaODA/60547> ; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/60546> ;
<https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/13631>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/60560>;
<https://t.me/bbcrossian/96700> ; <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/22067>; <https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1344588-na-mikolaivsini-zagynuv-colovik-vnaslidok-udaru-saheda-po-pidpriemstvu/> ;
<https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/33707>; <https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1344398-raketa-vlucila-u-pidpriemstvo-v-poltavskomu-rajoni-so-vidomo-pro-naslidki/> ;
<https://t.me/odeskaODA/17184>; <https://suspilne dot media/1344230-ukraina-zakupit-u-svecii-16-vinisuvaciv-gripen-rf-moze-gotuvati-nastup-z-branskoi-oblasti-1589->
; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2740 ; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1344942-cetvero-civilnih-postrazdalih-vnaslidok-dvoh-rosijskih-atak-po-sumah-detalnise/>
[75] <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1344804-cotiri-udari-za-dobu-na-chernigivsini-zbilsilasa-kilkist-rosijskih-atak-po-azs/> ;
[76] <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30501>; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27365;
<https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/01/vorog-atakuvav-5-zapravok-na-dnipropetrovshhyni-ye-zagybla-ta-poraneni/>
[77] <https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1344628-vijskovi-rf-posilili-ataki-na-azs-u-zaporizkij-oblasti-so-vidomo/>
[78] <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30215>

[Previous](#)

[Next](#)