

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2026

Institute for the Study of War · 2026

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/>

PDF generated from the original web publication.

Previous

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2026

Toplines

Russian forces conducted a large drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 1 to 2, primarily targeting Kyiv City and killing at least 27 and injuring at least 91.[1]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 2 that Russian forces launched 570 drones and missiles, including 496 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones; four Zirkon anti-ship missiles; 24 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles; 34 Kh-101 cruise missiles; eight Kalibr cruise missiles; and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles overnight.[2]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 476 drones, four Iskander-M/S-400s, 32 Kh-101s, all eight Kalibrs, and all four Kh-59/69s. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 25 ballistic missiles and 12 drones struck 33 locations and that debris fell on 18 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck over 20 locations in Kyiv City with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, primarily hitting residential buildings, an ambulance station, a scientific institute, a hotel, and an enterprise, and killed at least 27 and injured at least 90 in the city.[3] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that Russian forces struck at least 20 buildings directly, and damaged nearly 100 buildings in total in Kyiv City, and that additional civilians likely remain trapped under rubble.[4] Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported that the strikes also damaged the Donetsk Oblast Intensive Care Hospital in Kyiv City (Ukraine reestablished the hospital in Kyiv City after Russian forces occupied the original in Mariupol).[5] The Ukrainian branch of the Red Cross reported that Russian strikes destroyed a large humanitarian warehouse in Kyiv City, destroying over 79 million hryvnia (about \$1.76 million) worth of humanitarian assistance and critical equipment, including generators, heat pumps, medical equipment, and supplies for first responders.[6]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged warehouses in Odesa Oblast, killing at least two and injuring at least 13; a shopping center, an enterprise, and a logistics terminal in Zaporizhzhia City; transport, agricultural, and fuel infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; a farm in Kharkiv Oblast; and agricultural infrastructure and a locomotive in Kirovohrad Oblast.[7] Zelensky reported that Russian strikes killed at least five additional civilians in Kharkiv Oblast.[8] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Sumy, Kyiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.[9]

The frequency of Russian large-scale drone and missile strikes against Ukraine lessened in June 2026 for unclear reasons. Russian forces likely retain the ability to conduct large-scale drone and missile strikes against Ukraine several times per month, as they have in recent months.

Russian forces intensified their large-scale strike series in mid-January 2026, conducting strikes with at least 300 drones and missiles three times in mid- to late-January; six times in February; four times in March; five times in April; and six times in May.[10] Between January and May 2026, Russian forces typically launched one to three of these large-scale strikes within roughly a week of each other, then conducted much smaller strikes for a week or two, likely in part to stockpile strike vehicles, then resumed large-scale drone and missile strikes in the same pattern to maximize damage. Russian forces only conducted two drone and missile strikes consisting of over 300 strike vehicles in June 2026, however, on June 2 and June 15.[11] It is unclear why Russian forces reduced their large-scale strikes in June. Russian forces may be stockpiling drones, particularly for a higher frequency of large-scale strikes at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing, especially if Russia believes it can further exhaust Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces may also have shifted manufacturing patterns, such as seeking to decentralize Shahed-type drone production or shifting to prioritize drone variants that may be more difficult to manufacture, such as drones with jet engines. ISW will continue observing Russian strike patterns and reports about Russian strike tactics and drone production and will update its assessment accordingly.

Russian technological adaptations and strike package innovations continue to lead to increasing amounts of civilian harm, in part because these adaptations are making it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to shoot down Russian drones and missiles.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on July 2 that Russian forces used a high number of drones with jet engines in the July 1 to 2 overnight strikes, compared with previous large strike packages, and are increasingly using these drones in overnight strike packages.[12] Ihnat stated that these drones can fly up to 500 kilometers per hour (about 310 miles per hour), speeds

closer to those of cruise missiles.[13] Ihnat noted that these drones fly too fast for Ukrainian mobile fire groups or interceptor drones to down and that Ukraine must instead use fighter jets or air defense missiles, of which Ukrainian forces have a critical shortage, to down these drones. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy ·Flash· Beskrestnov reported on June 21 that Russian forces recently began operating drones at a new frequency of 3,900 to 4,100 megahertz (MHz).[14] Beskrestnov noted on July 2 that almost all the Russian Shahed-type drones launched at Kyiv City were operating on this new frequency, suggesting that Russian forces are trying to outpace Ukrainian EW capabilities to down drones operating on this frequency.[15] Russian forces have typically used tactical and technological innovations in drone systems to maximize civilian harm during strikes on Ukraine, for example, equipping Shahed drones with cluster munitions and munitions designed to detonate at a delay after the drone is downed. Faster-moving drones that are harder for Ukraine to intercept will likely generate increased civilian harm, much as other strike package adaptations have in the past. Russia has been using its shadow fleet vessels to facilitate its drone incursions into NATO airspace since 2024.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a report on July 2 indicating that the Kremlin likely used shadow fleet vessels operating in international waters to conduct drone incursions into NATO airspace by using the vessels as launch and recovery platforms.[16] The IISS recorded 144 incidents of Russian drones flying over 13 NATO states and Ireland between August 2024 and February 2026, including over military and submarine bases in the United Kingdom (UK) and France. The IISS identified between one and five shadow fleet vessels operating in the vicinity of each incursion. The IISS assessed that Russia likely launched the drones from shadow fleet vessels with their transponders off and used other shadow fleet vessels with their transponders on as recovery ships or signal repeaters and noted that the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) is orchestrating the campaign. ISW has reported on numerous instances of Russian shadow fleet vessels appearing near the drone incursion sites and has previously assessed that the Russian shadow fleet vessels are likely connected to the Russian reconnaissance and sabotage operations over the NATO airspace.[17] ISW observed automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform that confirms the presence of 11 out of 15 distinct Russian shadow fleet vessels in the vicinity of the incursion sites that IISS identified. The other four vessels that IISS identified likely turned off their AIS, which shadow fleet vessels often do to evade detection. ISW continues to assess that Russian drone incursions are part of the intensifying Russian ·Phase Zero· campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[18] The Russian military command is reportedly reducing its plans to augment strategic reserves in favor of replenishing Russian frontline troops.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 30 that the Russian military command is reducing the number of new divisions it plans to form in the strategic reserve to replenish Russian forces on the frontline.[19] Syrskyi did not expand on details or provide evidence to support his statement, which is inconsistent with his June 25 report stating that the Russian military command ·adjusted its plans,· intending to form an unspecified number of new divisions and five new brigades in 2026.[20] ISW cannot independently verify either of Syrskyi's statements, but the June 30 statement appears to be more consistent with the fact that Russian forces suffered almost 40,000 casualties in June 2026 alone, and would likely struggle with the staffing of reserves given constant frontline losses.[21]

#### Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted a large drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 1 to 2, primarily targeting Kyiv City and killing at least 27 and injuring at least 91.

The frequency of Russian large-scale drone and missile strikes against Ukraine lessened in June 2026 for unclear reasons. Russian forces likely retain the ability to conduct large-scale drone and missile strikes against Ukraine several times per month, as they have in recent months.

Russian technological adaptations and strike package innovations continue to lead to increasing amounts of civilian harm, in part because these adaptations are making it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to shoot down Russian drones and missiles.

Russia has been using its shadow fleet vessels to facilitate its drone incursions into NATO airspace since 2024.

The Russian military command is reportedly reducing its plans to augment strategic reserves in favor of replenishing Russian frontline troops.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 2.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of July 1 to 2.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of July 1 to 2.

Ukrainian officials reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the AVT-6 primary oil refining unit of the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery and the Starolikeevo Linear Production and Dispatching Station in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 780 kilometers from the international border).[22] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) noted that the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery is one of Russia's largest fuel refining enterprises and that the Starolikeevo Linear Production and Dispatching Station is an important node for transporting fuel to central Russia.[23] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows a fire burning at the AVT-6 primary oil refining unit of the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery and the Starolikeevo Linear Production and Dispatching Station in Kstovo.[24]

Ukrainian and open sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 1 that Ukraine's June 26 strike against a Russian Space Communications Center near Beloomut, Moscow Oblast (roughly 515 kilometers from the international border) damaged the center's main technical building and large antennas and destroyed some parabolic antennas on a tower.[25] A Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian strikes against Russian satellite communications centers in Beloomut and Dubna, Moscow Oblast, and Gus-Khrustalny, Vladimir Oblast, disrupted the communications system of the Russian Missile Attack Warning System in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, and the backup command post in Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, and disabled communications channels with the Voronezh and Daryal early warning radar systems and the KROKUS communication channel that alerts Russian leadership of incoming missile strikes.[26] Geolocated imagery published on July 1 shows smoke plumes rising from the JSC Scientific Research Institute of Physical Measurements in Penza City, Penza Oblast following a July 1 Ukrainian strike.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 1 and 2 but did not advance.[28]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on July 1 that Russian forces are increasingly using individual infantrymen to scout routes, sending one person first and then gradually sending additional personnel along different routes to identify open areas.[29]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[30] ISW last observed reports of the 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast on September 5, 2025.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

.

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 1 and 2 but

did not advance.[32]

Ukrainian forces appear to be conducting clearing operations around Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).

Derhachiv Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko stated on July 2 that Russian forces infiltrated into Kozacha Lopan in small groups at the end of June 2026, including by disguising themselves as civilians, an act of perfidy and a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[33] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces eliminated Russian forces near Kozacha Lopan and cleared Hraniv (north of Kozacha Lopan and along the international border).[34]

Russian forces may be experiencing shortages of certain types of drones in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces are regularly using Molniya fixed-wing, first-person view (FPV) drones with warheads from TM-62 anti-tank mines cut in half, possibly indicating that Russian forces have a shortage of other types of drones and are innovating solutions with other weapon types.[35] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces decreased their use of Molniya drones in May 2026 and instead used VT-40 fiber-optic FPV drones either as strike drones or to remotely mine roads, but noted that Russian forces now only use the VT-40s sporadically.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 1 and 2 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction.

Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Russian personnel operating in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses were likely infiltration missions.[37]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently launched mechanized counterattacks near Kurylivka, Podoly, and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (all southeast of Kupyansk).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Russian forces advanced in southern Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk) and in fields southeast of Novoosynove.[39]

Russian milbloggers continue to post likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at exaggerating Russian advances.

Russian milbloggers posted footage on July 1 purportedly showing Russian forces holding Russian flags north, south, and southeast of Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has reason to suspect that the imagery is AI-altered.[40] Russian sources publish footage showing the presence of single Russian soldiers holding flags as part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive war effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims.

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kashevich reported on July 2 that Russian forces struck Shevchenkove (west of Kupyansk and roughly 28 kilometers from the frontline) with a FAB glide bomb, killing one person and injuring two others.[41]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk and roughly seven kilometers from the frontline).[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Russian forces advanced east of Druzhelyubivka and west of Novoyehorivka (both southeast of Borova).[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River near a railway station in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 96 kilometers from the frontline).[45] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas distribution station near Aidar (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline) and an electrical substation near Tymonove (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline).[46] Images posted on July 2 show burning Russian vehicles near Alchevsk (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[48]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 2 that Russian forces continue small-group assaults but that Russian forces are losing the offensive initiative.[49] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are struggling to maintain a numerical advantage over Ukrainian forces in the area and continue to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

The Russian MoD continues to use likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances.

Likely AI-altered footage published on July 2 purports to show elements of the Russian 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) raising flags in Pyskunivka (east of Slovyansk).[50] The Russian MoD subsequently claimed that Russian forces seized Pyskunivka.[51] Russian officials have recently intensified their use of likely AI-altered footage to further aggrandize claims of Russian successes.[52] These videos are part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive warfare effort aimed at falsely portraying the entire frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence. Russian forces continue infiltration missions around Kostyantynivka and recently consolidated some positions within Kostyantynivka itself.

Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in Malynivka (north of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53] Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kostyantynivka.[54] ISW has not observed Ukrainian forces near the location of the strike in central Kostyantynivka since March 6, indicating that Russian forces have consolidated positions in the area.[55]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 1 and July 2 but did not advance.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 1 and July 2 but did not advance.[57]

The Russian MoD claimed on July 2 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian railway train near Slavne (west of Pokrovsk) with Geran drones.[58]

Russian forces are conducting small group infiltrations and suffering heavy losses in the Pokrovsk direction.

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 2 that Russian forces are infiltrating through contested areas rather than conducting ground assaults with armored vehicles and large infantry groups.[59] The commander noted that the Russian military command withdrew elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) from the Pokrovsk direction twice for replenishments. The commander added that Ukrainian forces are improving the capabilities of fiber-optic drones in the area to reach beyond 15 kilometers.

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 1 and July 2 but did not advance.[60]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in western Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure and transportation equipment in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the Starobisheve thermal power plant (TPP) near occupied Novyi Svit (either roughly 51 or 87 kilometers from the frontline).[62] Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows multiple damaged Russian trucks in a parking lot in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline) after reported Ukrainian strikes.[63]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger reported on July 2 that elements of the Russian 15th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion are operating in the Oleksandrivka direction.

ISW has not previously observed evidence of a Russian 15th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 1 and 2 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[64]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking near Novoselivka (southwest of Hulyaipole) for several days.  
[65]

A Ukrainian Border Guard unmanned systems unit reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tornado-S multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in the Hulyaipole direction and that the system costs roughly 15 million dollars.[66]

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Orikhiv direction on July 1 and 2 but did not advance.[67]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot near occupied Kamyanka (roughly 31 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on June 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck on the M-18 Melitopol-Novooleksiivka highway near occupied Pishchanske (roughly 86 kilometers from the frontline).[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot near occupied Melitopol (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline).[70] Footage published on July 2 shows smoke rising from a gas station in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian strike.[71]

Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian oil infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The Russian MoD claimed on July 2 that Russian forces struck a gas storage facility near Zaporizhzhia City.[72]

Russian forces continue to militarize the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and to strike civilians in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Ukrainian 30th Marine Corps Spokesperson Pavlo Drohal reported on July 1 that Russian forces continue to store artillery, electronic warfare systems, electronic reconnaissance systems, and drones at the ZNPP and to use the stored equipment to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure in the Nikopol region (northwest of the ZNPP on the right (western) bank of the Dnipro River).[73]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 2. Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign is increasingly affecting Russian logistics in occupied Kherson.

Druhal stated on July 2 that Russian forces are struggling with logistics from occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea and that Russian forces are no longer using typical transport routes due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[74] Druhal stated that Russian forces are increasingly using mobile fire groups to cover transports and personnel. Druhal noted that Russian forces have significantly decreased offensive intensity around the Dnipro River Island delta in recent weeks.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Crimea.

Brovdi reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the 35 kV electrical substation ·Ozernenska· in occupied Karyerne (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline); the 110/35 kV electrical substation ·Vypasne· in occupied Vypasne (either roughly 119 or 141 kilometers from the frontline); the 110 kV electrical substations ·Rodnykove·, ·Karyerne·, ·Mytiaieve·, in occupied Arkadiivka, Karyerne, and Mytiaieve (roughly 201, 165, and 172 kilometers from the frontline respectively) as well as 110 kV electrical substations near the Okhotnykove Solar Power Plant (roughly 170 kilometers from the frontline) and in occupied Shyroke (roughly either 175 or 190 kilometers from the frontline); the 220 kV electrical substations ·Donuzlav· and ·Feodosiiska· in occupied Krylovka (roughly either 125 or 147 kilometers from the

frontline) and Feodosiia (roughly 263 kilometers from the frontline) respectively; and the 330 kV electrical substation 'Zahidno-Krymska,' in occupied Karyerne.[75] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data from July 2 shows heat anomalies in or near occupied Karyerne, Mytiaieve, Krylovka, and Feodosiia.[76] An anonymous source told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Crimean Service on July 2 that a large quarry near occupied Bilohirsk (roughly 217 kilometers from the frontline) halted operations due to a lack of fuel.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line  
See topline text.

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Russian officials accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against another Belarusian bus in Russia.

Acting Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed on July 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a passenger bus traveling from Minsk, Belarus, to Anapa, Krasnodar Krai, in the Zlynkovsky Raion of Bryansk Oblast and that the claimed strike injured two people.[78] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Major Andriy Kovalev responded on July 2 that Ukrainian forces did not strike the specified passenger bus and that Russia is conducting an information operation to divert attention from Russian strikes against Kyiv City.[79] Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich stated on July 2 that Belarusians should refrain from traveling to Russia presently and acknowledged the strike but did not discuss the origin of the strike, notably refraining from attributing the strike to Ukrainian forces.[80] Belarusian officials continue to avoid adopting Kremlin framing that seeks to portray Ukraine as a threat to Belarus.[81] Russian officials previously used claims of an alleged June 17 Ukrainian strike against a Belarusian bus in Bryansk Oblast, which Ukrainian officials confirmed was not a Ukrainian strike, to legitimize future long-range strikes against Ukraine and may do the same with the alleged July 2 strike.[82]

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] <https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2544>

[2] <https://t.me/kpszsus/67095>

[3] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40661>; [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/19708](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19708) ;

[https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/7015](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7015); <https://t.me/astrapress/117323>; <https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2530>;  
<https://armyinform.com> dot

[ua/2026/07/02/u-kyievi-vzhe-56-postrazhdalyh-cherez-nichnu-rosijsku-ataku-zbilshylas-kilkist-zagyblyh/](https://t.me/dsns_telegram/67399);  
<https://armyinform.com> dot

[ua/2026/07/02/masovana-ataka-na-kyiyiv-pozhezhi-ta-rujnuvannya-v-kilkoh-rajonah-ye-zagybli/](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7001);  
[https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/7001](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7001); <https://t.me/astrapress/117312>; [https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/7003](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7003);  
[https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/7013](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7013); <https://suspilne> dot

[media/kyiv/1345130-u-kievi-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-4/](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7000); [https://t.me/vitaliy\\_klitschko/7000](https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7000);

<https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2515>; <https://t.me/astrapress/117385>; <https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2544>;

[https://t.me/Mykola\\_Kalashnyk/10693](https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10693)

[4] [https://x.com/Svyrydenko\\_Y/status/2072572152717492519](https://x.com/Svyrydenko_Y/status/2072572152717492519)

[5] <https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/16531>

[6] <https://redcross.org> dot [ua/en/news/2026/07/154280/](https://redcross.org/ua/en/news/2026/07/154280/)

[7] <https://x.com/MVS-UA/status/2072327712824299791> ;

<https://x.com/MVS-UA/status/2072327712824299791>; [https://t.me/ivan\\_fedorov\\_zp/43157](https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43157);

[https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/63468](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63468); [https://t.me/ivan\\_fedorov\\_zp/43175](https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43175);

[https://t.me/ivan\\_fedorov\\_zp/43200](https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43200); [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/63498](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63498);

[https://t.me/ivan\\_fedorov\\_zp/43214](https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43214); [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/63506](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63506);

<https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30533>; <https://t.me/vilkul/16954>;

<https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30519>; <https://t.me/astrapress/117375>; <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1345184-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-atakuvav-fermu-v-dovziku-na-harkivsini-zaginuli-ta-poraneni-telata/>;  
<https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1345192-rosijski-droni-atakuvali-kirovogradsinu-poskodili-silskogospodarsku-tehniku/>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1GzugL4pHE/>; [https://t.me/DSNS\\_Kharkiv/23840](https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/23840)  
[8] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/19708](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19708)  
[9] <https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5164>  
[10] <https://t.me/kpszsu/62647>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/62173>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/61846>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/61715>; <https://t.me/kpszsu/61764>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/61223> ; <https://t.me/kpszsu/61254>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/61079> ;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/60720>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/60113>; <https://t.me/kpszsu/60064>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/59996>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/59417>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/59224>; <https://t.me/kpszsu/59251>  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/58995> ;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/58637>; <https://t.me/kpszsu/58685>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/57963>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/57337>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/56598>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/56278>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/55822>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/54980>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/54777>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/54449>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/53516>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/53142>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/52374>  
[11] <https://t.me/kpszsu/65248>;  
<https://t.me/kpszsu/63655>  
[12] <https://suspilne dot media/1345460-ignat-rozpoviv-pro-osoblivist-masovanogo-udaru-po-kievu/>;  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs>  
[13] <https://suspilne dot media/1345460-ignat-rozpoviv-pro-osoblivist-masovanogo-udaru-po-kievu/>;  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs>; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-chastishe-zastosovuyut-balistyku-dlya-atak-r>  
[14] [https://t.me/serhii\\_flash/7509](https://t.me/serhii_flash/7509)  
[15] [https://t.me/serhii\\_flash/7534](https://t.me/serhii_flash/7534);  
<https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02YQetKyEe8Rf6RpjBwBMzadfqFWKMnUD5pc1BfxahsJGYc>  
[16] <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2026/06/russias-uav-campaign-over-europe/> ;  
<https://military dot com/uk/news/yevropa-pidozryuye-tinovyj-flot-uf-u-prychetnosti-do-zapuskiv-droniv/>  
[17]  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2025/>  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025/>  
[18]  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/>

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/>;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/>  
[19] <https://militaryni dot com/uk/news/zmeshyla-dyvizii-formuyutsya-popovnennya/>;  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2loliH9Hy9w>  
[20]  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/>  
[21]  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/>  
[22] <https://t.me/SBUkr/17989> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40662> ; [https://t.me/usf\\_army/2134](https://t.me/usf_army/2134) ;  
<https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10930> ; <https://t.me/DIUkraine/8832> ;  
[https://x.com/StratCom\\_AFU/status/2072589296112918874](https://x.com/StratCom_AFU/status/2072589296112918874)  
[23] <https://t.me/SBUkr/17989>  
[24] <https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2072529990575329411?s=20> ;  
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2072557308971032866?s=20> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/117358> ;  
[https://x.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/2072659724051329407?s=20](https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2072659724051329407?s=20) ;  
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2072669839009988803?s=20> ; [https://t.me/kiber\\_boroshno/13291](https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13291)  
[25] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40644> ;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/>  
[26] [https://t.me/rucriminalinfo\\_2/1764](https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1764)  
[27] [https://x.com/Exilenova\\_plus/status/2072188520555598166](https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2072188520555598166) ;  
<https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2072282772337553553> ;  
[https://x.com/Exilenova\\_plus/status/2072180559057690768](https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2072180559057690768) ;  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/>  
[28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/95486](https://t.me/dva_majors/95486) ; <https://t.me/severnnyi/8561>  
; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35224>  
[29] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/01/ruhayutsya-po-odnomu-dlya-perevirky-marshrutiv-vorog-zminyuye-taktyku-shturmiv-na-sums>  
[30] <https://t.me/warriorofnorth/19802>  
[31]  
<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/>  
[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/95486](https://t.me/dva_majors/95486) ; <https://t.me/rybar/81448> ;  
<https://t.me/wargonzo/35224> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44860>  
[33] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1345550-rosiani-zaizdzaut-u-kozacu-lopan-na-velosipedah-zadorenko-rozpoviv-ci-e-zagroza-dla-l>  
[34] <https://t.me/skala425/918>  
[35] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/namagayutsya-proshhupaty-nashi-bojovi-poryadky-yak-vorog-shukaye-progalyny-v-oboroni->  
[36] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672>  
[37] <https://t.me/kcaebirds/3140> ; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/12361](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12361)  
[38] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/95486](https://t.me/dva_majors/95486) ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44882>  
[39] <https://t.me/divgen/82088?single>  
[40] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/12361](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12361) ; <https://t.me/kcaebirds/3140>  
[41] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1345336-zagroza-prodovzuvatime-zrostati-rosia-bombarduvala-sevcenkove-na-harkivsini-e-zagib>  
<https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17eBX6Dg5j/?mibextid=wwXlfr>  
[42] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40662>  
[43] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647> ; <https://t.me/grvZapad/19026> ; <https://t.me/grvZapad/19026>  
[44] <https://t.me/divgen/82091?single>  
[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40662>  
[46] [https://t.me/robert\\_magyar/2545](https://t.me/robert_magyar/2545)  
[47] <https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2072610541428736027> ; <https://t.me/andriyshTime/62014> ;  
[48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35224> ;  
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44860> ; <https://t.me/grvZapad/19026>

[49] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1345450-rf-zalucae-najmanciv-iz-afriki-ta-latinskoi-ameriki-na-limansini-cerez-problemi-iz-osobov>

[50] <https://t.me/shock3OA/7849>; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/12370](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12370)

[51] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/65186](https://t.me/mod_russia/65186) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/65187](https://t.me/mod_russia/65187)

[52] <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/>; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/> ; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/>; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/>; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/>; <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/>

[53] <https://t.me/romedronen/590>; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/12369](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12369)

[54] [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/36888](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36888); [https://t.me/soniah\\_hub/16723](https://t.me/soniah_hub/16723)

[55] [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/36888](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36888); [https://t.me/soniah\\_hub/16723](https://t.me/soniah_hub/16723)

[56] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/95486](https://t.me/dva_majors/95486)

[57] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35224>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/118267>;

[58] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/65178](https://t.me/mod_russia/65178)

[59] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/90-tu-tankovu-dyviziyu-dvichi-sterly-pid-nul-yak-pokrovskyj-napryamok-stav-czvyntarem-dlya> <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1387162703275322>

[60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647>

[61] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2072317548608078065?s=20> ; <https://t.me/craftoriz/664> ; <https://x.com/MaximeFago89056/status/2072353089076560156?s=20> ; <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2072359438980088164?s=20> ; <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2072361349716357588?s=20>; <https://t.me/craftoriz/659> ; <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2072327581454495869>

[62] [https://t.me/robert\\_magyar/2545](https://t.me/robert_magyar/2545)

[63] <https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2072348815672111474> ; [https://x.com/666\\_mancer/status/2072406007473426847](https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2072406007473426847); <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/30888>; <https://t.me/andriyshTime/61924>

[64] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40672>; <https://t.me/rybar/81449>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/35224>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/95476](https://t.me/dva_majors/95476)

[65] <https://t.me/rybar/81449>

[66] <https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2107> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/prykordonnyky-urazyly-rszv-tornado-s-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/>

[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40645>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40647>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/44893>

[68] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40662>

[69] <https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2072487677853900869?s=20> ; <https://x.com/RALee85/status/2071537561059692956?s=20> ; <https://www.instagram.com/p/DaJ7sGsBXf1/>

[70] [https://t.me/robert\\_magyar/2545](https://t.me/robert_magyar/2545)

[71] [https://x.com/Exilenova\\_plus/status/2072555647036805173](https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2072555647036805173) ; [https://x.com/Exilenova\\_plus/status/2072556716164882658](https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2072556716164882658)

[72] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/65179](https://t.me/mod_russia/65179)

[73] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/u-chervni-rosiyany-zastosuvaly-blyzko-20-tysyach-droniv-po-hersonshhyni-ta-nikopolshhyni/> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMycyUBq\\_Y0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMycyUBq_Y0)

[74] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/02/u-chervni-rosiyany-zastosuvaly-blyzko-20-tysyach-droniv-po-hersonshhyni-ta-nikopolshhyni/>

[75] [https://t.me/robert\\_magyar/2545](https://t.me/robert_magyar/2545)

[76] <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.609,45.284,14.000z;>

<https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.693,45.235,14.000z;>

<https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.108,45.376,13.099z;>

<https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@35.355,45.059,12.882z;>

<https://t.me/Crimeanwind/103687> ; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/103689>

[77] <https://ru dot>

[krymr.com/a/news-krym-priostanovlena-rabota-kar-yera-vblizi-belogorska/33794713.html](https://krymr.com/a/news-krym-priostanovlena-rabota-kar-yera-vblizi-belogorska/33794713.html)

[78] [https://t.me/E\\_V\\_Kovalchuk/958](https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/958)

[79] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2026/07/02/8042114/>

[80] <https://belta dot>

[by/society/view/volfovich-prizval-belorusov-vozderzhatsja-ot-poezdok-v-prigranichnye-oblasti-rossii-789462-2026/](https://society/view/volfovich-prizval-belorusov-vozderzhatsja-ot-poezdok-v-prigranichnye-oblasti-rossii-789462-2026/)

[81]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/>

;

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/>

[82]

<https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/>

Previous