

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2026

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Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed late on July 3 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka, contrary to all available evidence of the true extent of Russian advances in the city.

Putin met with Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and several other senior Russian commanders and claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka alongside other aggrandizing claims of purported Russian advances across the entire theater, including in areas where Russian forces are actively losing ground, such as western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Russian forces have achieved tactical gains within Kostyantynivka in recent weeks, but the bulk of the Russian presence in the city is comprised of small groups of infiltrators interspersed with Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian military sources have indicated that about 100 to 250 Russian soldiers were in Kostyantynivka as of mid-June and that there were more Ukrainian soldiers in Kostyantynivka than Russian soldiers as of June 23.[2] Putin, Gerasimov, and other senior Russian commanders have aggrandized Russian claims of advance across the frontline in highly publicized briefings at least once a month since January 2026 as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at convincing the West of the falsehood that Russian forces are able to rapidly advance across the entire frontline.[3] Russian advances in June 2026 are just a fraction of those achieved in June 2025, and the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operationally significant advances.[4] Putin likely staged the meeting with his commanders late on July 3 at least in part to influence Western media coverage of the war into the weekend, particularly the July 4 holiday in the United States.

Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are already trying to capitalize on the informational victory of the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka and will likely continue to do so in the coming days and weeks.[5] ISW will cover the July 3 statements of Putin, Gerasimov, and other Russian commanders in-depth in the July 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering kinetic provocations against Poland and other NATO states.

Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30, citing five sources in the Polish special services, the Polish Ministry of Defense (MoD), connected to Polish President Karol Nawrocki, and an ambassador to Poland from an unspecified NATO state, that US officials have been warning Polish officials that Russia could conduct a limited military provocation against NATO's eastern flank that could include Poland.[6] The Polish sources told Onet that Russia would not launch a conventional full-scale invasion of Poland and offered several possible scenarios that Russia could choose to undertake, including drone strikes against critical infrastructure, simulated airstrikes, or a provocation that could involve Russian or Belarusian soldiers crossing the international border, after which the soldiers would only withdraw after negotiations. The sources stated that Russia wants to avoid a war with NATO and wants to deter NATO military support for Ukraine. A security services source from an unspecified Baltic state told the Telegraph on July 2 that Moscow is discussing plans for a possible provocation against the Baltic states and/or Poland and that Russia may claim after-the-fact that Ukraine conducted the provocation.[7] European security sources told the Telegraph that Russia prefers a provocation against Poland over a provocation against the Baltic states.

These reported US and European warnings are consistent with ISW's long-term assessment that Russian operations such as drone and other aerial incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare (EW) interference, and overflights are part of Russia's Phase Zero campaign.[8] These Phase Zero operations aim to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[9] Though Polish sources offered possible scenarios to Onet, the nature, timing, and other details of a potential Russian operation against NATO's eastern flank are unclear at this time. Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline.

The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on July 3 the results of a poll indicating that Putin's approval rating fell by 3.5 percent to 66.9 percent and that trust in Putin fell by 3.4 percent to 73.3 percent between June 22 and 28.[10] Independent media outlet Azenstvo noted that this is the steepest decline in Putin's trust rating since at least February 2022 and that the previous fastest decline was in early April 2026 when Putin's trust rating fell by 1.8 percent within a week.[11] Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published polling

data for the month of June 2026, which demonstrated that Putin-s approval rating dropped from 79 to 74 percent, that the share of Russians who disapprove of Putin-s activities increased from 15 to 21 percent, and that the share of those who believe that Russia is moving on the right course fell from 61 to 52 percent.[12] Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) published statistics on July 3 also showing drops in Putin-s approval and trust levels and that 55 percent of Russians noticed anxiety in those around them.[13] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that this is the highest level of anxiety since the September 2022 involuntary reserve callup (during which public anxiety levels were recorded at 70 percent) and that anxiety levels only dropped to about 50 percent by the end of 2022.[14] These Russian polling centers have been tracking steady reductions in Putin-s approval rating since mid-March 2026, and it remains notable that Russian state-owned and Kremlin-linked polling centers believe it necessary to acknowledge growing societal discontent.[15] Russia-s slow and costly progress on the battlefield in Ukraine, struggling domestic economy, and censorship efforts have all generated discontent in recent weeks, and the domestic fuel shortages from Ukraine-s long-range strike campaign are likely further exacerbating this discontent.[16] Putin-s ability to demand more sacrifices from ordinary Russians for the war effort in Ukraine appears to be under significant strain.[17] Putin may look for alternative pathways to escalate the conflict and try to convince Russians to accept the ever-increasing costs associated with its war.[18]

The Russian government continues efforts to increase domestic fuel supplies amid intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia.

Reuters reported on July 3, citing three sources briefed on the matter, that Russia will begin importing jet fuel from Japan through several intermediary sources in the first half of July 2026.[19] Two unspecified sources told Reuters that intermediaries will load at least 200,000 barrels of jet fuel in Chiba, Japan in July, ship them to Yeosu, South Korea, load them onto another tanker, and pass them through a network of other traders before shipping the fuel to Russia. Reuters stated that the final destination for these jet fuel barrels is unclear. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed decrees on July 2 allowing the Russian government to temporarily reduce the sale requirement for Class 5 gasoline (Russia-s domestic standard for gasoline) on the exchange from 15 percent to 10 percent of production volume from July 1 to September 30 and allowing oil refineries to produce gasoline at the Euro-3 standard (below Russia-s usual standard).[20] These decrees together aim to increase the domestic availability of gasoline by loosening standards.

The Russian government-s attempts to increase the domestic flow of gasoline supplies thus far have failed to curb the increasing gasoline shortages across Russia, however. Local Telegram channels published footage on July 2 and 3 that shows long lines outside a Rosneft gas station near Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai.[21] Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai authorities briefly suspended the sale of gasoline at all gas stations in the city on July 3. Krasnodar Krai authorities acknowledged that eight gas stations were selling diesel, but none were able to sell gasoline.[22] Both Transbaikal and Krasnodar Krai have experienced gasoline shortages in the past few weeks, and these events underscore the severity of the fuel crisis in many areas of Russia.[23] ISW has observed reports suggesting that fuel shortages are affecting all areas of occupied Ukraine and all Russian federal subjects except Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kalmykia, Chukotka, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug as of June 25.[24] Russian State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Markhaev harshly complained on July 3 about the intensifying gasoline shortages in Russian federal subjects and occupied Crimea, blaming Russian authorities for failing to manage and prevent intensifying shortages.[25] Ukraine-s successful long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure since March 2026 has decreased Russia-s ability to produce and refine oil, leading to intensifying gasoline and diesel shortages that the Russian government is struggling to mitigate.[26]

Unknown actors reportedly detonated an explosive against a car carrying members of the Rylsk Raion, Kursk Oblast administration on July 3.

Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that unspecified actors remotely detonated the explosive, injuring Rylsk Raion Head Vladimir Kovalchuk and three other members of the administration.[27]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed late on July 3 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka, contrary to all available evidence of the true extent of Russian advances in the city.

Putin likely staged the meeting with his commanders late on July 3 at least in part to influence

Western media coverage of the war into the weekend, particularly the July 4 holiday in the United States.

The United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering kinetic provocations against Poland and other NATO states.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline.

The Russian government continues efforts to increase domestic fuel supplies amid intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia.

Unknown actors reportedly detonated an explosive against a car carrying members of the Rylsk Raion, Kursk Oblast administration on July 3.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on July 3.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a long-range strike against Russian energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 guided aircraft missiles and 105 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a long-range strike against Russian energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast on July 3.

Geolocated footage published on July 3 shows a fire at an electrical substation at the Michurinskaya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Belgorod City, Belgorod Oblast after a reported Ukrainian strike.[28] Additional footage published on July 3 shows a fire at the Yuzhnaya Electrical Substation in Belgorod City after a reported Ukrainian strike.[29] The Belgorod Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on July 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against Belgorod Oblast, causing a fire at an unspecified infrastructure facility and damaging energy infrastructure.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 2 and 3 but did not advance.

[32]

The Ukrainian State Border Service reported on July 3 that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City and roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[33]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 2 and 3 but did not advance.

[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 · Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.

[35]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 2 that Russian forces seized Kucherivka and

advanced to southern Podoly (both east of Kupyansk).[36] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone activity continues to prevent Russian forces from conducting large-scale operations on the west (left) bank of the Oskil River. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and Kupyansk Vuzlovyyi (south of Kupyansk).[37]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 3, but ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces advanced.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 · Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 2 and 3 but did not advance.

[39]

A commander of a subunit of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 2 that Ukrainian drone activity is preventing Russian forces from driving vehicles close to the frontline.[40]

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in mid-June.

Footage posted on June 18 but geolocated on July 3 shows Russian servicemembers operating in western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 2 and 3 that Russian forces advanced north of Malynivka, west of Novomarkove, north and west of Markove (all northeast of Kostyantynivka), and on the northern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 2 and 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

[43]

A

Russian milblogger claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced east of Hannivka (east of Dobropillya).[44]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 2 and July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

[45]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 3 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), north of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk), and into Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[46]

Russian forces continue to operate newly modified drones in the Pokrovsk direction.

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk reported on July 3 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are using BM-35 strike drones and are occasionally finding ways to use Starlink technology.[47] Lasiychuk noted that Russian forces conduct 70 to 80 percent of strikes with drones and 20 to 30 percent with artillery and use artillery more during worse weather.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 3 but did not advance.

[48]

Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled Howitzer near occupied Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk Oblast (southwest of Novopavlivka roughly 7 kilometers from the frontline).[49]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on July 2 and July 3 but did not advance.

[50]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 3 that Russian forces seized Oleksandrivka and published footage purportedly showing Russian servicemembers raising flags in Oleksandrivka.[51] ISW is not prepared to assess if the footage was altered with artificial intelligence (AI) at this time. Oleksandrivka is 15 kilometers from the nearest assessed Russian infiltration area, and the appearance of the footage and the relative timeline on which it was posted are consistent

with a wider pattern of Russian sources publishing footage, including likely AI-altered footage, to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, energy infrastructure, and transportation equipment in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Ukrainsk (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[53] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian train near occupied Novoamvrosiivske (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[54] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows fires and destroyed cargo trucks in occupied Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) following reported Ukrainian drone strikes.[55]

Ukrainian military officials provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that a July 1 Ukrainian strike destroyed three spans of a road bridge over the Kalka River near occupied Hranitne (either roughly 98 or 106 kilometers from the frontline).[56]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian military units refuted recent Russian claims over Lisne and Kopani (both northwest of Hulyaipole).

[57]

Two Ukrainian military units operating in the Hulyaipole direction refuted on July 2 the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-s June 30 and July 1 claims that Russian forces seized Lisne and Kopani, and geolocated footage posted on July 2 and 3 shows Ukrainian forces operating in Lisne and Kopani.[58] The units stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian forces attacking toward Lisne and captured a Russian servicemember who had infiltrated into Kopani.[59] Lisne was nine kilometers from the furthest assessed extent of Russian infiltrations as of the Russian MoD-s June 30 claim over the settlement.[60] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is conducting a cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian advances northwest of Hulyaipole as it has done in other areas of the frontline, including in the neighboring Oleksandrivka direction in late June 2026.[61] Recently geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces previously advanced northwest of Orikhiv.

Geolocated footage published on June 29 and likely filmed in Winter 2026 shows Ukrainian forces clearing northern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv), further supporting reports and footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced within and past Prymorske since mid-February 2026.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on July 3, but ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces advanced.[63] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy ·Flash· Beskrestnov reported on July 3 that Russian forces have begun using Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) en masse in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and that existing Ukrainian drone detectors are ineffective against these Molnias.[64]

Ukrainian forces continue striking Russian air defense assets and interdicting Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast as part of their intermediate-range strike campaign.

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert ·Magyar· Brovdi reported on July 3 that Russian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system near occupied Smyrnove (about 51 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage confirms the strike.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near occupied Novhorod (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[66] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck west of occupied Tokmak (about 27 kilometers from the frontline).[67]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that the Ukrainian June 29 strike on a road bridge near occupied Azovske (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed two spans of the bridge.[68]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 3. Russian forces continue to strike civilian targets in Kherson City.

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on July 2 and geolocated

footage confirms that Russian forces struck a hospital in Kherson City, damaging the building, injuring a nurse, and killing a doctor.[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Ukrainian forces conducting Hornet drone strikes against a Russian Tigr GAZ-2330 infantry mobility vehicle on the M-17 Kalanchak-Armyansk highway east of Kalanchak (at a point roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) and a UAZ van southeast of Myrne (at a point roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[70] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Kamaz armored vehicle in northern Skadovsk (at a point roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[71]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Crimea.

Brovdi reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the 35 kV electrical substation ·Tarkhankut· near occupied Chornomorske (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) and another 35 kV electrical substation at the Tarakhankut Wind Farm near occupied Okunivka; the 110/35 kV electrical substation ·Vypasne· in occupied Vypasne (either roughly 119 or 141 kilometers from the frontline); the 110 kV electrical substations ·Bilohirsk·, ·Saky·, ·Tavriia·, ·Mykolaivka·, and ·Staryi Krym· in occupied Bilohirsk, Saky, Kliuchi, Vinnytske, and Staryi Krym respectively (roughly 217, 185, 208, 200, and 230 kilometers from the frontline); the 330/110 kV electrical substation ·Zakhidno-Krymska· in occupied Karyerne (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline); and the ·Kliuchi· gas compressor station in occupied Kliuchi.[72] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 3 shows heat anomalies near Chornomorske, Bilohirsk, Saky, Vinnytske, Staryi Krym, Karyerne.[73]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge over the Krasnohvardiiskyi Canal near occupied Kurman (roughly 160 kilometers from the frontline), an electronic warfare station near occupied Artemivka (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline), and an electronic intelligence unit in Sevastopol.[74] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saky military airfield for the second time since July 1, damaging seven aircraft and seven hangars for storing Su-30SM, Su-30, and Su-24 planes.[75] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces also struck two Shahed drone hangars at the Hvardiiske airfield (either roughly 140 or 190 kilometers from the frontline). Satellite imagery published July 3 shows damage to two Shahed hangars at the Hvardiiske airbase.[76]

Russian opposition outlet The Insider reported on July 2 that retired and reserve Russian officers and Russian military commentator Viktor Murakhovsky took part in a Russian wargame simulating a Ukrainian landing in Crimea.[77]

Crimea occupation authorities reportedly ordered municipal offices in Kerch and Feodosia to evacuate valuable documents and equipment.

Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on July 2 that Crimean occupation authorities ordered the Kerch and Feodosia municipal occupation administrations to evacuate valuable documents and equipment by July 4.

[78]

Atesh reported that some officials left for Krasnodar Krai.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 2 to 3.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 3 that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the direction of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and 105 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Donetsk City.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59/69 cruise missile and 82 drones, that one Kh-59/69 missile and 21 drones struck 16 locations, and that drone debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, agricultural, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[80] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[81]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on July 3 that the death toll from the July 2 Russian strikes on Kyiv City has risen to at least 30 people.

[82]

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian gas stations.

Ukrainian officials reported on July 2 and 3 that Russian forces struck gas stations in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts.[83] Russian forces are increasingly striking gas stations in Ukraine as part of a concerted strike campaign aiming to replicate the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russia's fuel infrastructure.[84]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing significant to report.

Note:

ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

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